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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
  
 
Every Monday, I start my day with a light breakfast (fat-free quark), grab a quick coffee, and 
take the bike to the train station in my hometown. After a short trip by train, and another trip 
on my bike, I’m ready to start a day at the office. Most time I spend sitting behind my desk, 
working on revisions or preparing for teaching. Even though I have a desk that can be 
adjusted to standing-mode, I prefer to work seated. A steady stream of coffee, water and 
(mostly healthy) snacks keep me energized, hydrated and satiated. After work, usually I can 
be found in the gym, to let off some steam resulting from the latest journal rejection, just 
before I head back home and prepare for volleyball practice.  
You may ask, is there a point to this insight into the rather monotone life of an early career 
researcher? It stands to show that even a dusty academic’s day is filled with decisions that are 
either about health or will have a direct effect on health. For example, I choose to work 
seated, while I know that being sedentary for a prolonged time may have detrimental health 
effects (Van Uffelen et al., 2010), and multiple times each week I’m faced with the dilemma 
to go to the gym in Rotterdam and improve my health, or head back home as quickly as 
possible.  
My dissertation deals with such decisions about health and provides some insights from a 
behavioral and health economic perspective. My focus is both on individual decisions about 
health (e.g. ‘Should I have surgery or ask for radiation therapy?’ or ‘Should I invest in my 
health today to reap the rewards later?‘) and on decisions about health at the societal level 
(e.g. ‘Is this life-improving drug too expensive to fund from public health care resources?’ or 
‘Which provides more health for society, surgery or radiation therapy?’).  
The main goal of this dissertation is extending and applying the methods and theories from 
behavioral economics to improve understanding of individual and societal decisions about 
health. In this introduction of my dissertation I will first attempt to convince the reader of 
why studying decisions about health is important and relevant, followed by a short 
characterization of how economists typically studied decision-making (about health). As an 
illustration, I will try to apply this approach to my decision to work seated rather than 
standing. Having established the main assumptions present in the traditional approach to 
studying decisions about health, I will discuss how these assumptions are also relevant for 
decision-making about health at a societal level (in the context of economic evaluations). The 
short summary of existing work in behavioral economics that follows, however, shows that 
these assumptions are often a poor description of how individuals actually decide about 
health. Instead, behavioral economics attempts to incorporate insights from psychology and 
other behavioral sciences (i.e. behavioral insights) into economic theory and methods to 
improve their applicability to actual decisions and behavior. The use of such behavioral 
insights in health economics is relatively novel, but appears to be a promising way forward. 
This dissertation (consisting of two distinct parts) aims to contribute to this growing field, 
and in particular to behavioral health economics.  
Decisions about health – why should we study them?  
The importance of studying decisions about health is best illustrated by two global trends: a) 
the increase in relative mortality (Bennett et al., 2018) as a result of preventable non-
communicable diseases (such as cardiovascular disease, diabetes and cancer), and b) the rise 
in proportions of gross domestic products spent on health and health care (WHO, 2018). 
Whereas the former indicates that more and more individuals are becoming ill and/or dying 
 
 
from causes that could have been prevented by changing health behavior, the latter requires 
societies to decide how to spend healthcare resources sensibly. To curb these trends, 
understanding how individuals decide about their health and how to promote effective 
societal decision-making about health could be crucial. 
Furthermore, studies of health and decisions about health are of obvious importance, as being 
healthy is rated by many individuals as one of the most important goals in life (Bowling, 
1995), is one of the most important contributors to wellbeing (Dolan et al., 2008), and is often 
a prerequisite to strive towards realizing other goals and psychological needs, such as being 
appreciated or self-actualization (Maslow, 1943). Indeed, the World Health Organization 
(1948) considers the highest attainable standard of health a fundamental right of every human 
being. Nonetheless, many individuals (myself included) often show preferences and behavior 
that is in stark contrast with the importance health has in individuals’ lives and society. For 
example, only half of the Dutch population meets national exercise guidelines (RIVM, 2015). 
Furthermore, still 23% of Dutch people smoke (RIVM, 2015), and only 15% consume the 
recommended amount of vegetables or fruit on a daily basis (Van Rossum et al., 2017). 
Rational decision making (about health) 
Decisions about health (or with consequences for health), such as whether to smoke or not, to 
have a burger instead of fat-free quark, or to work sedentary or standing, usually involve 
costs and benefits both on the short and long term for the individual involved. For example, I 
am one of the lucky few to work at a desk that could be used while standing. Standing up 
from my office chair has the benefit of improving my health, but on the other hand standing 
requires more effort from me than sitting does (and the desk makes a terrible noise when 
adjusted to standing mode). In economic theory and applications thereof, any decision, 
including my decision whether or not to work standing, is seen as a reflection of the trade-off 
of these costs and benefits (Mankiw, 2020, Rubinstein, 2012). Traditionally, it was assumed 
that individuals engage in such trade-offs in a perfectly rational manner (Savage, 1954, von 
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944), although economists have disagreed on what exactly such 
rational decision making entails (Wakker, 2010). Below I provide a characterization of such 
an individual, similar to those that were traditionally assumed to inhabit the theories and 
experiments developed by (health) economists. We will refer to this individual, as is often 
done (e.g. Thaler, 2000, Thaler and Sunstein, 2009) as homo economicus. 
In order to formally model and predict decisions (about health) the following is often 
assumed about homo economicus (as summarized by Galizzi, 2014, Lazear, 2000): 
• when faced with a set of options to choose from, homo economicus has complete, 
coherent, stable and consistent preferences; 
• taking into account all information, homo economicus’s preferences maximize utility 
(or alternatively wellbeing), such that the final choices can be seen as the best 
possible option in terms of costs and benefits; 
• when (as is usually the case with decisions for health) the available options are 
uncertain or risky (i.e. have multiple possible outcomes), homo economicus considers 
all outcomes and weights them by their likelihood of occurring. The option that yields 
the highest likelihood-weighted utility or wellbeing is preferred.  
 
This characterization of homo economicus has a few implications for what is seen as a 
rational decision about health, relevant to this dissertation. First, rational decision-making 
implies consistency, such that if one prefers A over B, one will do so consistently, repeatedly 
and independent of context (e.g. time and place). For example, if I prefer a seated desk over a 
standing desk, I should have this preference today, tomorrow and every other day (all other 
things equal). Second, preferences are procedurally invariant, i.e. they are independent of 
how they are elicited. Simplified, this means, for example, that my answer on all of the 
following should be ‘seated desk’:  
i) which do you want to have in your office, a seated desk or a standing desk?,  
ii) for which would you be willing to pay more, a seated desk or a standing desk?,  
iii) which do you find is worth more fat-free quark, a seated desk or a standing desk?  
Given that I prefer a seated desk over a standing desk, I should pick the former over the latter. 
Similarly, as both money and fat-free quark have positive value for me, I assign more value 
to the seated desk in both monetary and dairy terms. Third, for health decisions that involve 
uncertainty or risk, often a specific theoretical approach is used to predict and prescribe 
individuals’ choices: Expected Utility (EU) theory. As is the case with most economic 
theories, EU is usually defined and illustrated algebraically. Such formal descriptions of 
economic theories or methods are printed in Boxes throughout this Introduction for interested 
readers (e.g. see Box 1.1 for a definition of EU theory), but they can be skipped without loss 
of continuity.  
 
Expected utility and QALYs  
The implications of EU for rational decision-making about health are easily illustrated with a 
stylized example. Let’s assume for the sake of this example that my decision to work while 
seated or standing is going to have some influence on my health from 70 onwards (when I’m 
finally allowed to retire), and no influence on my health before age 70. If I choose to work 
while sitting for the rest of my career, I’m increasing my risk of cardiovascular disease. For 
now, assume that being sedentary will mean that on my 70th birthday, I have a 20% chance to 
have a fatal heart attack, and otherwise I will live out the remaining 20 years of my life in 
perfect health. If I choose to work while standing, I completely remove this risk of a fatal 
heart attack. However, the effort involved with working while standing is going to take a toll 
Box 1.1. Expected Utility (EU) theory 
Throughout all boxes, we will denote preferences as usual, i.e. ≻, ≽, and ∼ denote strict 
preference, weak preference and indifference, respectively. If we assume that preferences 
satisfy EU theory, gambles of the form 𝑥𝑝𝑦, i.e. gambles yielding outcome 𝑥 with 
probability 𝑝 and outcome 𝑦 otherwise, are evaluated as:  
𝐸𝑈(𝑥𝑝𝑦) = 𝑝 ∗ 𝑈(𝑥) + (1 − 𝑝) ∗ 𝑈(𝑦). 
Here, 𝑈(∙) is a real-valued, monotonically increasing utility function that assigns to each 
outcome a real number that represents how valuable that outcome is. As such, if we find 
an indifference between a gamble 𝑥𝑝𝑦 and a sure outcome 𝑧, this implies: 
𝐸𝑈(𝑥𝑝𝑦) = 𝐸𝑈(𝑧) ⟶  𝑝 ∗ 𝑈(𝑥) + (1 − 𝑝) ∗ 𝑈(𝑦) = 𝑈(𝑧). 
 
 
 
on my knees, ankles and lower back, such that from my 70th birthday onwards I will need a 
cane to move about. For simplicity, we will abstract from all non-health outcomes1, e.g. from 
the effort costs of working while standing, the annoying noise my standing desk makes, and 
assume that my preference for working while sitting is only related the health outcomes of 
seated and standing work.  
Which of the two modes of working I will prefer, will depend on: i) how much I care about 
my health after 70, ii) how bad I feel it is to need a cane to walk (compared to perfect health), 
and iii) how much risk of dying I am willing to take. If, as my daily routine showed, I prefer 
working seated, this means that I assign more utility to living 20 years in perfect health with a 
20% chance of a fatal heart attack (Option A) than living 20 more years whilst needing a cane 
(Option B). Or in other words, I find that option A is giving me more health utility than 
option B. But how much more, and how can we model such decisions in economic theory?  
In health economics, such questions are answered by using quality-adjusted life years 
(QALYs) to express the amount of health received in some health profile. QALYs comprise 
both length and quality of life into a single measure. One finds the amount of QALYs 
associated with a health profile by multiplying the duration of the profile by a QALY weight, 
which represents the health-related quality of life experienced during that period. These 
QALY weights are normalized such that being dead has weight 0 and perfect health has 
weight 1 (with states worse than dead receiving negative weights). Under that normalization, 
10 years in perfect health equals 10 QALYs. However, when health is less-than-perfect, this 
receives a weight smaller than 1, such that each year in that health state is worth less than 1 
QALY. For example, if we assume that a disease reduces quality of life with 50% (compared 
to perfect health), each year someone lives in that health state is worth ½ QALY (as the 
QALY weight for that health state is 0.5).  
This simple and intuitive way of expressing health benefits is derived from the linear QALY 
model (see Box 1.2 for definition and example), which is a model of individual preferences 
that assumes that EU holds (Pliskin et al., 1980) and implies the following for decisions about 
health. First, the use of EU assumes that individuals have consistent preferences and are 
perfectly capable of probability calculus (i.e. are homo economicus). Second, the use of the 
linear QALY model typically implies that each year has the same value as the next, i.e. utility 
of life duration is linear. Third, a linear utility function implies risk neutrality for life duration 
(i.e. no risk seeking or risk aversion for years of life).  
At this point, one may question why a model of individual preferences with such strict 
assumptions about how we decide about health is relevant for this dissertation. The 
straightforward answer to this question is that these assumptions allow simple measurement 
and use of QALYs in practice, as I will elaborate on below. 
 
1 Note that this simplification is in no way necessary to apply EU to study decisions about health and thus only 
reflects a narrative choice. 
 
 
Societal decisions about health: cost-utility analyses  
The growing pressure on public spending on health care necessitates considering if new and 
existing treatments provide sufficient value for money. Such considerations are complex, as 
they require both an accurate assessment of the costs and benefits associated with a treatment, 
and a means of determining when value for money is ‘sufficient’. For example, consider a 
recent innovation in the treatment of spinal muscular atrophy in infants, which was priced at 
almost 2 million euro per patient (Cohen, 2019). This one-time treatment can result in drastic 
improvements in otherwise soon paralyzed and terminally ill infants, and hence appears to 
provide substantial value. However, funding this treatment from public health care resources 
would considerably affect the available budget (which could also be used for treating other 
patients or hire more staff in elderly homes). Hence, the question whether the value provided 
is sufficient to warrant reimbursement becomes crucial in these societal decisions about 
health. 
Economic evaluations, in which a comparison is made between the costs associated with a 
treatment and treatment-related benefits, are increasingly often used in this context 
(Drummond et al., 2015). Treatment-related benefits can be expressed in different ways, but 
for the sake of comparability across treatments and patient groups the QALY is often chosen 
as outcome measure. Economic evaluations that inform policymakers about the incremental 
costs per QALY gained by some treatment (compared to a relevant comparator), are often 
referred to as cost-utility analyses (CUAs). These incremental costs per QALY are often 
compared against a threshold for reimbursement, which may differ between countries 
Box 1.2. linear QALY model 
QALY models are usually applied to chronic health outcomes, i.e. outcomes that involve 
the experience of a single health state for some prolonged duration (as opposed to health 
outcomes characterized by short episodes of ill health, such as epilepsy). In the linear 
QALY model, we denote health outcomes as (𝑇, 𝑄), i.e. 𝑇 years in health state 𝑄, and 
preferences for health outcomes can be represented by:  
𝑈(𝑇, 𝑄) = 𝑇 ∗ 𝑉(𝑄). 
Here, 𝑈(∙) and 𝑉(∙) are the utility functions over health outcomes and health status 
respectively. Lotteries of the form (𝑇1, 𝑄1)𝑝(𝑇2, 𝑄2), i.e. (𝑇1, 𝑄1) with probability 𝑝 and 
(𝑇2, 𝑄2) otherwise (i.e. with probability 1 − 𝑝) are evaluated by EU, i.e.:  
𝑝 ∗ 𝑈(𝑇1, 𝑄1) + (1 − 𝑝) ∗ 𝑈(𝑇2, 𝑄2) = 𝑝 ∗ 𝑇1 ∗ 𝑉(𝑄1) + (1 − 𝑝) ∗ 𝑇2 ∗ 𝑉(𝑄2). 
The following normalization is often used with the linear QALY model: 𝑈(𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ) = 0 
and 𝑉(𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ) = 1. Applied to the example reported in text, we find: 
(20, 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ)0.8(𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ) ≻ (20, 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑒),  
which is evaluated by: 
0.8 ∗ 20 ∗ 𝑉(𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ) + (1 − 0.8) ∗ 𝑉(𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ) > 20 ∗ 𝑉(𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑒). 
We can simplify this to: 
16 > 20 ∗ 𝑉(𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑒), i.e. 𝑉(𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑒) < 0.8. 
 
 
(Drummond et al., 2015). Reimbursement decisions, furthermore, may also depend on other 
factors the public may believe to be relevant: e.g. the age of the recipient of the treatment, 
how severe the consequences are of not reimbursing treatment, and how rare the condition 
being treated is (van de Wetering et al., 2016). 
To illustrate how CUAs inform societal decisions about health and discuss several 
methodological issues related to this dissertation, let us consider again the standing desk. For 
example, imagine that the Dutch Ministry of Health is considering the health benefits of 
providing all public offices with standing desks to reduce prolonged sedentariness 
(disregarding that like mine they may remain unused). In order to determine the cost-
effectiveness of this policy using CUA, the health benefits of having a standing desk need to 
be expressed in QALYs. Again, let us assume that this benefit is captured in a reduced risk of 
cardiovascular disease at age 70, but at a loss of mobility (i.e. needing a cane to walk about). 
Calculating the QALYs associated with having (and using) a standing desk then requires 
determining the utility associated with needing a cane.  
A difficult question, however, is whose utility should matter (Versteegh and Brouwer, 2016). 
First, one could consider to take into account the utility of the patients who would benefit 
from treatment (Aronsson et al., 2015, Leidl and Reitmeir, 2011). For example, if we want to 
perform a cost-utility analysis of the health benefits of standing desks under the assumptions 
discussed above, this requires assessing the utility associated with needing a cane to walk 
about (from age 70 and onwards). Hence, in CUAs one could take into consideration the 
utility that individuals who need a cane to walk about assign to their health status. However, 
an often-voiced concern is that patients adapt to their health status (Damschroder et al., 2005, 
Damschroder et al., 2008, Menzel et al., 2002). For example, a bed-ridden patient may be, 
altogether, quite happy (see the classic work comparing paralyzed accident victims and 
lottery winners: Brickman et al., 1978), which is a remarkable testament of humans’ ability to 
strive in tough situations. As such, by only including patients in attempts to measure health 
utilities (i.e. health state valuation) we may assess the possible benefits accrued by improving 
their condition as being relatively low. For example, if I need a cane for the last 20 years of 
my life, this might have a strong negative effect on my utility at first, but over time I may get 
used to needing the cane and find ways of dealing with this such that it impacts my health 
utility less. If asked to value my health, at this later point in time, I might provide valuations 
as high as feeling perfectly healthy. If a treatment becomes available that allows me to walk 
again, it may appear that relatively little is gained in terms of utility compared to the initially 
already high valuation of needing a cane.  
Since no consensus exists on if and how to correct for adaptation (Versteegh and Brouwer, 
2016), instead QALYs are often derived from preferences of the general public. Given that 
health-care costs are provided for by all members of the general public collectively, it could 
be argued that that their utilities should be used to reflect the preferred societal perspective in 
CUAs. For example, if the Dutch Ministry of Health should provide standing desks in all 
public buildings, the utility the general public (that would collectively finance the desks) 
assigns to the standing desks’ health benefits could be taken into account. Typically, such 
QALY weights for the general public are obtained using a representative sample that values 
hypothetical health states by imagining themselves living in these states for some duration 
(Oppe et al., 2014, Stolk et al., 2019).  
 
Health state valuation: time trade-off and standard gamble 
Two of the most popular methods used for health state valuation are time trade-off (TTO) and 
standard gamble (SG)2. In the TTO method, respondents are asked to imagine living in 
impaired health for some fixed duration. Alternatively, respondents can choose to live for a 
shorter period in perfect health. This shorter time in full health is varied until respondents 
indicate that they consider both health profiles equivalent. For example, imagine you would 
live for 10 more years, and you would need a cane to walk about. However, you are offered a 
treatment that will allow you to walk without a cane, but if you take this treatment you will 
live for a shorter amount of time. How many years in perfect health do you consider to be 
equivalent to living 10 more years with a cane? Perhaps you found 7 years in perfect health 
equivalent to 10 years whilst needing a cane. This implies that your QALY weight for 
requiring a cane to walk is 7/10 = 0.7 (see Box 1.3 for the justification for this derivation). 
In the SG method, again, respondents asked to imagine living in some impaired health state 
for a fixed duration. Unlike in the TTO method, for SG they are now offered an alternative 
treatment, which is risky. This treatment takes the form of a gamble, which either yields 
perfect health for the same fixed duration with some probability or immediate death 
otherwise. The risk involved with this gamble is varied until respondents indicate they find 
both options to be equivalent. For example, again imagine living 10 years whilst needing a 
cane. Would you undergo a treatment to cure your mobility problems (for your remaining 10 
years of life), if the chance exists you might die immediately instead (e.g. as a result of 
undergoing risky surgery)? And if so, what is the largest chance of immediate death you 
would be willing to risk? Perhaps you were only willing to take the gamble (to cure your 
mobility problems) if the treatment has a probability of success larger than 85% (i.e. a risk of 
death of less than 15%). This would imply your QALY weight for life with a cane is 0.85 
(see Box 1.3 for justification).  
Although TTO and SG share their purpose, i.e. eliciting QALY weights, the methods 
typically yield different results when applied to the same health state. As you might have 
experienced when considering the examples above, often SG yields higher QALY weights 
compared to TTO (e.g. Bleichrodt and Johannesson, 1997, Torrance, 1976). This poses a 
problem to those relying on CUAs to inform policy, as health benefits expressed in QALYs 
become dependent on the method chosen to value them. As such, most institutions that 
perform and evaluate CUAs (such as NICE in the UK and the Healthcare Institute in the 
Netherlands) pick a single instrument to measure and express health benefits with. Examples 
of such instruments are the EQ-5D and the Short Form Six Dimensions (SF-6D), which 
capture relevant facets of health-related quality of life along a few clearly defined 
dimensions. Such instruments are generic, meaning that they can be applied to describe 
health-related quality of life for a multitude of diseases. The QALY weights for such generic 
measures are often obtained “indirectly” from nationally representative tariff lists, which are 
obtained in studies conducted in samples of the general adult population (Stolk et al., 2019). 
However, given that different methods are used for generating these tariff lists (e.g. EQ-5D 
involves TTO, and SF-6D uses SG), and no general consensus exists to prefer one over the 
other, this is only a partial solution. In my dissertation I explore alternative solutions to these 
 
2 Pictorial representations of these methods can also be found in the Online Supplements of this dissertation. 
 
 
methodological problems, by exploring the role of the perhaps unrealistic assumptions used 
in the linear QALY model (described in Box 1.2). 
 
Beyond homo economicus for decisions about health?  
Having briefly introduced the traditional economic approach to studying decisions about 
health, the overall goal of this dissertation can be formulated, i.e. extending and applying the 
methods and theories from behavioral economics to improve (understanding of) individual 
and societal decisions about health. Achieving this goal requires moving beyond the 
assumptions often used to study decisions about health, or in other words beyond homo 
economicus. This may be considered important and timely, as a plethora of evidence exists 
documenting violations of the assumptions that characterize homo economicus, which 
suggests that assuming individuals decide rationally about their health misrepresents real 
decisions. Below I provide a short review of a few of those findings relevant for this 
dissertation (more details can be found in the related chapters of my dissertation). 
The following has been found for decision-making (about health):  
• We are risk averse for life duration, i.e. we tend to avoid risks for life duration if we 
have the possibility. As is the case for monetary outcomes (Andersen et al., 2006, 
Andersen et al., 2008, Harrison et al., 2005), we often observe such risk aversion for 
life duration (Breyer and Fuchs, 1982, Kemel and Paraschiv, 2018, Oliver, 2018, van 
der Pol and Ruggeri, 2008, Verhoef et al., 1994). This means, for example, that when 
offered a treatment that will increase our life by 9 months, or a treatment that will 
yield 20 months with 50% chance and 0 months otherwise, most of us opt for the 
Box 1.3. Deriving QALY weights using time trade-off and standard gamble  
The TTO method, asks for a time equivalent in perfect health which yields indifference 
between (𝑇1, 𝑄) and (𝑇2, 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ), with 𝑇1 > 𝑇2. The number of years 𝑇2 is 
varied until the respondent is indifferent (denoted by ~). Under the linear QALY model, 
we evaluate TTO indifferences of the form (𝑇1, 𝑄)~(𝑇2, 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ) as follows: 
𝑇1 ∗ 𝑉(Q) = 𝑇2 ∗ 𝑉(𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ). 
This allows deriving the utility of health state Q as:  𝑉(𝑄) = 𝑇2/𝑇1. Applied to the 
example reported in text, we find (10, 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑒)~(7, 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ), which yields: 10 ∗
𝑉(Q) = 7 ∗ 𝑉(𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ). Assuming 𝑉(𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ) = 1, this simplifies to 
𝑉(𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑒) = 7/10. 
The SG method involves determining probability p at which decision makers are 
indifferent between a sure outcome (𝑇1, 𝑄), and a risky prospect 
(𝑇1, 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ)𝑝(𝐷). Under the linear QALY model, we evaluate SG indifferences 
of the form (𝑇1, 𝑄)~(𝑇1, 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ)𝑝(𝐷) by: 
𝑇1 ∗ 𝑉(Q) = 𝑝 ∗ 𝑇1 ∗ 𝑉(𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ) + (1 − 𝑝) ∗ 𝑉(𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ). 
This allows deriving the utility of health state Q as:  𝑉(𝑄) = 𝑝. Applied to the example 
reported in text, we find (10, 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑒)~(10, 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ)0.85(𝐷), which yields:   
10 ∗ 𝑉(Q) = 0.85 ∗ 10 ∗ 𝑉(𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ). Assuming 𝑉(𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ) = 1 and 
𝑉(𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ) = 0, this simplifies to 𝑉(𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑒) = 0.8. 
 
certain treatment (even though the gamble is expected to yield more health). Such risk 
aversion violates the assumption of linear utility of life duration in the linear QALY 
model. Chapter 2 of this dissertation elaborates and provides additional evidence. 
• Procedural invariance is often violated, i.e. we find preference reversals when 
comparing preferences between different methods. For example, Lichtenstein and 
Slovic (1971) found that respondents prefer a gamble with high certainty, but, when 
asked, provide higher monetary values to risky lotteries. This leads to a preference 
reversal, as preferred lotteries should also be valued higher (i.e. if you prefer A over 
B, you should also value A higher than B and vice versa). Their work inspired many 
replications and extensions for monetary outcomes (for a review, see: Seidl, 2002), 
and some studies have shown that such preference reversals also occur for decisions 
about health (Attema and Brouwer, 2013, Oliver, 2006, Oliver, 2013b). Chapter 5 of 
this dissertation discusses this further and provides additional evidence. 
• Reference-points matter, i.e. health profiles are not necessarily evaluated in absolute 
terms (as in the linear QALY model) but rather in relative terms. Several studies have 
shown that health is often considered relative to a reference-point, i.e. a specific 
health outcome to which all other outcomes are compared. A few reference-points 
that have been suggested to affect decisions about health are: expectations about 
length (van Nooten and Brouwer, 2004, van Nooten et al., 2009) and quality of life 
(Wouters et al., 2015), the best (e.g. perfect health in TTO) or worst (e.g. immediate 
death in SG) possible outcome (van Osch et al., 2006), and the health individuals feel 
they deserve (Wouters, 2016). Chapters 3, 7, and 9 of this dissertation discuss this 
further and provide additional evidence. 
• Losses loom larger than gains, i.e. it matters whether health profiles occur above or 
below the reference-point. Outcomes that exceed the reference-point are perceived as 
gains, while those that fall short of the reference-point are seen as losses. Many 
studies using monetary outcomes have shown loss aversion, i.e. many individuals are 
more sensitive to losses compared to similarly sized gains (Abdellaoui et al., 2008, 
Abdellaoui et al., 2016, Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Tversky and Kahneman, 
1992). Recently, this study of loss aversion has also been extended to health outcomes 
(Attema et al., 2013, Attema et al., 2016). Chapters 3 and 7 of this dissertation discuss 
this further and provide additional evidence. 
• Small changes in probabilities carry disproportionate weight, i.e. small chances of 
good or bad health outcomes might be weighted heavily in decisions about health. 
Utility models based on EU (e.g. linear or generalized QALY models) do not allow 
for such probability weighting. This is likely to misrepresent decision-making as 
many studies have shown that individuals are especially sensitive to changes from 
impossible to possible (e.g. 0% to 1%) and uncertain to certain (e.g. 99% to 100%). 
This is referred to as inverse S-shaped probability weighting, which is the modal 
finding for decisions about money (Abdellaoui, 2000, Bleichrodt, 2001, Gonzalez and 
Wu, 1999, Suter et al., 2016) and decisions about health (Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2000, 
Bleichrodt et al., 1999, Suter et al., 2016). Chapters 5 and 7 of this dissertation discuss 
this further and provide additional evidence. 
Many of these insights derived from experimental work in behavioral economics (i.e. 
behavioral insights) can be combined into a single alternative utility model that is central to 
 
 
many of the chapters reported in this dissertation: prospect theory3. Several authors have 
suggested that prospect theory (or more accurately the behavioral insights captured in this 
model) could provide an explanation for several health-related decisions for which traditional 
economic theory has no explanation: e.g. low uptake of voluntary deductibles in health 
insurance (van Winssen et al., 2016), the too low or too high uptake of some forms of 
insurances (Gottlieb, 2012), the low uptake of screening (Baillon et al., 2018), and the 
difference between health state valuations derived with TTO and SG (Bleichrodt, 2002). At 
the time of writing of this dissertation, however, only a few studies have investigated the 
relevance of prospect theory to understand decisions about health empirically (Attema et al., 
2013, Attema et al., 2016, Kemel and Paraschiv, 2018), as opposed to the larger evidence-
base for monetary outcomes. As such, it is not entirely clear if the behavioral insights 
captured in prospect theory extend fully to health outcomes, and more behavioral 
experiments in health are thus needed (Galizzi and Wiesen, 2018). 
Research objectives 
With this thesis I therefore aim to provide i) additional understanding of how individuals 
actually decide about health (using theories and methods from behavioral economics), and ii) 
use this understanding to improve the methods used for health state valuations. These two 
research objectives are reflected in the structure of this dissertation, which consists of two 
parts.  
In Part I, a series of ‘Behavioral experiments in health’ on varying topics is reported, while 
Part II has a specific focus on ‘Applications of behavioral insights to health state valuation’. 
Hence, whereas the first part of this dissertation presents research findings that may be 
relevant to understanding or improving decisions about health in many different contexts (e.g. 
decisions about length and quality of life, physician decision-making, and exercise behavior), 
the second part of this dissertation applies insights (derived in part from the studies reported 
in Part I) to the highly specialized context of health state valuation.  
Part I of this dissertation reports on a series of behavioral experiments in health that provide 
some answers to the following research questions: 
• To what extent are individuals risk averse for uncertain health outcomes with small or 
moderate stakes, and can EU explain such risk aversion? (Chapter 2) 
• Does the degree to which individuals are loss averse for life duration depend on the 
quality of life experienced during this time? (Chapter 3) 
• How heterogeneous are risk and time preferences, and can this heterogeneity be used 
to tailor financial incentives to improve decisions about health? (Chapter 4) 
• Are decisions about health as (in)consistent as those for money, and does the degree of 
preference reversals depend on who makes these decisions? (Chapter 5) 
Part II of this dissertation reports on a series of studies aimed at studying how behavioral 
insights could be utilized to obtain QALY weights that better reflect individuals’ trade-offs 
between length and quality of life, with the following research questions:  
 
3 A full formal definition of prospect theory would go beyond the scope of this introduction. Chapters 3, 7 and 9 
of this dissertation provide a formal application of prospect theory as a generalization of the (linear) QALY 
model for interested readers. 
 
• Which method better reflects QALY weights according to respondents themselves: 
TTO or SG (Chapter 6)? 
• Can prospect theory be applied to derive QALY weights with improved validity (i.e. 
corrected weights, Chapter 7)?  
• How feasible is it to apply such ‘corrected weights’ in practice (Chapter 8)? 
• What is the influence of expectations regarding length of life on TTO and SG weights 
(Chapter 9)?  
• Are QALY weights improved by deciding on them collectively (Chapter 10)? 
Outline of this dissertation  
Part I (Behavioral experiments in health) starts with the extension to the health domain of a 
now-classic critique of EU theory, the concavity-calibration paradox presented by Rabin 
(2000), which provides a compelling case against EU and for reference-dependent theories 
(Chapter 2). Chapter 3 continues this inquiry into the difference between decisions for 
health gains and health losses. This chapter reports a study that tested the stability of loss 
aversion, by exploring if the degree of loss aversion depends on the quality of life in which 
these lost years of life are spent. Chapter 4 explores whether it is possible to design financial 
incentives that are tailored to individual preferences. Finally, Part I ends with a study on the 
degree of preference reversals in medical and financial decision-making for others, which is 
reported in Chapter 5. 
Part II (‘Applications of behavioral insights to health state valuation’) deals with health state 
valuation using TTO and SG. Chapter 6 studies the degree to which QALY weights 
measured through these methods correspond to how individuals would value the 
corresponding health states on the 0-1 scale. Chapter 7 reports the results of an experiment 
in which biases in TTO and SG weights are corrected using a model based on prospect 
theory. The findings of this study suggest that applying a ‘corrective approach’ to health state 
valuation, in which biases in measurement are approximated and corrected for based on 
prospect theory, may be a promising tool for improving economic evaluation. Chapter 8 
discusses this promise by showing how the decision to correct or not to correct influences 
outcomes of economic evaluations and discusses the many methodological and practical steps 
required before a corrective approach can be used to inform policy. One of these steps is 
addressed in Chapter 9, which studies whether expectations about length of life, i.e. one’s 
subjective life expectancy, serves as reference-point in health state valuations. Finally, in 
Chapter 10 a different technique for resolving the difference between TTO and SG is 
studied. Instead of completing these health state valuation exercises by themselves, 
participants in this study completed TTO and SG in dyads, deliberating and bargaining about 
their decisions.  
In the Discussion of this dissertation (Chapter 11), Part I and Part II are brought together 
again. After reflecting on the implications and limitations of my research regarding the 
overarching theme (understanding individual and societal decisions about health), this 
chapter concludes this dissertation.  
Those of you who made it this far through my Introduction will be happy to hear there will be 
no more mentioning of the adjustable desk (which I am leaving as we speak, today is 
Monday, so I’m off to the gym)! 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
Part I: Behavioral experiments in health 
 
Chapter 2: Rabin’s Paradox for Health Outcomes 
 
Chapter based on: 
Lipman, S.A., & Attema, A.E. (2019) Rabin's paradox for health outcomes. Health 
economics, 28(8), 1064-1071.   
 
Abstract: Many health economic studies assume expected utility (EU) maximization, with 
typically a concave utility function to capture risk aversion. Given these assumptions, Rabin’s 
paradox (RP) involves preferences over mixed gambles yielding moderate outcomes, where 
turning down such gambles imply absurd levels of risk aversion. Although RP is considered a 
classic critique of EU, no paper has as of yet fully tested its preferences within individuals. In 
an experiment we report a direct test of RP in the health domain, which was previously only 
considered in the economic literature, showing it may have pervasive implications here too. 
Our paper supports the shift towards alternative, empirically valid models, such as prospect 
theory, also in the health domain. These alternative models are able to accommodate Rabin’s 
paradox by allowing reference-dependence and loss aversion.  
  
 
Introduction 
Risk is central in health economics, and is for instance covered in literature on health 
insurance (e.g. Arrow, 1963, Kairies-Schwarz et al., 2017), health state valuations (e.g. 
Pliskin et al., 1980, Torrance, 1976), health-related behavior change (e.g. Anderson and 
Mellor, 2008), and patient preferences (e.g. Galizzi et al., 2016b, Seston et al., 2007). 
Generally, individuals dislike risk, i.e. variance in outcomes, and prefer certain options with 
the same expected value over risky options. This is referred to as risk aversion, a hallmark 
phenomenon in economics that has found its way into many health applications, such as 
Arrow’s (1963) classic exposition on health insurance.  
Risk aversion is typically modeled within the framework of expected utility (EU) theory with 
a concave utility function over wealth (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944), often 
considered to be the normative and rational benchmark for decision making under risk (e.g. 
Harsanyi, 1955, Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Wakker, 2010). However, the descriptive 
validity of EU, i.e. its applicability to understand or describe how individuals actually decide, 
has been questioned for decades (for a review, see: Starmer, 2000). For example, several 
paradoxes have been presented in the economic literature that violated EU, such as Allais’ 
(1953) paradox and Rabin’s paradox (RP, Rabin, 2000, Rabin and Thaler, 2001). As an 
illustration of the latter: consider an agent who turns down a 50/50 gamble of gaining 11$ or 
losing 10$ at all wealth levels. Rabin (2000) showed how under EU with concave utility this 
agent should turn any gamble with a 50/50 loss of 100$, even when the agent could gain 
millions!  
This thought experiment has become a classic criticism of EU as a descriptive theory of risk 
aversion. Although EU can capture risk aversion by assuming a concave utility function over 
wealth, this utility function should be extremely concave to capture turning down 50/50 
gambles over such small stakes (e.g. gaining 11$ or losing 10$), which leads to absurd 
predictions for larger stakes. Given that most classic work on risk aversion in economics 
assumed EU with concave utility, RP has generated much debate among economists. 
Whereas some authors argue that EU is simply not a plausible theory for risk aversion and 
propose a move towards reference-dependent theories (e.g. Bleichrodt et al., 2019), others 
criticize the assumptions relevant to RP (Andersen et al., 2011, Harrison et al., 2017). 
However, empirical evidence on the presence of RP is scarce, only a handful of empirical 
studies are available that tested RP, all in the economic domain. First, Cox and colleagues 
(2013) observed RP preferences for financial outcomes in an incentive-compatible study. 
Second, Bleichrodt and colleagues (2019) identified the causes of RP empirically, showing 
how a reference-dependent model with loss aversion may explain RP (as already suggested 
by Rabin, 2000). A drawback of the first study, however, is that it involved highly unlikely 
outcomes (i.e. casino outcomes), while a drawback of the second study is that preferences for 
large stakes are not studied.  
So far, both theoretical and empirical work has focused solely on Rabin’s (2000, 2001) 
critique on EU in the monetary domain. There it has had vast implications, as citation scores 
show. It is well-known that preferences for health outcomes may differ from decisions for 
financial outcomes (even at a neurological level, see Suter et al., 2015). Such differences 
have been observed for time preferences (e.g. Attema et al., 2018b, Chapman, 1996), 
ambiguity preferences (e.g. Curley et al., 1984), and, most relevant to our purposes, risk 
 
preferences (e.g. Suter et al., 2016, Weber et al., 2002). Whereas Allais’ paradox has been 
tested with health outcomes (Oliver, 2003b), no such work exists for RP. Therefore, in this 
paper we extend RP to the health domain.  
Notation and formal definitions 
We first introduce notation and define RP for monetary outcomes (𝑥, 𝑦). We consider agents 
as modeled in EU (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944), who face gambles of the form 
𝑥0.5𝑦, i.e. 𝑥 results with probability 0.5 and 𝑦 otherwise. Preferences are denoted by the usual 
≻, ≽, and ∼, representing strict preference, weak preference and indifference, respectively. 
Under EU, gambles are evaluated linearly in probabilities, i.e. 𝑥0.5𝑦 is evaluated by: 
0.5 𝑈(𝑥) + 0.5 𝑈(𝑦), where often 𝑈(⋅) is assumed to be a strictly increasing and concave 
utility function over final wealth (which is equal to initial wealth 𝐼𝑤 with the outcome of the 
gamble incorporated). This concavity of 𝑈(⋅) is assumed to reflect risk aversion, which is 
defined as preferring a gamble’s expected value with certainty over the actual gamble 
(Wakker, 2010).  
The classic RP thought-experiment starts with the assumption that an agent turns down a 
gamble 𝑥0.5𝑦 at all levels of initial wealth, i.e. always prefers staying at 𝐼𝑤 over the gamble 
for some 𝑥 and 𝑦. For example, assume 𝑥 = +11 and 𝑦 = −10, and consider someone who 
always turns down (+11$0.5 − 10$). By means of a calibration process, Rabin (2000) 
showed that this person should also turn down gambles with extremely large expected value. 
To illustrate this calibration process, assume we observe such risk aversion for all 𝐼𝑤 and 
utility over final wealth remains concave. Turning down (+11$0.5 − 10$) at all wealth levels 
implies that over each length of 21 dollars 𝑈′drops by a factor of 10/11 (see Wakker, 2010). 
Such geometric decay is highly unlikely, as it implies that the marginal utility of each 
additional dollar diminishes expeditiously: take for example the decay of 𝑈′ on an interval of 
4200$, which will be (
10
11
)
200
= 5.26 ∗ 10−9 (more details in the Online Supplements of this 
dissertation). However, these conclusions only hold if gambles such as +11$0.5 − 10$ are 
indeed turned down at all wealth levels (or at least at many wealth levels4). Often, this 
empirical assumption is justified by observing that many agents will (ceteris paribus) reject 
such gambles at many (if not all) wealth levels, which led Rabin (2000) to assume that this 
gamble will also be turned down by a single agent at many (if not all) wealth levels. 
Now, we extend RP to health outcomes (ℋ), which are quantifiable and real-valued (e.g. 
hours of life). We consider agents as modeled by EU in two cases: a) individual decisions – 
i.e. agents deciding about their own health, and b) societal decisions – i.e. agents deciding as 
societal decision makers for population health5. In both cases, 𝑈(ℋ) is a strictly increasing 
and concave utility function over final health. For individual decisions, initial health 𝐼ℎ 
 
4 Much of the discussion surrounding RP has focused on this assumption, with its validity being questioned for 
example by: Andersen and colleagues (2011) and Harrison and colleagues (2017). Rabin (2000) showed that 
gambles need not be turned down at all wealth levels, and Wakker (2010) discusses how gambles only need to 
be turned down over relatively small domains of initial wealth to produce absurd concavity under EU. 
5 See the Online Supplements of this dissertation for more detail on the social welfare function. 
 
denotes an agent’s life expectancy before a choice is considered, whilst for societal decisions 
𝐼ℎ denotes the societal decision maker’s judgement of society’s initial health. In both cases 
final health is obtained by adding to 𝐼ℎ (gains) or subtracting from 𝐼ℎ (losses) the relevant 
health outcomes in gambles, i.e. ℒ, ℓ , 𝐼ℎ, ℊ, 𝒢 ∈ ℋ (see Table 2.1 for details on outcomes). 
We let ℊ (𝒢) represent a moderate (large) health gain compared to initial health 𝐼ℎ and we let 
ℓ (ℒ) denote a moderate (large) health loss compared to 𝐼ℎ. As in the canonical example by 
Rabin and Thaler (2001), we test RP by setting ℊ = +11 and ℓ = −10 (e.g. +11 or -10 hours 
of life). Like Rabin (2000) for monetary outcomes, we assume that if ℊ0.5ℓ is turned down by 
agents with many different levels of 𝐼ℎ, this implies that such gambles are also turned down 
by one individual at many life expectancies (for individual decision) and for many society’s 
initial health levels (for societal outcomes)6. Under these assumptions (according to Rabin’s 
(2000) calibration theorem), if we replace gamble ℊ0.5ℓ with 𝒢0.5ℒ, with ℒ = −100, this 
person should turn down gambles for any 𝒢 (up to 𝒢 = ∞). Given the difficulties with 
grasping infinity, we elicit RP with 𝒢 = 10,000. 
We define RP as the following combination of preferences: 𝐼ℎ  ≻  ℊ0.5ℓ and 𝐼ℎ  ≺  𝒢0.5ℒ, 
which constitutes a violation of EU with concave utility7. Whenever subjects turn down 
(accept) both gambles (i.e. 𝐼ℎ  ≻ (≺) ℊ0.5ℓ & 𝐼ℎ  ≻ (≺) 𝒢0.5ℒ), we will say that they do not 
violate EU. 
 
Method 
Sample: N = 201 subjects were recruited by means of the Erasmus Research Participation 
System. All subjects were Business Administration students and were rewarded course 
credits for participation. The mean age of our sample was 20.29 (SD = 1.36) and 34% of our 
sample was female.  
Procedure and Design: This experiment was part of a larger study on preferences for health 
outcomes, and was completed using Qualtrics Survey Software. Each subject completed all 6 
RP gamble-pairs, which each consisted of a moderate stake gamble (ℊ0.5ℓ) and a calibrated 
large stake gamble (𝒢0.5ℒ). The RP gamble-pairs were grouped in two counter-balanced 
blocks (completed within-subjects): 3 individual gamble-pairs and 3 societal gamble-pairs 
(presented in random order). 
 
6 Obviously, for health outcomes there is less to no evidence that such preferences hold for many individuals at 
many levels of initial health. In fact, some authors have suggested that utility might be kinked around 
individuals’ subjective life expectancy, i.e. such expectations about length of life are a reference point (van 
Nooten & Brouwer, 2004, van Nooten et al., 2009). However, the focus in this paper is to extend RP preferences 
to health, and hence, we will not extensively test or discuss the assumptions that generate the paradox. 
Furthermore, although such kinked preferences around subjective life expectancy may invalidate the 
assumptions necessary to generate RP, they increase the need to consider reference-dependent models for 
decisions about health. The limited evidence that we obtained to sustain Rabin’s (2000) empirical assumptions 
is discussed in the Online Supplements of this dissertation. 
7 The definitions used here rely on strict preference (as our experiment only involves direct choices), but as 
shown in the Online Supplements of this dissertation the following preferences also constitute RP: 𝐼ℎ  ~ ℊ0.5ℓ 
and 𝐼ℎ  ≼  𝒢0.5ℒ.  
 
Stimuli: The exact scenarios for all 6 gamble-pairs can be found in Table 2.1, while 
instructions are reprinted in the Online Supplements of this dissertation. In accordance with 
Bleichrodt and colleagues (2019) we only asked subjects if they would accept this gamble, to 
which they could respond “Yes” or “No”. 
Additional measures: We collected demographic information on age, gender, body-mass 
index (BMI), subjective health (0 – 100 scale from worst to best imaginable health) and 
happiness (1-10 scale from completely dissatisfied to completely satisfied with life as a 
whole). 
 
Table 2.1. Scenarios for Rabin Paradox (RP) gamble-pairs for individual and societal 
outcomes 
Gamble-pair                                         Scenario Outcome 
 Individual  
RP1 Imagine that it is possible to take a gamble that affects your remaining 
lifetime (e.g. living until 87). The outcome is added or deducted from your 
lifetime. 
Hours 
RP2 Imagine that you are 75 and will live with slight mobility problems (not able 
to walk more than 3 kilometers). You can gamble to change your lifetime 
(longer or shorter). 
Hours 
RP3 Imagine you are 75 and will live until 85 with light back pain (e.g. treatable 
with mild painkillers). You can gamble to change your life time. 
Hours 
 Societal  
RP4 Imagine a chronic disease, which leads to considerable losses in quality and 
length of life. Normally this disease affects about 300,000 people in the 
Netherlands (e.g. cancer). A risky drug is developed, which may either 
increase the amount of cases or decrease the amount of cases. 
Cases 
averted 
/extra 
cases 
RP5 Imagine an outbreak of a fatal disease occurred. The disease will lead to 
considerable lives lost. You are considering to take a gamble, in which either 
11 lives are saved or 10 additional lives are lost. 
Casualties 
saved / 
extra 
casualties 
RP6 Imagine you have the chance to obtain extra healthy life years for society, be 
means of an easy to implement, costless, medical procedure. As a reminder: 
you do not know to whom these life years will be distributed. The procedure 
also has a chance of resulting in a reduction of healthy life years for society. 
Life years 
Note: Each gamble-pair had the following forms, with numbers referring to different health 
outcomes depending on the pair: a) Moderate Stake Gamble ℊ𝑝ℓ : (+11 , 0.5, -10), b) 
Calibrated Gamble 𝒢𝑝ℒ : (+10.000, 0.5, -100) 
 
Results 
As can be seen from Table 2.2, for all items a small majority of the sample rejected the 
gambles for moderate stakes, while a large majority generally accepted calibrated gambles. 
These proportions were all significantly larger than 50% ( 𝜒2
′
𝑠(1, 𝑁 = 201) > 6.81, 𝑝′𝑠 <
.009) for all items but RP1 (𝜒2(1, 𝑁 = 201) = 1.44, 𝑝 = .23). Next, for each RP gamble-
pair we determined how many subjects showed RP preferences (see Table 2.2). Out of all 4 
possible preference patterns within gamble-pairs, RP preferences occurred most frequently 
(43% - 64%). However, a substantial part of the sample showed preference combinations 
consistent with EU by rejecting or accepting both gambles (individual: 13% and 39%, 
societal: 15% and 23%). Of all choices consistent with RP preferences a larger share (358 out 
of 632, i.e. 56%) occurred for societal outcomes (𝜒2(1, 𝑁 = 632) = 11.16, 𝑝 < .001). 
Inversely, the proportion of our samples’ choices satisfying EU was smaller (227 out of 541, 
i.e. 42%)8 for societal outcomes (𝜒2(1, 𝑁 = 541) = 13.99, 𝑝 < .001). We also qualified 
these results with mixed logistic regression (see the Online Supplements of this dissertation), 
which suggested that RP preferences were more frequent for societal outcomes after 
controlling for the demographics collected (as described in: ‘Additional measures’). 
Next, we explored to what extent RP preferences were stable within-subjects, by calculating 
what proportion of our sample showed this combination of preferences across gamble-pairs. 
As can be seen from Table 2.3, overall RP preferences were observed frequently, with the 
percentages of those showing RP preferences for all three gamble-pairs being near equal for 
individual and societal outcomes. When considering the stability of these preferences 
between domains, it appeared that many individuals that had no RP preferences for individual 
outcomes did show RP preferences for societal outcomes. A series of analyses in the Online 
Supplements of this dissertaion shows that these preferences were more consistent and stable 
than would be expected if they were generated by a population satisfying EU or being 
completely indifferent (i.e. noise). Furthermore, RP preferences were more consistent than 
would have been expected if all choices were made independently across all gamble-pairs. 
 
8 The remaining 2% of all choices over gamble-pairs consisted of accepting the moderate stake gamble, but 
turning down the calibrated gamble. Such preferences occurred for a negligible part of the sample and are not 
captured by RP preferences or EU. We will not discuss these counter-intuitive preferences in more detail. 
 
Table 2.2. RP gamble-pairs with number of acceptances (acc.) vs. rejections (rej.) for 
moderate stake gambles (MSG, in columns) and calibrated gambles (in rows), with row and 
column totals (tot.) 
Individual 
setting 
 RP1-MSG 
ℊ0.5ℓ 
 RP2-MSG 
ℊ0.5ℓ 
   RP3-MSG 
ℊ0.5ℓ 
 
Calibrated 
Gambles 
Rej. Acc. (Tot.) Rej.  Acc. (Tot.)  Rej. Acc. (Tot.) 
RP1-RP3 
𝒢0.5ℒ 
Rej. 15 3 (18)  35 8 (43)  26 4 (30) 
 Acc. 94+ 89 (183)*  87+ 71 (158)*  93+ 78 (181)* 
 (Tot.) (109) (92)   (123)* (79)   (119)* (82)  
Societal 
setting 
 RP4-MSG 
ℊ0.5ℓ 
 RP5- MSG 
ℊ0.5ℓ 
   RP6-MSG 
ℊ0.5ℓ 
 
Calibrated 
Gambles 
Rej. Acc. (Tot.) Rej.  Acc. (Tot.)  Rej. Acc. (Tot.) 
RP4-RP6 
𝒢0.5ℒ 
Rej 25 8 (33)  14 3 (17)  49 7 (58) 
 Acc. 119+ 49 (168)*  127+ 57 (184)  112+ 33 (145)* 
 (Tot.) (144)* (57)   (141)* (60)   (161)* (40)  
Note: a RP preferences are signified by +,  * indicates the total proportion is significantly 
larger than 50%, by a pairwise 𝜒2-test with 𝑝 < 0.05  
 
 
Table 2.3. Frequency (N) and proportion (%) of RP preferences counts (C) within-subjects  
N (%)  Societal     
  C = 0 C = 1 C = 2 C = 3 Total individual 
Individual C = 0 19 (9%) 21 (10%) 22 (11%) 22 (11%) 84 (42%) 
 C = 1 2 (1%) 6 (3%) 9 (4%) 8 (4%) 25 (12%) 
 C = 2 4 (2%) 5 (2%) 9 (4%) 9 (4%) 27 (13%) 
 C = 3 8 (4%) 12 (6%) 18 (9%) 27 (13%) 65 (32%) 
Total societal 33 (16%) 44 (22%) 58 (29%) 66 (33%)  
 
Discussion 
The goal of this study was to supplement the empirical literature on RP, by extending this 
classic critique of EU to the health domain. We replicate RP for health; that is, we observe 
risk aversion for gambles over moderate health stakes, which implausibly (and incorrectly for 
a majority of our sample) suggests that calibrated large stake gambles should also be turned 
down according to EU. These findings are in accordance with the two other empirical studies 
testing RP preferences in the monetary domain (Bleichrodt et al., 2019, Cox et al., 2013). 
Several different hypothetical health outcomes and contexts were used, where RP preferences 
were more pronounced for societal outcomes. To our knowledge, our study is one of the first 
finding risk aversion for moderate individual health outcomes9, with another example being 
Breyer and Fuchs (1982) who consider gambles over days with a 2 hour headache. Risk 
aversion for larger individual health outcomes, for example in the range of 0.5 to 20 years of 
life is observed frequently (e.g. Attema et al., 2013, Attema et al., 2016, Galizzi et al., 2016c, 
Oliver, 2018, van der Pol and Ruggeri, 2008), albeit these studies used a different 
methodology (i.e. certainty equivalences). For societal outcomes, studies have, for example, 
found risk aversion for life years (Eraker and Sox, 1981) or lives (Kemel and Paraschiv, 
2018).  
However, a substantial part (30-52%) of our sample did not violate EU by accepting or 
rejecting both gambles, which is similar to that observed in the only direct test of RP in the 
economic literature (Cox et al., 2013). A direct comparison to Bleichrodt et al. (2019) is not 
possible, as they only tested risk aversion for small stakes, but the proportion of their sample 
that accepts small stake gambles is lower compared to our sample. A surprising and unique 
result of our study is that a small set of the sample rejects both gambles, and the strong 
concavity these preference imply could be considered absurd (Wakker, 2010). Whereas 
earlier work on RP focused on criticizing the assumptions generating RP (e.g. Andersen et 
al., 2011, Harrison et al., 2017), or explaining its paradoxical nature (e.g. via reference-
 
9 We do not refer to our stimuli as small stake gambles, as we object to labeling any health loss as small, 
especially when our gambles concern human lives. 
 
dependence, Bleichrodt et al., 2019), our work suggests that for a non-negligible group of 
individuals no paradox may exist to begin with. Nonetheless, turning down the opportunity of 
gaining over a year of life or saving 10,000 lives when risking moderate losses in lifetime or 
human lives seems difficult to justify. Whereas loss aversion may explain RP preferences, as 
Rabin (2000) suggested and Bleichrodt and colleagues (2019) established, it is 
straightforward to demonstrate that to explain acceptance of both gambles loss aversion 
would need to be extreme. Hence, we offer two explanations for these preferences not related 
to risk aversion. First, especially relevant to individual outcomes, some individuals may not 
be willing to live any longer in the reduced health states (in scenario 2 and 3). Such 
preferences are observed frequently for health states more severe than those under 
consideration here (i.e. maximum endurable time, Sutherland et al., 1982). A second 
explanation is that one may prefer not to take any gamble at all, out of the well-known 
preference for inaction over action when risking adverse outcomes (i.e. omission bias, 
Spranca et al., 1991).  
Some additional methodological limitations deserve mentioning. First, this study was not 
specifically designed to test the validity of the assumptions present in Rabin’s (2000) 
calibration theorem. Given that some of these have been challenged in the economic domain 
(e.g. Andersen et al., 2011, Harrison et al., 2017), this provides opportunities for future work. 
For example, it could be determined if risk aversion indeed holds for many (if not all) levels 
of initial health, either by testing this for a single individual at many (hypothetical) ages, or 
by comparing risk aversion between individuals with different ages, that are otherwise 
similar. Second, this study used a relatively small, homogeneous, convenience sample, which 
may limit its external validity. Nonetheless, it is common to start a new experiment in 
convenience samples, and extend it afterwards to representative samples. Third, our study 
relied on hypothetical scenarios without real incentives. Although the importance of 
incentive-compatibility for behavioral experiments in health has often been stressed (e.g. 
Galizzi and Wiesen, 2018), our goal of offering calibrated gambles in terms of health made 
such a procedure impossible. Furthermore, some evidence exists in the economic domain 
suggesting that risk preferences are not qualitatively different between hypothetical and 
incentive-compatible gambles, although they may be more variable in the former (for 
reviews, see: Camerer and Hogarth, 1999, Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001). Finally, our 
definition of RP and method only allowed for strict preferences, whereas the small 
differences in rates of acceptance and rejection for individual gamble-pairs suggest that part 
of our sample may actually have been indifferent for moderate stakes. However, if this was 
the case we would have observed less within-subjects stability and importantly such 
indifferences would still yield RP, as indifference for moderate stake gambles still implies 
risk aversion, and thus strong concavity under EU (see the Online Supplements of this 
dissertation).     
Conclusion 
This study has shown that the paradox proposed by Rabin (2000) is also relevant to health 
outcomes. Given its large impact in economics, its implications for health deserve further 
study. It poses a challenge to earlier work in health economics which described risk aversion 
 
by means of EU with concave utility over health outcomes, as this would lead to implausible 
conclusions for the large stakes often present in the health domain—this is the main message 
of Rabin (2000). This appears to hold especially for models describing societal decision-
making. Fortunately, by modelling preferences (over health outcomes) within a reference-
dependent framework such as prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), RP can be 
easily resolved. The increasing attention for such reference-dependent frameworks in health 
economics (Abellan-Perpiñan et al., 2009, Attema et al., 2013, Pinto-Prades and Abellan-
Perpiñan, 2012, and also Chapter 7 of this dissertation) in work seeking more accurate 
descriptive theories is supported by our findings. Although these reference-dependent 
theories may be general enough to capture the strong risk aversion demonstrated by a small 
part of our sample, further investigation to understand how we decide about health under risk 
is clearly still needed. 
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Abstract: Evidence has accumulated documenting loss aversion for monetary and, recently, 
for health outcomes – meaning that generally losses carry more weight than equally-sized 
gains. In conventional Quality-Adjusted Life Year (QALY) models, which comprise utility 
for quality and length of life, loss aversion is not taken into account. When measuring 
elements of the QALY model, commonly the (implicit) assumption is that utility for length 
and quality of life are independent. First attempts to quantify loss aversion for QALYs 
typically measured loss aversion in the context of life duration, keeping quality of life 
constant (or vice versa). However, given that QALYs are multi-attribute utilities, it may be 
possible that the degree of loss aversion is dependent on, or inseparable from, quality of life 
and non-constant. We test this assumption using non-parametric methodology to quantify loss 
aversion, under different levels of quality of life. We measure utility of life duration for four 
health states within-subjects, and present the results of a robustness test of loss aversion 
within the QALY model. We find loss aversion coefficients to be stable at the aggregate 
level, albeit with considerable heterogeneity at the individual level. Implications for applied 
work on prospect theory within health economics are discussed.  
  
 
Introduction 
Like other decisions, medical decisions often involve trade-offs between gains and losses in 
different domains. In health economics, an important trade-off concerns that between length 
and quality of life (QoL), also in the context of health state valuations. Research in behavioral 
economics and psychology has established that in such trade-offs losses typically carry more 
weight than gains of the same size. This sensitivity to losses is referred to as loss aversion 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Recently, scholars 
demonstrated the importance of loss aversion within the health domain, both for life duration 
(Attema et al., 2013, Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2002, Oliver, 2003a, and Chapter 7 of this 
dissertation) and quality of life (QoL) (Attema et al., 2016, Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2002, 
Stalmeier and Bezembinder, 1999). In health economic analyses, utilities are often defined as 
a product of these two attributes, jointly comprising Quality-Adjusted Life-Years (QALYs) 
(Pliskin et al., 1980). Commonly, the utility function over these two outcomes is decomposed 
into separate utility functions over life duration and QoL. This separability of QALYs is, 
however, only possible under several assumptions, which have solely been tested under 
conditions in which no distinction is made between gains and losses (Bleichrodt et al., 2009).  
Here, we use prospect theory (PT), which incorporates loss aversion and judges changes from 
the perspective of some relevant reference-point (RP). Bleichrodt and colleagues (2009) 
established that when considering multi-attribute outcomes, such as QALYs, gains and losses 
may be determined per attribute with separate attribute-specific RPs. This also makes it 
possible quantify loss aversion, to see how much more weight losses carry than gains. Earlier 
attempts at quantifying loss aversion under PT have typically focused on single attributes 
within the QALY framework, for example by obtaining loss aversion for life duration while 
maintaining QoL constant (Attema et al., 2013, see also Chapter 7 of this dissertation) or vice 
versa (Attema et al., 2016). Although these studies produced similar median estimates of loss 
aversion, with health losses receiving between 1.5 and 2 times more weight than gains, they 
did not allude to the issue of separability. In other words, these studies ignored the possibility 
that loss aversion for one attribute (e.g. length of life) depends on the level of the other 
attribute (which is typically held constant) and, hence, assumes loss aversion for health 
outcomes to be constant, independent of their QALY profile.  
However, it could be the case that some QALY losses carry more weight relative to 
commensurate QALY gains than others, for example if loss aversion is more pronounced for 
more severe health states. In this article we test this assumption using a non-parametric 
method (Abdellaoui et al., 2016) to quantify loss aversion over life duration, under varying 
levels of QoL. This non-parametric method was developed recently and allows estimation of 
utility curvature and loss aversion without imposing parametric assumptions on either. Earlier 
work has argued that the choice of parametric family or functional form restricts 
interpretation of subjects’ choice patterns, and may lead to considerable bias especially for 
extreme cases (Abdellaoui, 2000, Abdellaoui et al., 2016). This method was first adapted to 
and used in the health domain for the study reported in Chapter 7 of this dissertation. 
 
 
Theoretical framework 
Consider a decision maker facing choices with regard to his health under uncertain 
conditions, operationalized by presenting decision makers with prospects representing 
different life durations and QoL. We assume completeness and monotonicity for both 
attributes. We consider lotteries involving chronic health profiles, described as (𝛽, 𝑇), where 
β represents QoL and 𝑇 duration in years. According to the generalized QALY model 
(Miyamoto and Eraker, 1989), a decision maker’s preferences for health profiles can be 
represented by:  
𝑉(𝛽, 𝑇) = 𝑈(𝛽) ∗ 𝐿(𝑇),                    (3.1) 
with V(𝛽, 𝑇) being a product of 𝑈(𝛽), the utility of 𝛽, and 𝐿(𝑇) denoting the utility of 𝑇 life 
years.  
Here, we assume PT with a sign-dependent utility function for life duration, so that gains are 
evaluated differently than losses, relative to an attribute specific reference point. We assume 
that through instruction, it is possible to set this attribute-specific RP to a specific health 
condition 𝛽𝑐 and life duration 𝑇0. In order to elicit a continuous utility function for life 
duration, we elicit a standard sequence for life duration that runs through L(𝑇0) = 0. 
Meanwhile, we keep QoL constant at 𝛽𝑐 throughout the task. We repeat this process under 
different levels of 𝛽𝑐. 10 
We elicit the utility function for life duration, relative to this reference point, both for gains 
and losses for the different health states. Hence, we obtain 𝐿𝑖(𝑇) for each 𝛽𝑐, with 𝑖 = + for 
gains and 𝑖 = − for losses. 𝐿𝑖(𝑇) is a standard ratio scale utility function, which is strictly 
increasing and real-valued with 𝐿𝑖(𝑇0) = 0. We incorporate loss aversion by taking 𝐿
−(𝑇) =
 𝜆 𝐿(𝑇) for T < 𝑇0, where λ denotes a loss aversion index, with 𝜆 > 1 [= 1, < 1] indicating 
loss aversion [loss neutrality, gain seeking]. Hence, by obtaining the utility around the 
reference point, the degree of loss aversion can be derived.  
Methods 
A total of 111 students (average age: 20.23, SD = 1.52) of Rotterdam School of Management 
(61 female) participated in this study for a course credit reward. Experimental sessions lasted 
for 25 minutes and were run with up to 4 subjects per session. One experimenter was present 
in the room to answer questions. The experiment was computerized with Matlab.  
To test the robustness of loss aversion, we used the non-parametric method (Abdellaoui et al., 
2016) under four levels of QoL. In other words, each subject completed the non-parametric 
method four times, with a different 𝛽𝑐 throughout each of these four phases. This process 
allows us to obtain estimates of utility curvature and loss aversion for each of the four levels 
of QoL, and compare them within-subjects.  
QoL was defined by means of EQ-5D-5L health state descriptions (Herdman et al., 2011), 
which utilize five domains: mobility, self-care, usual activities, pain/discomfort, and 
anxiety/depression. The 5L version of the EQ-5D distinguishes five levels of severity on each 
 
10 For a classification of PT under these assumptions see Chapter 7, and for a more elaborate description of 
additive utility under PT, see Bleichrodt et al. (2009). 
 
domain, ranging from ‘no problems’ to ‘extreme problems/unable to’. Health states are 
typically denoted by 5 digit codes like 22113, with each number representing severity of the 
relevant domain level of QoL. In this study, we used four relatively mild to moderate health 
states as RP (𝛽𝑐) in the non-parametric method: 11111, 21211, 31221, and 32341 (see the 
Online Supplements of this dissertation for exact description). This was done to have 
variation in health states but avoid states worse than dead, for which no separate procedure 
was included.  
The non-parametric method used here consisted of three stages which are described in detail 
in the Online Supplements of this dissertation.11 The first stage connects the utility for gains 
and losses. The second and third stages employ the trade-off method developed by (Wakker 
and Deneffe, 1996) to measure a standard sequence of outcomes in life years for gains 
(𝑥1
+, 𝑥2
+, … , 𝑥5
+), and for losses (𝑥1
−, 𝑥2
−, … , 𝑥5
−). This enables measuring loss aversion, 
without imposing parametric assumptions on utility curvature.12 Additionally, standard 
sequences allow the testing of utility independence (Bleichrodt et al., 2009). The three stages 
had slightly different instructions, providing context for the required trade-offs. The 
instructions were similar to those used in Chapter 7 of this dissertation. During all stages of 
the experiment, it was made clear to subjects that they should imagine living until 70 years in 
𝛽𝑐, after which they would contract a disease resulting in immediate death without any pain. 
Subjects completed a series of binary choices between two drugs which could change their 
situation (leading to gains and losses compared to living until 70). Employing a bisection 
choice method, we obtained indifferences, set equal to the midpoint after the 5th binary 
choice. Some stimuli and constants relevant to the non-parametric method had to be set 
beforehand; these are listed in the Online Supplements of this dissertation. 
Results 
Seven subjects were excluded from further analyses for the following reasons: mechanical 
failure (n = 2), refusing to incur life year losses (n = 3), and observed misbehavior (e.g. 
rushing through the task, n = 2). The results are reported for the reduced sample (n = 104)13. 
Throughout, we will first report aggregate analyses, where median parameters are compared 
for the whole sample, and refer to these as results at ‘the aggregate level’. Second, we will 
investigate individual results more closely, by classifying each individual according to 
classification rules reported in Box 3.1 and we explore within-subjects parameter instability. 
We refer to these analyses as ‘individual-level analyses’. 
Table 3.1 demonstrates the results at the aggregate level, by comparing point-estimates for 
utility curvature and loss aversion for each health state. We compared differences between 
health states using omnibus tests (i.e. comparing all four health states simultaneously), more 
specifically Friedman’s tests, which are robust against the violations of normality typically 
observed for parameters under the definitions reported in Box 3.1. Next, we compared all 
health states in pairs with Wilcoxon signed ranks tests. For the omnibus tests, no significant 
 
11 For an elaborate, formal description of this method, see Abdellaoui and colleagues (2016). 
12 For more information on how utility curvature and loss aversion were determined, see Box 3.1. 
13 Conventional post-hoc power analyses suggested this sample was sufficiently powerful to enable detecting 
differences with at least small effect sizes (Cohen’s d < 0.3), assuming α=0.05 and statistical power at the 
recommended 80% level (Cohen, 1988). 
 
differences were observed between health states, both for utility curvature and loss aversion 
(all p’s >.06). When comparing parameter estimates in pairs of health states, some significant 
differences were observed. For loss aversion under both definitions, parameter estimates for 
β2 were significantly lower than for β3 (p’s < 0.03). All other pairwise comparisons for loss 
aversion yielded no significant differences (all p’s > 0.07). Using pairwise comparisons for 
utility curvature we observe no significant differences for both parametric and non-
parametric estimations (all p’s > 0.05). 
In general, we observe close to linear utility for all health states, both for gains and losses14. 
Furthermore, we observe considerable loss aversion at the aggregate level, with λ 
significantly greater than 1 for all 𝛽𝑐 (Wilcoxon tests: p <.001 for all β’s). 
 
Table 3.1. Median (IQR in brackets) parameter point-estimates for loss aversion under two 
definitions and utility curvature as defined by area-under-curve (AUC) and power utility 
Health state β0: 11111 β1:21211 β2: 31221 β3: 32341 
Utility curvature     
AUC – Gains 0.51 (0.42 – 0.63) 0.49 (0.38 – 0.59) 0.53 (0.44 – 0.64)  0.52 (0.41 – 0.70) 
AUC – Losses 0.51 (0.46 – 0.57) 0.50 (0.45 – 0.57) 0.50 (0.42 – 0.58) 0.49 (0.40 – 0.60) 
Power – Gains 0.96 (0.58 – 1.37) 1.07 (0.69 – 1.71) 0.91 (0.57 – 1.28) 0.78 (0.45 – 1.41) 
Power – Losses  0.93 (0.74 – 1.16) 0.94 (0.73 – 1.20) 0.97 (0.73 – 1.41) 1.02 (0.66 – 1.40) 
Loss aversion     
Köbberling Wakker 1.97 (1.33 – 4.43) 1.93 (1.45 – 3.67) 1.88 (1.39 – 3.30) 2.13 (1.15 – 8.38) 
Kahneman Tversky 2.13 (1.24 – 4.39) 1.94 (1.26 – 4.62) 2.10 (1.25 – 3.23) 2.51 (1.18 – 6.24) 
 
Table 3.2 demonstrates how subjects classify under different estimations of utility curvature 
and loss aversion (see Box 3.1). For all individual classifications, we observed that the 
conventionally assumed loss neutrality and linear utility curvature are not present in our data. 
Although at the aggregate level linear utility was found, when classifying individually, 
considerable heterogeneity in utility curvature was observed, with proportions of 
concave/convexity varying between definitions and health states. This finding could be 
explained by the near equal division of concavity/convexity in our sample, resulting in 
roughly linear utility at the aggregate level. For loss aversion, however, such an equal 
division was not visible, with the majority of subjects classifying as loss averse across 
definitions and health states. 
 
14 Wilcoxon tests comparing non-parametric curvature estimates with AUC=0.5, and parametric estimates with 
𝛼 = 1, produced no significant results for all β (all p’s > 0.08), with one exception: β1 power utility for gains, 
p=0.04. 
 
 
Table 3.2. Individual classifications for utility curvature (n = concave, linear, convex), and 
loss aversion (n = loss averse, loss neutral, gain seeking) 
Health state 𝛽0: 11111 𝛽1:21211 𝛽2: 31221 𝛽3: 32341 
Utility curvature     
AUC – Gains 55, 0, 49 47, 0, 54 61, 0, 43 61, 0, 43 
AUC– Losses 44, 0, 60 42, 0, 62 49, 0, 55 56, 0, 48 
Power – Gains 54, 0, 50 47, 0, 57 62, 0, 42 65, 0, 39 
Power – Losses  41, 0, 63 41, 0, 63 51, 0, 53 53, 0, 51 
Loss aversion     
Köbberling/Wakker 90, 0, 14 92, 0, 12 95, 0, 9  89, 0, 15 
Kahneman/Tversky 86, 0, 15 85, 0 ,17 89, 0, 13 82, 0, 18 
 
Our design allowed exploring point-estimate stability for utility curvature and loss aversion 
between different levels of 𝛽𝑐. To this end, we calculated the difference between the smallest 
and largest estimate within-subjects (e.g. the lowest and highest λ). Furthermore, to allude to 
within-subjects heterogeneity in classification, we calculated the proportion of subjects for 
whom classifications were dependent on health states (e.g. loss averse for 𝛽0 to 𝛽2, gain 
seeking for β3). Both exploratory measures of within-subjects parameter and classification 
variance demonstrated considerable heterogeneity between health states (see Table 3.3). 
Finally, we investigated whether systematic patterns in utility curvature or loss aversion 
could be observed in our sample. To this end, we determined the extent to which subjects 
showed monotonically increasing (or decreasing) parameters (see Table 3.3). For loss 
aversion, this classification indicated that subjects became more (less) loss averse for 
increasing health state severity for 𝛽𝑐. These analyses indicate that these patterns did occur, 
but only for a small part of our sample, again suggesting non-systematic heterogeneity of 
parameter estimates. 
  
 
Table 3.3. Exploration of within-subjects heterogeneity for different health states 
 
Parameter point-
estimate difference 
(max – min) 
Health-state 
dependent 
classifications (%) 
Monotonically 
increasing/ 
decreasing (%) 
Utility curvature    
Non-par – Gains 0.26 75% 6% / 7% 
Non-par – Losses 0.18 76% 4% / 7% 
Power – Gains 1.17 73% 7% / 7% 
Power – Losses 0.75 79% 5% / 5% 
Loss aversion    
Köbberling Wakker 5.10 37% 8% / 7% 
Kahneman Tversky 4.17 49% 6% / 7% 
 
Discussion 
In this paper we compared estimates for utility curvature and loss aversion for QALY 
outcomes under four levels of QoL, to test the robustness of these estimates. An extensive 
literature exists testing the validity of QALY models, which has documented mixed evidence 
with regard to the separability of life duration and QoL (e.g. Abellan-Perpinan et al., 2006, 
Attema and Brouwer, 2012b, Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2005, Miyamoto and Eraker, 1988). 
Additionally, many authors have investigated utility independence with regard to health state 
valuation (e.g. the relation between utilities and time horizon in standard gambles), finding 
many descriptive violations of this independence (for a review, see: Attema and Brouwer, 
2012b). Ours was the first experimental test of this separability for QALY gains and losses 
separately, and we also tested the robustness of loss aversion. Our results, at the aggregate 
level, provided evidence that estimations of loss aversion and utility curvature are 
independent of QoL. However, loss aversion and utility curvature estimates were 
heterogeneous at the individual level, i.e. varied considerably between health states for the 
same individual.  
Our findings are in many regards similar to earlier work that measured PT for QALY 
outcomes. We observed considerable loss aversion (defined over length of life), as was found 
in similar magnitude in earlier work applying similar methodology (Attema et al., 2018a, and 
Chapter 7 of this dissertation), or with different elicitation methods (Attema et al., 2013, 
Attema et al., 2016). In contrast to what was observed in earlier applications of the non-
parametric method for health outcomes (Attema et al., 2018a, and in Chapter 7 of this 
dissertation), we found linear utility for both gains and losses at the aggregate level. Applying 
a parametric approach to our non-parametric measurements did not affect these conclusions. 
However, when estimating individual classifications, we found none for whom our data 
 
supported this linearity, as we observed a near equal spread in concave/convex utility (i.e. 
averaging out to linear).  
We document considerable heterogeneity in parameter estimates between-subjects, and in 
also observed such heterogeneity within-subjects for different health states. Our exploratory 
analyses did not uncover systematic or monotonic patterns in this within-subjects 
heterogeneity. An explanation related to our chosen chained utility elicitation method could 
be that these individual differences occurred as a result of preference imprecision (Bhatia and 
Loomes, 2017). Such ‘noisy preferences’ could result in error propagation, i.e. cascading of 
errors or imprecision in early stages of our chained method into later stages, producing 
differences in parameters between health states when errors occur randomly. Although earlier 
work using similar methodology (Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2000, and Chapter 7 of this 
dissertation) observed no effects of error propagation, we cannot rule out it affected current 
results. Another factor contributing to possible error propagation in our study could be that 
we opted to obtain indifferences via bi-section only (to reduce complexity), whereas earlier 
work (Abdellaoui et al., 2016) using this method applied a slider to obtain indifferences, 
allowing subjects to correct errors adaptively. Future work could explore this further, for 
example by adding a slider to obtain indifference points, using non-chained methodology, or 
running an error propagation simulation. 
Some additional limitations of this study deserve noting. First, since this study involved a 
first test of independence of loss aversion in health, we used a convenience sample consisting 
of students. Of course, future extensions preferably should include representative samples to 
generalize our findings. Although power analyses suggested that our sample was adequately 
powered to detect small effects, using a larger sample could perhaps result in the detection of 
smaller effects, also given the large heterogeneity for parameter estimates reported here. 
Second, we assumed it is possible to set the RP through instruction, while it may be the case 
that respondents took another RP in mind. Still, given the high loss aversion coefficients we 
found, it seems plausible that our respondents indeed held the induced RP in mind. Finally, 
our study used four mild to moderate health states, including perfect health, while the EQ-5D 
descriptive system enables many more possible health states, with more severe health 
problems than our selection. Given the aim of our study this is a clear limitation, as perhaps 
these states where insufficiently spaced in terms of utility for us to observe systematic 
patterns in loss aversion on utility curvature parameters. However, our empirical approach 
required us to make a fundamental assumption: monotonicity. The non-parametric method 
breaks down if monotonicity is not satisfied, i.e. if subjects prefer to lose years of life instead 
of gaining them. For more severe health states, monotonicity need not always hold 
(Sutherland et al., 1982). Obviously, many other mild health states were available for our 
purposes, but to reduce cognitive strain for our subjects we decided on including just four. 
For reference, these four health profiles receive utility weights ranging from 1.00 to 0.46 in 
the Dutch tariff (Versteegh et al., 2016), which we considered to be sufficient for our 
purposes. Future work could replicate our findings with a different or larger selection of 
health states.  
Our findings may have implications for policy makers and researchers aiming to apply PT 
measurements to health-related decision-making. Our results imply that median parameters in 
applications of PT may have merit, as these estimates appear to be robust across different 
scenarios (in terms of QoL). For example, our work warrants the conclusion that, at the 
 
aggregate level, life year losses are weighed twice as much as similarly-sized gains, 
regardless of QoL level. However, as our exploratory analyses of within-subject 
heterogeneity demonstrated, individuals’ loss aversion and utility curvature may depend on 
the health state used during elicitation. This heterogeneity at the individual level may be 
problematic for approaches using averages, like median-optimized parameters (Pinto-Prades 
and Abellan-Perpiñan, 2012). When aiming to address such loss aversion at the individual 
level, our data would suggest that assuming such median loss aversion parameters may 
misrepresent individuals’ actual preferences and trade-offs. When one aims to apply PT to 
allude to biases in individual cases (e.g. in health state valuation), an individual approach 
maybe more suitable, given both the considerable between-subjects and between-health states 
heterogeneity reported in this study. Such corrections with individually estimated parameters 
could be too time consuming and labor-intensive when applied separately for each economic 
evaluation. However, in many countries, such as the UK, QALYs are not derived 
individually, but from indirect’ preference-based classification systems, such as EQ-5D or 
SF-6D via tariff lists (Drummond et al., 2015). Recent developments in de-biasing QALY 
measurement (see Chapter 7 and 8 of this dissertation) have created new opportunities and 
arguments in favor of individual correction for PT within these frameworks, where 
proponents argue for large scale valuation studies to include (individual) corrections (see 
Chapter 7 and 8 of this dissertation). Given that these valuation studies aim to obtain accurate 
QALY weights, it seems important to consider which health state is used to quantify PT 
parameters, if such individual correction is to be applied.  
In conclusion, although we observed large heterogeneity of loss aversion and utility of life 
duration depending on QoL, we failed to observe systematic patterns in this dependence, and 
observed no differences on average. Future work should aim to address whether this 
heterogeneity is method-dependent or due to systematic differences between individuals or 
health states. For now, it appears that on average loss aversion is equal across health states, 
i.e. a QALY loss is a QALY loss is a QALY loss, and it receives approximately twice as 
much weight as equally sized QALY gains.  
 
 
  
Box 3.1. Analyses of utility curvature and loss aversion 
We non-parametrically calculated the area under the curve for 𝐿𝑖(𝑇), which was 
normalized to [0,1], for gains and [0, −1] for losses. If utility is linear, the area under this 
normalized curve equals one half for both gains and losses. Utility for gains in life 
duration is convex (concave) if the area under the curve is smaller (larger) than one half, 
while for losses the opposite direction holds (convex > ½, concave < ½). Second, we 
fitted a parametric utility curve to our data by employing the power family, with the 
utility of life duration defined as 𝑥𝛼 with 𝛼 > 0. As is well known, for gains [losses] 𝛼 >
1 corresponds to convex [concave] utility, 𝛼 = 1 corresponds to linear utility, and 𝛼 < 1 
corresponds to concave [convex] utility.  
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) defined loss aversion (λ) as – 𝑈(−𝑥) > 𝑈(𝑥) for all 𝑥 >
0. To measure loss aversion coefficients according to this definition, we computed 
– 𝑈(−𝑥𝑗
+) 𝑈(𝑥𝑗
+)⁄  and – 𝑈(−𝑥𝑗
−) 𝑈(𝑥𝑗
−)⁄  for 𝑗 = 1, … ,5. As a result of the trade-off 
procedure, 𝑈(−𝑥𝑗
+) and 𝑈(−𝑥𝑗
−) could usually not be observed directly and thus were 
determined through linear interpolation. Subjects were classified as loss averse if 
– 𝑈(−𝑥) 𝑈(𝑥)⁄ > 1 for more than half of the observations, as loss neutral if 
– 𝑈(−𝑥) 𝑈(𝑥)⁄ = 1 for more than half of the observations, and as gain seeking if 
– 𝑈(−𝑥) 𝑈(𝑥)⁄ < 1 for more than half of the observations.   
Köbberling and Wakker (2005) provided an easier method to determine loss aversion. 
They defined loss aversion (λ) as the kink of utility at the reference point. That is, they 
defined loss aversion as 𝑈↑
′(0) 𝑈↓
′(0)⁄ , with 𝑈↑
′(0) representing the left derivative and 
𝑈↓
′(0) the right derivative of 𝑈 at the reference point. To operationalize this definition, 
we computed each subject’s coefficient of loss aversion as the ratio of 𝑈(𝑥1
−) 𝑥1
−⁄  over 
𝑈(𝑥1
+) 𝑥1
+⁄ , because 𝑥1
− and 𝑥1
+ are the loss and gain elicited closest to the reference 
point. A subject was classified as loss averse if 𝑥1
+ −𝑥1
−⁄  > 1, loss neutral if 𝑥1
+ −𝑥1
−⁄  = 1, 
and gain seeking if 𝑥1
+ −𝑥1
−⁄  < 1. 
 
  
 
 
Chapter 4: One size fits all? Designing financial incentives 
tailored to individual preferences 
 
Chapter based on:  
S.A. Lipman (2020). One size fits all? Designing financial incentives tailored to individual 
preferences. Behavioural Public Policy. 
  
 
Abstract: Financial incentives are often designed to benefit from behavioral insights. 
Individuals’ preferences for such behaviorally inspired incentives are rarely studied, nor is 
the role the behavioral insights that motivated them play. This study aimed to let individuals 
design their own incentives (i.e. tailored incentives) and explore which individual 
characteristics are associated with these preferences for tailored incentives. A sample of 
students (n = 182) tailored hypothetical incentives for visiting the gym. Incentives could be 
tailored by: a) committing personal funds, b) picking weekly pay-outs (increasing or 
decreasing), and c) introducing pay-out risk whilst increasing value. Afterwards, (inter alia) 
loss aversion, probability weighting, time discounting, present bias, cognitive reflection, and 
trait self-control were measured. A large majority indicated to be willing to deposit their own 
money, and only very few individuals select risky incentives. These heterogeneous 
preferences for financial incentives are poorly predicted by the individual characteristics 
measured (i.e. economic preferences and psychological traits). These results suggest that 
preferences for tailored incentives could be studied as input for the design of financial 
incentives. However, it is unclear if tailoring incentives improves cost-effectiveness, as the 
lack of association between tailored incentives and the behavioral insights that motivate them 
has multiple conflicting interpretations. 
 
  
 
Introduction 
Financial incentives appear to be a promising public policy tool to promote behavior change 
for the most prominent causes of chronic, non-communicable disease (WHO, 2009), such as 
tobacco use, poor diet and physical inactivity (for systematic reviews, see: Giles et al., 2014, 
Mantzari et al., 2015, Mitchell et al., 2013, Strohacker et al., 2013). Many different financial 
incentive schemes are used, which differ for example in terms of the size, timing or certainty 
of payment (Adams et al., 2014). Often, insights from behavioral economics are used to 
motivate or design the financial incentives used. For example, financial incentives have been 
used that capitalize from behavioral insights such as loss aversion (e.g. deposit/commitment 
contracts: Bhattacharya et al., 2015, Bryan et al., 2010, Giné et al., 2010, Volpp et al., 2008) 
or probability weighting (e.g. lottery incentives: Haisley et al., 2012, Kimmel et al., 2012, van 
der Swaluw et al., 2018, Volpp et al., 2008). The effectiveness of such financial incentives, 
which Galizzi (2014) refers to as behaviorally inspired incentives, is hypothesized to be 
amplified by deviations from traditional rationality.  
However, no conclusive evidence exists to support policymakers in the choice between 
different (behaviorally inspired) financial incentive schemes. Several randomized control 
trials (e.g. Haisley et al., 2012, Patel et al., 2016) have systematically compared different 
incentive schemes directly against each other (e.g. lottery vs. commitment incentives), or 
against fixed incentives (Halpern et al., 2011). However, given the costly nature studying 
financial incentives, such studies far from exhaust all possible comparisons between 
behaviorally inspired incentives. The use of incentive schemes that mix behavioral 
components of different designs is even rarer (e.g. van der Swaluw et al., 2018). As a result, 
it is unclear who responds to financial incentives and why (Paloyo et al., 2015), which may 
explain why a one-size-fits-all approach is often applied: offering all respondents the same 
type of financial incentives (often motivated by a single behavioral insight, if any at all). The 
main motivation of this paper is to move beyond such one-size-fits-all approaches, and 
instead provide incentives tailored to individuals’ preferences. This extends earlier work on 
incentives is in two domains. 
First, existing work mostly compares behaviorally inspired incentives by means of random 
assignment (e.g. Kullgren et al., 2016, Volpp et al., 2008), rather than exploring which types 
of financial rewards individuals prefer themselves. However, scarce evidence suggests that 
preferences for behaviorally inspired incentives are heterogeneous. For example, Halpern and 
colleagues (2015) find that only 14% voluntarily accept deposit contracts, while Vashishta 
and colleagues (2015) find a small majority prefers lotteries over fixed incentives (in a non-
health context). Allowing individuals full autonomy in selecting those incentives they prefer 
(i.e. tailoring incentives) could increase individuals’ motivation to engage in healthy behavior 
(see the work on self-determination theory by: Deci and Ryan, 2008). Hence, in this study, a 
newly-developed tool is implemented which individuals to tailor their own incentives, i.e. 
each individual could select a unique combination of different incentive design elements. 
This tool was tested in a lab experiment, in which individuals were asked to self-select 
(hypothetical) tailored incentives to promote exercise. 
 Second, even though large heterogeneity exists in the economic preferences motivate 
behaviorally inspired incentive designs, the importance of these individual differences has 
rarely been explored in the context of financial incentives. For example, a plethora of work in 
 
experimental economics has shown large differences in for example probability weighting 
and loss aversion, both for money (e.g. Abdellaoui et al., 2016, Abdellaoui et al., 2007, 
Bleichrodt et al., 2016, Bruhin et al., 2010, Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992) and for health (e.g. Attema and Lipman, 2018, Kemel and Paraschiv, 2018, 
and Chapters 3 and 7 of this dissertation). This large heterogeneity in economic preferences 
raises several issues. For example, it is unknown if those who show preferences consistent 
with a behavioral insight (e.g. are loss averse) are to a larger extent affected by financial 
incentives designed with this behavioral insight in mind (e.g. deposit contracts) than those 
who are not. To date, only some evidence exists for lottery incentives for secondary 
prevention (Björkman Nyqvist et al., 2018) and financial incentives for exercise 
procrastination (Woerner, 2018). Furthermore, it is unknown if these economic preferences 
may explain heterogeneity in uptake of behaviorally inspired incentives, i.e. if those who are 
loss averse would be more (or less) likely to sign up for deposit contracts. This study 
addresses the latter issue, by for each respondent measuring a set of economic preferences, 
which are often used to motivate particular incentive design choices. To further explore who 
responds to financial incentives and why, the association between these economic preferences 
and tailored incentives is investigated.  
Experiment 
Sample and setting 
The sample consisted of 18215 Business Administration students (63 females, average age = 
19.17, SD =1.47) who were rewarded course credits for their participation. Sessions lasted 30 
minutes and were run in adjacent cubicles with an instructor present to answer any questions. 
Tool for tailored incentives 
Students were presented with a (hypothetical) scenario, in which their employer was 
facilitating their achievement of a weight-loss goal by offering a financial incentive for 
visiting the gym at least twice every week for a 10-week period. The reward had a fixed 
expected value of 100$ over this 10-week period. The tool for tailored incentives16 allowed 
individuals to interactively design their own incentive scheme, whilst keeping the expected 
value of the incentives constant. The following instruction was used: ‘Your employer is quite 
flexible, and besides the expected pay-out has no preference in how your financial reward is 
structured. Obviously, you yourself know best what kind of pay-out structure would motivate 
you to go to the gym and reach your goal of losing weight. Therefore, we ask you to indicate 
how you would like your pay-out(s) to be structured’. Students could tailor incentives along 
four dimensions, by: a) deciding to commit personal funds (Pre-commitment)17, b) picking 
weekly pay-outs (Timing), c) which could be increasing or decreasing (Sequence), and d) 
 
15 To my knowledge, this is the first study of tailored incentives, i.e. no studies were available as a basis for a 
priori sample size calculation. Post-hoc power analysis suggests that this study was powered to find small to 
medium effects (see the Online Supplements of this dissertation for analysis and interpretation). 
16 This tool was developed in Shiny, an R package allowing the development of web-apps. A demo version of 
the task is available at: https://referencepoints.shinyapps.io/Minecentive/. Code is available on request, and the 
task can be adapted by any researchers, organizations or policy makers interested in tailoring incentives.  
17 Such incentives in which individuals commit their personal funds are often referred to as deposit contracts. In 
the tool designed for this study, this option was called Pre-committing. 
 
introducing pay-out risk that increases value (Risk). Table 4.1 shows an overview of the 
framing and parametrization used for each dimension.  
Economic preference elicitation 
Table 4.2 provides an overview of the economic preferences elicited in this study, and the 
implications of these risk and time preferences (full detail on measurement and definitions 
can be found in Online Supplements). Risk preferences were elicited by measuring loss 
aversion, utility curvature (for gains and losses) and probability weighting (for gains and 
losses) using non-parametric methodology (adapted from Abdellaoui, 2000, Abdellaoui et al., 
2016). This methodology has been recently introduced, and inter alia successfully applied to 
measure risk and time preferences for decisions about money and health (Abdellaoui et al., 
2016, and Chapters 3 and 7 of this dissertation). The use of such non-parametric methodology 
may be preferred as it does not rely on certain parametric assumptions, which may not reflect 
preferences (Abdellaoui, 2000, Abdellaoui et al., 2007) or have troublesome mathematical 
properties around extremes (Wakker, 2008). Next, time preferences were measured assuming 
a quasi-hyperbolic discounting model (Laibson, 1997), where present bias (for gains and 
losses) and a weekly discount rate (for gains and losses) were elicited.  
Exploratory questionnaires 
Besides eliciting these economic preferences, subjects filled in a series of questionnaires, 
aimed at exploring the association between various psychological measures and tailored 
incentives. Several questions and questionnaires were used to measure self-reported health 
behaviors (alcoholic drinks/cigarettes consumed per week, exercise behavior and BMI), self-
control (Tangney et al., 2018), cognitive reflection (Toplak et al., 2011), and personality 
(Francis et al., 1992) (reprinted in the Online Supplements of this dissertation). These 
questionnaires were only filled in by subjects in time remaining after they finished the main 
experiment, and hence not completed by all subjects (see Table 4.3 for number of complete 
observations per measure).  
Results 
All analyses are available on request and are reported without correcting for multiple testing.  
Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.2 (economic preferences) and Table 4.3 (demographics and psychological measures) 
show descriptive statistics for the sample. These results indicate that students generally are: 
non-smokers, moderate drinkers, engaging in regular exercise, loss averse, diminishingly 
sensitive to gains and losses, sensitive to extreme probabilities (i.e. inverse S-shaped 
probability weighting), present biased, and not or slightly discounting monetary amounts on a 
weekly basis. However, the standard deviations reported in Table 4.2 and 4.3 reflect the 
considerable between-subject heterogeneity that motivated this study. 
 
Table 4.1. Overview of dimensions that could be edited to design tailored incentive schemes, with framing, options and parametrization  
Dimension Framing Options 
Pre-
commitment 
‘You can decide to pre-commit, by paying 100€ and your employer will 
add 100€. If you attain your weekly goals you will get this total amount 
of 200€, but you will lose (a part of) your committed 100€ if you don’t 
attain it’  
Do you want to pre-commit? 
Yes, I will pay for entry 
No 
Timing ‘For each week that you attain your goal you will rewarded. For 
example, if you attain your goals 8 out of 10 weeks, you will receive 
80% of the reward. You can choose to receive all of your pay-out at the 
end of the 10 week period, or to receive parts of this sum in weekly parts 
for each week you attain your goal. Obviously, not attaining your goals 
will mean you do not receive any pay-out that week. 
How often should your pay-outs be?  
One pay-out (at week 10) 
Weekly pay-outs 
Sequence  
 
(only shown if weekly pay-outs were selected) 
‘If you decide on weekly pay-outs, pay-out amounts can be fixed for 
each week, starting low or increasing or the other way around, the 
slider below lets you select different structures’ 
What should your pay-off structure be? 
(unbeknownst to respondents, each weekly reward 
was determined by multiplying the total available 
reward by a factor 𝑑𝑠, with: 
𝑑𝑠 = (10 + 𝑏 + 𝑟 ∗ 𝑡)/100,    𝑡 = 1,2, … 10) 
 
Slider options corresponded with the following 
parametrizations: 
Option 1: Strongly increasing, 𝑏 = −10, 𝑟 = 2 
Option 2: Increasing, 𝑏 = −5, 𝑟 = 1 
Option 3: Constant, 𝑏, 𝑟 = 0 
Option 4: Decreasing 𝑏 = 5, 𝑟 = −1 
Option 5: Strongly decreasing 𝑏 = 10, 𝑟 = −2 
Risk ‘Instead of receiving a sure amount, you may also receive your pay-out 
in the form of a lottery. Picking a lottery will increase your possible 
reward, but also increase the risk of not receiving any reward. The 
slider below lets you select different lottery structures.’ 
Chance of pay-out could be adjusted from: 
𝑝 =1-100%. This led to a lottery which increased 
the (weekly) pay-out by a factor of 100/𝑝.  
 
 
Table 4.2. Elicited economic preferences (including median and interquartile range), with the implication of modal (i.e. most frequently 
occurring) preferences and related dimensions of tailored incentives 
Parameter Median 
(Q1-Q3) 
N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Implication of modal preferences Ref. 
Loss aversion (𝝀)*  𝝀 < 𝟏 𝝀 = 𝟏 𝝀 > 𝟏   
 1.61  
(1.06 – 2.97) 
22 (12%) 11 (6%) 149 (81%) Monetary losses carry more weight than 
equally sized gains 
(Köbberling and 
Wakker, 2005) 
Utility curvature (𝜶)  𝜶 < 𝟏 𝜶 = 𝟏 𝜶 > 𝟏   
gains* 0.86 
(0.58 – 1.11) 
114 (62%) 7 (4%) 61 (33%) 
Each extra dollar gained carries less weight. 
(Abdellaoui et al., 
2016) 
losses* 0.91 
(0.70 – 1.18) 
104 (57%) 7 (4%) 71 (39%) 
Each extra dollar lost carries less weight. 
(Abdellaoui et al., 
2016) 
Probability weighting (𝜸)  𝜸 < 𝟏 𝜸 = 𝟏 𝜸 > 𝟏   
gains* 0.86 
(0.76 – 1.39) 
123 (67%) 4 (2%) 55 (30%) Small (large) chances of gains are 
overweighted (underweighted) 
(Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979) 
losses* 1.00 
(0.78 –2.63) 
88 (48%) 4 (2%) 90 (49%) Small (large) chances of gains are 
overweighted (underweighted) 
(Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979) 
Present Bias (𝜷)  𝜷 < 𝟏 𝜷 = 𝟏 𝜷 > 𝟏   
gains* 0.99 
(0.91 – 1.00) 
135 (74%) 5 (3%) 41 (22%) Gains incurred now always carry more 
weight than those in the future. 
(Laibson, 1997) 
losses* 0.99 
(0.93 – 1.01) 
101 (55%) 17 (9%) 64 (35%) Losses incurred now always carry more 
weight than those in the future. 
(Laibson, 1997) 
Discounting (𝜹)  𝜹 < 𝟎 𝜹 = 𝟎 𝜹 > 𝟎   
gains* 0.01 
(0.00 – 0.04) 
21 (11%) 6 (3%) 155 (85%) The positive value assigned to a dollar gained 
diminishes over time. 
(Laibson, 1997) 
losses* 0.00 
(0.00 – 0.01) 
66 (36%) 30 (16%) 86 (47%) The negative value assigned to a dollar lost 
increases over time. 
(Laibson, 1997) 
Note: * indicates that that this distribution was different that that expected by chance, tested with Chi-squared tests and a significance level of 
0.05. For definitions and implications of 𝜆, 𝛼, 𝛾, 𝛽, and 𝛿, see the Online Supplements of this dissertation).
 
Tailored incentives 
The results of the tool for tailored incentives can be found in Table 4.4. A significant majority 
decided to pre-commit personal funds to increase rewards (Chi squared test, 𝜒2(1, 𝑁 = 182) 
= 22.51, p < 0.001), and a near-even split existed in the sample for preferences for one or 
weekly pay-outs. Those preferring weekly pay-outs, generally preferred slightly increasing or 
constant pay-outs. Lottery incentives were infrequently selected, with a negligible group (3 
out of 163) selecting the lowest possible chance of winning and a large and significant 
majority preferring certain pay-outs rather than any of the other possible probabilities of pay-
out (Chi squared test, 𝜒2(34, 𝑁 = 182) = 1397, p < 0.001) The three most prominent tailored 
incentive schemes were: pre-committing with one certain pay-out (12% of the sample), pre-
committing with weekly, constant pay-outs (8% of the sample), and pre-committing with 
weekly, slightly increasing pay-outs (8% of the sample). 
Association between selected tailored incentives and economic preferences 
Next, a series of analyses was performed to explore the association between the tailored 
incentives students selected and their economic preferences.  
First, these associations were explored by means of t tests (for Pre-commitment and Timing 
dimensions) and Spearman rank-correlation analyses (Structure and Risk dimensions) 
between individuals’ choices on each dimension and the various measures obtained, which 
showed no consistent associations. For example, no significant differences were oberved 
between individuals who chose deposit contracts or not for: loss aversion, probability 
weighting, utility curvature, present bias, time discounting, health behaviors, cognitive 
reflection, personality, and trait self-control (t tests, all p’s > 0.08). A similar lack of evidence 
for Timing (t tests, all p’s > 0.07), Structure (all Spearman ρ’s < 0.15, p’s> 0.08), and Risk 
(all Spearman ρ’s < 0.11, p’s> 0.15) can be observed. The only exception was the parameter 
for present bias for losses, with those who chose one pay-out having stronger present bias for 
losses, t(160) = -2.02, p = 0.04.  
Next, it was explored if those who chose one of the most prominent tailored preference 
patterns differed on the obtained economic and psychological measures. We found no such 
differences for respondents pre-committing with one certain pay-out (t tests, all p’s > 0.12). A 
similar lack of evidence is observed for those who chose to commit with certain weekly pay-
outs, constant (t tests, all p’s > 0.12), or slightly increasing (t tests, all p’s > 0.12). Several 
exceptions were observed: i) those pre-committing with weekly constant pay-outs discounted 
losses at a lower rate, t(160)= -2.02, p = 0.04 , and ii) those pre-committing with weekly, 
slightly increasing pay-outs had more concave utility curvature for gains, discounted both 
gains and losses to a smaller extent and had less pronounced present bias for losses (t tests, all 
p’s <0.03). 
Finally, this lack of systematic association between the obtained measures and tailored 
incentives was confirmed by a series multiple linear or logistic regression analyses, in which 
subject characteristics, economic preferences and psychological traits were included stepwise 
as predictors for each tailored incentive dimension (for model specifications used and 
regression results see the Online Supplements of this dissertation).  
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3. Descriptive statistics for demographic variables and psychological traits measures 
Health behaviors n M  SD Psychological measures n M SD 
Cigarettes (per 
week)  
182  1.05  2.64  Trait self-control  163  3.13  0.58  
BMI  182  21.85  4.24  Cognitive reflection  147  1.65  1.16  
Alcohol 
(glasses/week)  
182  7.91  9.40  EPQ - Neuroticism  136  0.58  0.20  
Exercise 
(days/week)  
182  2.85  1.67  EPQ - Extraversion  136  0.50  0.18  
    EPQ - Psychoticism  136  0.43  0.19  
    EPQ – Social 
desirability  
136  0.52  0.23  
 
 Table 4.4. Descriptive statistics for tailored incentives selection using newly developed tool 
Dimension Options: Count (%) 
Pre-commitment (n = 182) No 
Yes 
59 (32%) 
123 (68%) 
Timing (n = 182) One pay-out 
Weekly pay-out 
85 (47%) 
97 (53%) 
Sequence 
(n = 97)  
Strongly increasing 
Increasing 
Constant 
Decreasing 
Strongly decreasing 
14 (14%) 
37 (38%) 
31 (32%) 
11 (11%) 
4 (4%) 
Risk 
(n = 182) 
1% (highest risk) 
2% - 9% 
10% - 39% 
40% – 69% 
70 – 99% 
100% (no risk) 
3 (2%) 
0 (0%) 
6 (3%) 
40 (22%) 
46 (25%) 
87 (48%) 
 
Discussion 
Heterogeneity in preferences for financial incentives for health behavior change has rarely 
been studied (one of the few examples being: Halpern et al., 2015), and, thus, it is unclear 
who responds to financial incentives and why (Paloyo et al., 2015). To provide policymakers 
with some support in the choice between different (behaviorally inspired) financial incentive 
schemes, this study explored the preferences of respondents themselves. More specifically, 
this study aimed to explore heterogeneity in the type of financial incentives individuals prefer 
and if the behavioral insights oft used in practice to motivate the choice for a particular 
design are associated with these preferences.  
 
Surprisingly, the findings of this study indicate a large majority students would commit their 
own money to reach their exercise goals, whereas the work by Halpern and colleagues (2015) 
suggested uptake of such deposit contracts to be much lower. Furthermore, even though 
lottery incentives with small chances of receiving a relatively large sum have been used 
successfully (e.g. Haisley et al., 2012, Kimmel et al., 2012, van der Swaluw et al., 2018, 
Volpp et al., 2008), very few students selected incentives with low chances (<1% - 5%) of 
winning a prize for themselves. These tailored preferences were not systematically related to 
any of the behavioral insights often used to motivate implementation of behaviorally inspired 
incentives in practice (or to any of the measured health behaviors and psychological 
measures). Hence, although autonomy is likely increased by allowing individuals full 
freedom to design their own financial incentives using a tool like the one developed for this 
study, the results reported here provide no insight into why individuals prefer particular 
incentive schemes and if this will improve cost-effectiveness. Before providing 
interpretations based on this null result, and discuss explanations for the lack of evidence, 
several methodological limitations deserve noting.  
First, the preferences reported here are obtained from students, and may not apply to the 
populations in which financial incentives are used to promote health behavior, such as 
individuals motivated to change their behavior (e.g. Halpern et al., 2015, van der Swaluw et 
al., 2018), or people in lower/middle income countries (for a review, see Ranganathan and 
Lagarde, 2012). For example, census data show that the young and highly educated exercise 
more than other populations (CBS/RIVM, 2018), and students may thus need fewer 
incentives to go to the gym twice a week. Second, all preferences obtained in this study were 
for hypothetical outcomes. In other words, this study investigated the association between 
hypothetical financial incentives for exercise and economic preferences elicited over 
hypothetical monetary outcomes. Although earlier work has suggested that preferences for 
hypothetical and real outcomes are not qualitatively different (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999, 
Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001), generally the use of real outcomes is preferred in behavioral 
experiments in health, as hypothetical incentives may lead to increased measurement error 
(Galizzi and Wiesen, 2018). Third, the experimental set-up and instructions used for this 
study could have had an influence on the findings reported in this study. For example, 
students were instructed to tailor incentives for going to the gym twice in order to reach a 
weight loss goa, and also explicitly told that they would know which incentives would 
motivate them. However, no further information is provided on their weight loss goal, the 
nature of the activities they should (imagine themselves to) perform in the gym, or how they 
should know what motivates them. As such, the instructions could have been open to 
alternative interpretations, which future work could remedy by using different instructions 
and focus on individuals’ own health promotion goals. Furthermore, all measures obtained in 
this study were filled in by respondents only after they reported their preferences for tailored 
incentives. Without any counterbalancing procedures this study could not be controled for 
ordering effects, as for example found in Carlsson and colleagues (2012). However, 
economic preferences were generally in line with those found in earlier applications of the 
methods used in this study (Abdellaoui et al., 2016, Bruhin et al., 2010, and Chapter 7 of this 
dissertation), and no association was observed between these preferences and the incentives 
selected. Hence, it is unlikely that respondents aimed to be consistent between the two parts 
of the experiment.  
 
 
This study reports an exploration of the economic preferences that influence the incentives 
individuals prefer and found none to be systematically associated with self-selected 
incentives. This null result can mean one of two things: i) no such association exists or ii) the 
methods used failed to capture this association between economic preferences and (tailored) 
incentive. One explanation for the former, as suggested by Halpern and colleagues (2015) for 
the low uptake of deposit contracts (which were the most effective incentive design in their 
study), respondents may lack the sophistication to select financial incentives that would 
benefit them the most (e.g. they have insufficient knowledge of their own preferences, as 
found by: Hey and Lotito, 2009). This would explain why no association could be found 
between behavioral insights such as loss aversion and probability weighting, and the 
incentive dimensions these constructs are hypothesized to amplify.  
On the other hand, the null result reported in this study may also be explained by a lack of 
external validity of economic preferences or insufficient statistical power to detect small but 
relevant effects. For example, earlier work has questioned whether the elicitation of economic 
preferences has bearing on decision-making in the field at all (Galizzi et al., 2016a, Galizzi 
and Navarro-Martínez, 2018, Schram, 2005). As such, one could question the usefulness of 
measuring economic preferences in the context of provision of financial incentives. 
Nonetheless, Björkman Nyqvist et al. (2018) did find a strong association between risk 
preferences and lottery incentives for uptake of secondary prevention in a field study in 
Lesotho. Compared to the field study by Björkman Nyqvist et al. (2018), this study used 
hypothetical incentives and a relatively small sample. Hence, the smaller statistical power and 
possibly increased noise related to hypothetical incentives may explain why this large effect 
did not extend to the lab. 
To conclude, this study has several implications for future research and policy. The 
descriptive results reported suggest that that preferences for financial incentives differ 
between individuals. Hence, governments or organizations aiming to use financial incentives 
could, for example, use this tool or a similar one to study these preferences in their target 
population as input for the design of their interventions. Furthermore, it could be studied if 
tailoring incentives improves their cost-effectiveness, for example because tailoring increases 
motivation through enhanced autonomy, or because a subgroup of sophisticated individuals 
select incentives that are especially beneficial to them. An alternative way forward, to be 
explored either in future research or policy, is to assign individuals financial incentives that 
fit their economic preferences. However, although behavioral insights are oft used to 
motivate one-size-fits-all behaviorally inspired financial incentives, the theoretical or 
empirical basis for assigning individual-level tailored incentives is currently lacking.  
    
 
  
 
 
Part II: Applying behavioral insights to health state valuation   
 
  
 
 
Chapter 6: What’s it going to be, TTO or SG? A direct test of the 
validity of health state valuation. 
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Abstract: Standard gamble (SG) typically yields higher health state valuations than time 
trade-off (TTO), which may be caused by biases affecting both methods. It has been 
suggested that TTO yields more accurate health state valuations, because TTO is subject to 
both upward and downward biases that may cancel out. Verifying this claim, however, would 
require a golden standard to test validity against. In this study, we attempted to provide a first 
direct test of the validity of health state valuation. A total of 119 students completed five 
TTO and SG tasks. Afterwards, their health state valuations elicited with TTO and SG were 
shown to them in an interactive graph. Respondents were asked to indicate which of the 
methods represented their valuation of a health state best. They could also adjust their 
valuation. Overall, we found that respondents indicated that TTO valuations better reflected 
health state valuations, a result that was more pronounced for more severe health states. 
When offered the opportunity, on average respondents adjusted health state valuations 
downwards. These findings may have implication for future work on (bias correction in) 
health state valuations. 
  
 
 
Introduction 
Time trade-off (TTO) and standard gamble (SG) are two popular health state valuation 
methods (Drummond et al., 2015). Both methods enable the estimation of weights 
representing utility of health status, used for calculating quality-adjusted life years (QALYs). 
Despite their shared purpose, the operationalization of TTO and SG is different. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, so are the health utility weights elicited with these methods (henceforth 
referred to as QALY weights). Typically, QALY weights elicited with TTO (henceforth: 
TTO weights) are lower than those elicited with SG (henceforth: SG weights), which raises 
questions about which method yields the more appropriate QALY weights (see: Bleichrodt 
and Johannesson, 1997, Torrance, 1976). 
Both methods involve direct choices between two options, of which one is living in some 
health state 𝑄 for 𝑌 years. In TTO, respondents are offered an alternative: to live in perfect 
health (described as a state without health problems) for a shorter time, i.e. 𝑋 years (𝑋 < 𝑌). 
Respondents are asked to indicate duration 𝑋 such that they are indifferent between both 
options. In practice, this indifference is evaluated by normalizing the utility of perfect health 
to 1 and that of being dead to 0, and assuming that the utility of duration is linear (Torrance, 
1987). Under these strict assumptions, the obtained indifference reveals the TTO weight of 
state 𝑄, which is obtained by: 𝑋/𝑌. SG offers a different alternative to living in health state 𝑄 
for 𝑌 years: a lottery that results in perfect health for 𝑌 years (with probability 𝑝), or 
immediate death (with probability 1 − 𝑝). Respondents are asked to indicate probability 𝑝 
such that they are indifferent between both options. In practice it is often assumed that 
respondents handle the risky lottery as modeled in expected utility theory. Under this strict 
assumption, probability 𝑝 in the obtained indifference reveals the SG weight of state 𝑄.  
Bleichrodt (2002) proposed that the differences between TTO and SG weights could be 
explained by violations of the strict assumptions underlying the methods. SG responses are 
expected to be biased upwards (by probability weighting and loss aversion), while TTO 
responses are expected to be biased both upwards (by loss aversion) and downwards (by scale 
compatibility and utility curvature). Hence, Bleichrodt (2002) argued that i) the upward and 
downward bias in TTO might cancel out (to some extent) and ii) the difference between TTO 
and SG would diminish when these strict assumptions are dropped (e.g. as in prospect 
theory).While empirical evidence suggests that under less restrictive assumptions the 
differences between SG and TTO indeed diminish (van Osch et al., 2004, and also in Chapter 
7 of this dissertation), the first claim by Bleichrodt (2000) is more difficult to address. If bias 
(partly) cancels out, this implies that that TTO weights are likely to be a better approximation 
of health state valuation. Testing the validity of QALY weights, however, would require a 
golden standard for ‘true’ health state preferences, to compare weights elicited with different 
methods to. It is safe to say that even the degree to which true preferences exist, and can be 
measured, is controversial (e.g. Braga and Starmer, 2005), let alone with what method they 
could be derived. 
Instead, we propose a simple, direct test of validity of health state valuation: the opinion of 
the respondents whose preferences should actually be reflected. After eliciting QALY 
weights with TTO and SG, we provide respondents with the valuations derived from their 
responses to reflect on their validity. To our knowledge, our study is the first to ask direct 
feedback about QALY weights during health state valuation.  
 
Methods 
A total of 119 Business Administration students took part in this experiment and were 
rewarded course credit for participation. The sample consisted of 44 (37%) males and 75 
(63%) females, with a mean age of 20 (SD = 0.99). The experiment took place in a 
university-based computer lab, in experimenter-led sessions of 30 minutes, run with up to 
four students. In the first and second part of this experiment (programmed in Shiny), after 
completing a practice task for a health state described as ‘chronic back pain’, subjects 
completed a block of TTO (SG) tasks for the following EQ-5D-5L health states: 21211, 
31221, 31231, 31341, 33342 (see Table 6.1). Tasks (i.e. TTO or SG) and health states were 
presented in randomized order between-subjects. In the third part (i.e., the ‘validation’), 
subjects were presented with the implications of their responses in the first and second part 
(henceforth: implied QALY weights), and asked to validate them. After completing the 
experiment, subjects filled out a paper-and-pencil questionnaire measuring age, sex, and how 
difficult they felt the tasks were on a scale from 1 (not difficult at all) to 10 (very difficult)18.  
Table 6.1. Health states used in this experiment including tariff elicited from Dutch value set 
for EQ-5D-5L (Versteegh et al., 2016) 
Health state Q1: 21211 Q2: 31221 Q3: 31231 Q4: 31341 Q5: 33342 
Dutch Tariff  0.88 0.79 0.76 0.47 0.34 
You have … problems with 
walking 
Slight Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
You have … problems with 
washing and dressing yourself 
No No No No Slight 
You have … problems with 
washing and dressing yourself 
Slight Slight Slight Moderate Moderate 
… pain or discomfort No Slight Moderate Severe Severe 
 … anxious or depressed. Not Not Not Not Not 
 
TTO and SG task 
Both methods were operationalized using the common 10-year duration (as is usual in 
valuation studies, see: Oppe et al., 2014), i.e. the period in the impaired health state was 10 
years (𝑌 = 10). TTO and SG indifferences were obtained through a bisection process with 5 
choices. These 5 choices produced an indifference point, which subjects could confirm or 
change with a slider. These slider values were used to calculate the SG and TTO weights (as 
highlighted in the introduction). An overview of the instructions and supporting graphs used 
can be found in the Online Supplements of this dissertation. 
 
18 We found no differences in task difficulty across TTO, SG and validation (paired Wilcoxon tests, p’s > 0.48). 
 
 
Validation task 
For the validation task, subjects were explained the purpose of health state valuation and 
QALYs (see Online Supplements of this dissertation). These instructions were based on 
earlier work in which QALYs were successfully explained in an experimental setting 
(Bleichrodt et al., 2005). Afterwards, for each health state, the implied QALY weights for 
TTO and SG were visually represented on the QALY scale (labeled Option A and B in 
random order). Respondents were asked to indicate which value best represents the value of 
the health state (even if they were the same). Next, respondents could further adjust the 
chosen QALY weight (henceforth: confirmed QALY weights), if they felt that that would 
improve the health state valuation. To practice, respondents again first completed this 
validation task for chronic back pain.  
 
Figure 6.1. Median QALY weights elicited by TTO and SG, including the final QALY 
weights selected after validation 
Results 
For each health state, TTO, SG and confirmed QALY weights were not distributed normally 
(Shapiro-Wilk tests, all p’s <0.02). As such, we will apply non-parametric tests and compare 
median rather than mean QALY weights. Furthermore, the health states used in this 
experiment allow tests of logical consistency. Each consecutive health state had the same or 
more problems on each dimension, such that it would be expected that respondents for 
example preferred state 31221 (Q2) to 31231 (Q3). Only 13% of our sample showed such 
consistency throughout the whole experiment. The analyses reported below were repeated 
excluding inconsistent respondents (using a variety of exclusion criteria). The main 
conclusions were unaffected (as shown in the Online Supplements of this dissertation).  
 
Table 6.2. Overall respondent preferences for implied QALY weights and direction of 
change for confirmed QALY weights (n denotes the number of respondents, ↑ and ↓ denote 
upwards and downwards change) and divided by initial ordering of TTO and SG weights. 
Note: a signifies that the proportion preferring this method’s implied QALY weight (i.e. TTO 
or SG) is significantly  higher than the other (Chi-squared test, p<0.05), b signifies that (of 
those adjusting) a larger proportion adjusted QALY weights in this direction.  
TTO and SG task 
Figure 6.1 shows that health states received monotonically decreasing QALY weights for 
both TTO and SG (paired Wilcoxon tests, all 𝑝’𝑠 < 0.001). Inter-quartile ranges for TTO (SG) 
were between 0.21 and 0.40 (0.23-0.37) for all health states. The weights were only 
significantly different from the Dutch EQ-5D tariffs for Q4 and Q5 (Wilcoxon tests, p’s < 
0.002). For all health states, TTO weights were significantly lower than SG weights (paired 
Wilcoxon tests, all 𝑝’𝑠 < 0.02). A within-subject comparison showed that for all health states, 
SG weights were most likely to be higher (55-66%). Sometimes, TTO values were higher 
 Overall (n=119) 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Total 
Preferred TTO (n) 63 67 62 78 a 79 a 349 a 
Adjusted ↑(n) 15 12 17 20 16 80 
Adjusted ↓ (n) 15 19 21 27 37 b 119 b 
Preferred SG (n) 56 52 57 41 40 246 
Adjusted ↑(n) 12 8 9 10 8 47 
Adjusted ↓ (n) 17 20 b 22 b 12 16 87 b 
 Implied TTO weight > SG weight 
 Q1 (n=40) Q2 (n=39) Q3 (n=40) Q4 (n=38) Q5 (n=26) Total 
Preferred TTO (n) 23 14 13 10 8 68 
Adjusted ↑(n) 5 2 6 1 1 15 
Adjusted ↓ (n) 5 4 2 5 3 19 
Preferred SG (n) 17 25 27 a 28 a 18 a 115 a 
Adjusted ↑(n) 5 4 6 7 4 26 
Adjusted ↓ (n) 6 11 12 12 8 49 b 
 Implied TTO weight < SG weight 
 Q1 (n=65) Q2 (n=68) Q3 (n=72) Q4 (n=68) Q5 (n=78) Total 
Preferred TTO (n) 33 46 a 47 a 59 a 62 a 247 a 
Adjusted ↑(n) 9 8 10 19 12 58 
Adjusted ↓ (n) 8 15 19 19 31 b 92 b 
Preferred SG (n) 32 22 25 9 16 115 
Adjusted ↑(n) 6 4 2 3 4 19 
Adjusted ↓ (n) 10 8 8 0 6 32 
 Implied TTO weight = SG weight 
 Q1 (n=14) Q2 (n=12) Q3 (n=7) Q4 (n=13) Q5 (n=15) Total 
Preferred TTO (n) 7 7 2 9 9 34 
Adjusted ↑(n) 1 2 1 0 3 7 
Adjusted ↓ (n) 2 0 0 3 3 8 
Preferred SG (n) 7 5 5 4 6 27 
Adjusted ↑(n) 1 0 1 0 0 2 
Adjusted ↓ (n) 1 1 2 0 2 6 
 
 
(22-34%) or both methods yielded equal values (6-13%). Chi-squared analyses showed that 
these counts were significantly different (all p’s <0.001), i.e. the finding of higher SG values 
was also confirmed within-subjects. 
Validation task: preferences for implied QALY weights 
Table 6.2 shows the number of individuals that preferred the implied TTO or SG weights per 
health state. Overall, it can be concluded that for each health state (if a difference existed 
between TTO and SG), the majority of respondents indicated TTO weights represented the 
value of that health state best. Compiled for all health states, this finding was significant 
(Chi-squared test, p < 0.001). Analyses per health state showed that it was significant only for 
the two most severe health states. We also studied preferences for implied QALY weights 
within-subjects, showing that only 18% (5%) consistently preferred TTO (SG) values for all 
health states. Table 6.2 also shows preferences for implied QALY weights and adjustments 
split for which of the two weights was initially higher. Combined for all health states, these 
results show that if SG was higher than TTO, respondents were more likely to pick TTO (Chi 
squared test, p < 0.001). The opposite also holds. i.e. if TTO was higher than SG, SG weights 
was more likely to be preferred. Chi-squared test, p < 0.001). When analyzing separately for 
each health state, this holds for Q2 (only when TTO weights were smaller than SG weights) 
to Q5 (Chi squared tests, p’s < 0.05). If both weights were the same, no differences were 
observed in preferred implied QALY weight (Chi-squared test, all p’s > 0.16), i.e. the forced 
choice among two identical QALY weights was distributed independently.  
Validation task: confirmed QALY weights 
Respondents were likely to adjust their implied QALY weights, with 50% to 65% choosing 
to adjust, depending on the health state. Figure 1 shows that for all health states but Q1, 
median confirmed QALY weights were lower than TTO and SG weights. Inter-quartile 
ranges for confirmed QALY weights were similar to TTO and SG, i.e. between 0.16 and 
0.39, depending on health state. The difference between confirmed QALY weights and TTO 
weights was significant for Q4 and Q5 (paired Wilcoxon test, p’s < 0.02), while for SG 
weights such significant differences were observed for all health states except Q1 (paired 
Wilcoxon test, p’s < 0.001). Next, we explored the validity of confirmed QALY weights. We 
found significantly fewer logical inconsistencies after validation compared to both TTO and 
SG (paired Wilcoxon test, p’s < 0.03). Furthermore, combined for all health states, we find 
the fewest non-trading responses (i.e. QALY weights of 1) for confirmed QALY weights. 
This non-trading occurred significantly less compared to SG (Chi-squared test, p < 0.001), 
but not compared to TTO (Chi-squared test, p = 0.32). Finally, we explored which types of 
changes respondents made. Overall, for both TTO and SG, respondents were more likely to 
change their elicited QALY weights downwards than upwards (Chi-squared tests, p’s < 
0.001). These patterns were also studied separately depending on which method’s implied 
QALY weight was initially higher. Combined for all health states, these analyses show that 
respondents that made an adjustment were significantly more likely to adjust the lower of the 
two implied QALY weights downwards, both for TTO (Chi-squared test, p < 0.006) and SG 
(Chi-squared test, p < 0.008). 
 
Discussion 
In this study, we provided the first direct test of the validity of health state valuation, by 
asking respondents to reflect on their QALY weights elicited with TTO and SG. Whereas the 
EuroQol group by now applies a feedback module in their standard valuation protocol (Stolk 
et al., 2019), their module only allows respondents to reflect on the validity of the ordering 
implied by their responses. This ordinal feedback module led to reduced inconsistencies 
without strongly affecting QALY weights (Wong et al., 2018). Our study goes beyond this 
approach as we explain the QALY scale and QALY weights to respondents, and in that 
context respondents choose which elicited QALY weight is more valid and adjust it if 
necessary. 
We find that, according to respondents themselves, TTO weights are a better reflection of the 
value of a health state. This finding is in accordance with predictions by Bleichrodt (2002), 
who argued that upward and downward bias in this method may cancel out. Nonetheless, this 
cancelling out seemingly is not perfect, since respondents often adjusted their implied QALY 
weights. On average, the direction of this change was downwards, yielding lower confirmed 
QALY weights than implied by TTO. This may suggest that, as for example was found in 
Chapter 7 of this dissertation, the net effect of bias in TTO remains upwards. In this study, 
the magnitude of this remaining bias appears to increase with severity, with confirmed QALY 
weights being significantly lower than TTO weights for the two severest states only. Perhaps, 
directly correcting biases (as in Chapter 7 of this dissertation) could provide a further step 
towards valid QALY weights, rather than hoping biases in different directions cancel out. 
A few limitations deserve noting. First, we used a relatively small student sample, which 
means that the generalizability of our findings may be questioned. We encourage future work 
to apply this approach in (larger) general public samples (for instance in the context of EQ-
5D valuation). Second, we used our approach only in the context of health states better than 
dead, which might be remedied in future work using methods suitable for valuing health 
states worse than dead. Finally, an alternative explanation of our findings, which also reflects 
a fundamental difficulty in directly presenting and validating QALY weights, would be that 
our validation task has some resemblance to a visual analogue scale (VAS). It is well-known 
that VAS may suffer from other biases than TTO and SG do, and QALY weights elicited 
with VAS are generally lower than those elicited with TTO and SG (Bleichrodt and 
Johannesson, 1997, Robinson et al., 1997, Robinson et al., 2001). As any method of 
presenting QALY weights might suffer from biases, future work could, for example, test if 
alternative graphical or textual presentations lead to different conclusions. 
To conclude, it appears that, as Bleichrodt (2002) suggested, on average TTO better reflects 
individuals’ preferences for health states, perhaps as a result of biases cancelling out. 
However, the substantial proportion of individuals that adjusted their QALY weights when 
given the opportunity suggest the quest to increase validity of methods in health state 
valuation methods has not yet ended.  
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Abstract: Common health state valuation methodologies, such as standard gamble (SG) and 
time trade-off (TTO), typically produce different weights for identical health states. We 
attempt to alleviate these differences by correcting the confounding influences modeled in 
prospect theory (PT): loss aversion and probability weighting. Furthermore, we correct for 
non-linear utility of life duration. In contrast to earlier attempts at correcting TTO and SG 
weights, we measure and correct all these tenets simultaneously, using newly developed non-
parametric methodology. These corrections were applied to three less-than-perfect health 
states, measured with TTO and SG. We found considerable loss aversion, and probability 
weighting for both gains and losses in life years, and observe concave utility for gains and 
convex utility for losses in life years. After correction, the initially significant differences in 
weights between TTO and SG disappeared for all health states. Our findings suggest new 
opportunities to account for bias in health state valuations, but also the need for further 
validation of resulting weights. 
 
  
 
 
Introduction 
In cost-utility analyses (CUA), incremental costs of medical technology are compared with 
incremental health benefits, commonly expressed in Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs). 
These QALYs (Pliskin et al., 1980) are obtained multiplying prospective life years by 
weights, sometimes referred to as ‘utilities’. QALY weights represent health-related quality 
of life, such that 0 represents the subjective weight of the state ‘dead’ and 1 that of full health. 
Several methods are used to obtain QALY weights, most notably Standard Gamble (SG) and 
Time Trade-Off (TTO). Empirical work, however, has demonstrated that QALY weights 
differ systematically between these two elicitation methods, with SG weights being higher 
than TTO weights (e.g. Bleichrodt and Johannesson, 1997, Torrance, 1976). As a 
consequence, QALY weights and, hence, outcomes of economic evaluations may depend on 
the health state valuation (HSV) method used.  
Bleichrodt (2002) proposed that these discrepancies in elicited QALY weights may result 
from empirically invalid assumptions present in the theoretical frameworks underlying TTO 
and SG. More specifically, Bleichrodt (2002) argues that TTO and SG weights are biased as 
they are obtained under the assumptions of expected utility (EU) theory, which has been 
shown to be descriptively invalid for health outcomes (Bleichrodt et al., 2007, Treadwell and 
Lenert, 1999). Additionally, although discounted QALY models exist (for an overview, see 
Hansen and Østerdal, 2006), TTO and/or SG weights are commonly derived under the linear 
QALY model, which assumes linear utility of life duration (and no discounting of future life 
years). However, many authors have found diminishing marginal utility of life years; i.e. life 
years that occur in the distant future tend to receive less weight than life years in the nearer 
future (Abellan-Perpinan et al., 2006, Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2005, Wakker and Deneffe, 
1996). In order to obtain QALYs without bias, a methodological shift may be required in 
HSV towards the use of descriptive utility models such as prospect theory (PT).  
PT is characterized by four tenets (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Tversky and Kahneman, 
1992). These are: (1) reference dependence – utility derived from a good is defined over 
differences from a reference point (RP), instead of over the overall consumption of that good; 
(2) loss aversion - the utility function has an inflection point at the RP and is steeper for 
losses than for gains; (3) diminishing sensitivity - utility is concave for gains and convex for 
losses, which indicates diminishing sensitivity to outcomes further from the RP; and (4) 
probability weighting - the decision maker overweighs small probabilities and underweighs 
large probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). PT is 
usually applied to decisions about money, but has also been extended to health outcomes 
(Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2000, Miyamoto and Eraker, 1989). Importantly, as Bleichrodt (2002) 
proposed, the tenets modelled in PT will likely affect the TTO and SG method differently, 
with loss aversion exerting an upward bias on both methods, but utility curvature only 
affecting TTO while probability weighting only affects SG.  
Given the increased importance of CUA in informing health policy (Drummond et al., 2015), 
it is imperative to validly determine the weights that are ascribed to the relevant health states. 
The valuation of these health states, for example when obtaining tariffs for the commonly 
used EQ-5D-5L generic utility classification system (Versteegh et al., 2016), would 
necessarily occur within a descriptive context (Bleichrodt et al., 2001). This means that the 
status quo of applying EU and/or the linear QALY model to derive TTO and SG weights a) 
 
will not capture actual preferences, as these may include for example loss aversion, and b) 
may lead to different TTO and SG weights according to Bleichrodt (2002)19. As such, our 
main motivation is to address the discrepancy between TTO and SG weights by obtaining 
these QALY weights using derivations based on a descriptively valid but non-normative 
theory (PT). We will refer to this process, where TTO and SG weights are obtained while 
incorporating loss aversion, non-linear utility and/or probability weighting into their 
derivation, as correction for PT. If correcting TTO and SG for PT is feasible, it could be used 
to correct observed responses in health state valuations, allowing corrected weights to be used 
when calculating QALYs to express health benefits in CUAs, as commonly done. 
Some studies have attempted to test Bleichrodt’s (2002) predictions about PT and correct 
HSV techniques by assuming PT or adjusting for utility curvature (Attema and Brouwer, 
2009, Martin et al., 2000, Oliver, 2003a, van Osch et al., 2004, Wakker and Stiggelbout, 
1995). Yet, to date no study has been able to simultaneously correct both TTO and SG for 
loss aversion, utility curvature and probability weighting (see the Online Supplements of this 
dissertation for an overview of earlier studies on corrections). In this study we adapted a 
recently proposed methodology (Abdellaoui et al., 2016) to measure these three deviations 
without parametric assumptions, and elicit TTO and SG weights without assuming EU or the 
linear QALY model. In other words, we provide the first empirical test of predictions by 
Bleichrodt (2002), and show how correcting for PT alleviates the discrepancies between TTO 
and SG. 
Our study features several methodological improvements compared to previous attempts at 
correcting TTO and/or SG weights for PT (see the Online Supplements of this dissertation for 
an overview). First, our adaptation of the non-parametric method (Abdellaoui et al., 2016) 
enables us to determine utility curvature, loss aversion and probability weighting separately 
for each individual, without assuming a specific parameter or parametrical form for these 
functions (as opposed to work by Martin et al., 2000, van der Pol and Roux, 2005, van Osch 
et al., 2004). We believe this is relevant, as large heterogeneity typically exists for PT 
elicitations (Pinto-Prades and Abellan-Perpiñan, 2012), warranting an individual 
measurement approach. Furthermore, applying specific parametric forms within experimental 
elicitation can confound results (Abdellaoui, 2000), thus allowing considerable bias to remain 
after correction (Wakker, 2008, Wakker, 2010). Second, we attempt to append the 
heterogeneity surrounding RPs by providing all subjects with the same RP, which is a 
hypothetical expected life duration (following the succesful procedure described in Attema et 
al., 2013). This is important, since even though reference-dependence appears to be the most 
central tenet of PT, earlier work on the location of the RP suggests that individuals use 
multiple different health outcomes as RP (Bleichrodt et al., 2001, van Osch and Stiggelbout, 
2008, van Osch et al., 2006, van Osch et al., 2004). 
 
19 These statements hold regardless if one believes EU to be the normative standard (as Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Wakker, 2010 do), which would, for example, classify loss aversion as ‘irrational’ or a bias. We will 
make no such claims, and will refer to deviations of EU and the linear QALY model as generating bias in TTO 
and SG. 
 
 
Theoretical framework 
We describe health outcomes as (𝛽, 𝑡), where 𝛽 represents health status and 𝑡 indicates the 
age at which the health profile ends (e.g. living with chronic back pain until 70). Throughout, 
subscripts (e.g. x and y) are used to refer to possible health profiles faced by a single agent, 
with age of onset (e.g. current age) denoted by 𝑡𝑎 . We will often suppress 𝑡𝑎 by denoting 
(𝛽𝑥, 𝑡𝑥) as (𝛽𝑥, 𝑇𝑥), with duration defined by 𝑇𝑥 = 𝑡𝑥 − 𝑡𝑎 ≥ 0. We refer to (𝛽𝑥, 𝑇𝑥) as 
chronic health profiles. We let (𝛽𝑥, 𝑇𝑥)𝑝(𝛽𝑦, 𝑇𝑦) denote the risky prospect that provides 
health profile (𝛽𝑥, 𝑇𝑥) with probability 𝑝, and health profile (𝛽𝑦, 𝑇𝑦) with probability 1 − 𝑝. 
Preferences are denoted using the conventional notation: ≻, ≽, and ∽ to represent strict 
preference, weak preference, and indifference, respectively. Also, we assume weak-ordered 
preferences; i.e. they are complete, meaning that decision makers have preferences over risky 
prospects, and transitive (if x ≽ y and y ≽ z, then x ≽ z). Health profiles (𝛽𝑥, 𝑇𝑥) starting and 
ending at 𝑡𝑎 (so that  𝑡𝑎 =  𝑡𝑥) will thus have 𝑇𝑥 = 0 (i.e. they equal immediate death), and, 
for brevity, we will denote such profiles of the form (𝛽𝑥, 0) as 𝐷, for any 𝛽𝑥. As in Miyamoto 
and colleagues (1998), we assume indifference between all profiles denoted 𝐷 for any 
𝛽. Finally, we assume monotonicity for duration, i.e. (𝛽𝑥, 𝑇𝑥) ≻ (𝛽𝑥, 𝑇𝑦) for 𝑇𝑥 > 𝑇𝑦 and any 
𝛽𝑥.  
The general QALY model assumes that preferences for health profiles (𝛽𝑥, 𝑇𝑥) are 
represented by the general utility function V(𝛽𝑥, 𝑇𝑥) = 𝑈(𝛽𝑥) ∗ 𝐿(𝑇𝑥). In this model, 𝐿(𝑇) 
and 𝑈(𝛽) denote utility functions over life years or health status, respectively. This QALY 
model, and the preference foundations underlying it, typically rely on EU to some extent (for 
axiomatizations, see: Miyamoto and Eraker, 1988, Miyamoto and Eraker, 1989). To derive 
corrected TTO and SG weights, we will extend this model to incorporate insights from PT 
under risk. That is, we assume that preferences can be represented by the general QALY 
model, including the extensions we outline below.  
Several preliminaries are required before defining our full model (Eq. 7.1 and Eq. 7.2). We 
assume that preferences for health profiles are defined relative to a reference point (RP), 
which we denote as (𝛽𝑟, 𝑇𝑟). Following Wakker (2010), we define this RP as a point of 
comparison, that may differ during different parts of the analysis. Given that no plausible 
theory of RP selection is available (Wakker, 2010), we let the RP depend on framing of the 
decision context. Hence, (𝛽𝑟, 𝑇𝑟) refers to an expected health profile described in a decision 
task, which is taken as the neutral point. This health profile has health status 𝛽𝑟, endured for 
𝑇𝑟 years. Throughout, for brevity, we denote the duration of all other health profiles as 
deviations from the RP, i.e. we denote health profiles (𝛽𝑥, 𝑇𝑥) as (𝛽𝑥, 𝑇𝑥
∗) with 𝑇𝑥
∗ =  𝑇𝑥 −
𝑇𝑟 in 𝛽𝑥. We will restrict our model to health profiles (𝛽𝑥, 𝑇𝑥
∗) ≽ 𝐷 with 𝛽𝑥 ≽ 𝛽𝑟 for any 𝑇𝑥
∗ . 
In other words, we assume our model holds for a restricted outcome domain including only 
health profiles weakly preferred to immediate death, where health status remains at 𝛽𝑟 or is 
improved.  
Within this outcome domain, we model PT by incorporating sign-dependence for life 
duration, i.e. by modifying 𝐿(𝑇) in the general QALY model to 𝐿𝑖(𝑇∗). In our model, 𝐿𝑖(𝑇∗) 
is a standard, real-valued ratio scale utility function with 𝐿+(𝑇𝑟) = 0, which may be different 
 
for gain outcomes (𝛽𝑥, 𝑇𝑥
∗, with 𝛽𝑥~ 𝛽𝑟 and 𝑇𝑥
∗ ≥ 0) and loss outcomes (𝛽𝑥, 𝑇𝑥
∗, with 𝛽𝑥~ 𝛽𝑟 
and 𝑇𝑥
∗ < 0). We do not modify 𝑈(𝛽) in our model, which implies that changes in health 
status will be evaluated as in the conventional general QALY model. We incorporate loss 
aversion20 by taking 𝐿−(𝑇∗) = 𝜆 𝐿𝑖(𝑇∗) for 𝑇∗ < 0. Here 𝜆 denotes a loss aversion index, 
with 𝜆 >  1 [𝜆 =  1, 𝜆 <  1] indicating loss aversion [loss neutrality, gain seeking]. 
Furthermore, we incorporate non-linear weighting of probabilities by incorporating 
probability weighting functions 𝑤𝑖(𝑝), 𝑖 = +, −, for gains and losses respectively, that assign 
a number to each probability p, with 𝑤𝑖(0) = 0 and 𝑤𝑖(1) = 1.  
We will apply this model to risky prospects with at most two outcomes, i.e. binary prospects. 
Thus, preferences over risky prospects with both gain and loss outcomes, i.e. 
(𝛽𝑥, 𝑇𝑥
∗)𝑝(𝛽𝑦, 𝑇𝑦
∗), with 𝑇𝑥
∗ ≥ 0 > 𝑇𝑦
∗ are evaluated by: 
𝑤+(𝑝)𝑈(𝛽𝑥)𝐿
+(𝑇𝑥
∗) + 𝑤−(1 − 𝑝)𝑈(𝛽𝑦)𝐿
−(𝑇𝑦
∗),    (7.1) 
while preferences over risky prospects (𝛽𝑥, 𝑇𝑥
∗)𝑝(𝛽𝑦, 𝑇𝑦
∗) for either gains or losses are 
evaluated by: 
𝑤𝑖(𝑝)𝑈(𝛽𝑥)𝐿
𝑖(𝑇𝑥
∗) + (1 − 𝑤𝑖(𝑝)) 𝑈(𝛽𝑦)𝐿
𝑖(𝑇𝑦
∗), 𝑖 = +, −   (7.2) 
where 𝑖 = + [−] when 𝑇𝑥
∗, 𝑇𝑦
∗ > [<] 0, i.e. both outcomes are gains or losses. Whenever 
𝑤𝑖(𝑝) = 𝑝, 𝜆 = 1, and and no distinction is made between gains and losses (i.e. no reference-
dependence) our model reduces to the general QALY model. 
SG and TTO correction for PT 
TTO weights are obtained by eliciting duration 𝑇𝑦 which yields indifference between (𝛽𝑥, 𝑇𝑥) 
and (𝐹𝐻, 𝑇𝑦), with 𝑇𝑥 > 𝑇𝑦. SG weights, on the other hand, are obtained from indifferences 
between a certain outcome (𝛽𝑥, 𝑇𝑥), and a risky prospect (𝐹𝐻, 𝑇𝑥)𝑝(𝐷), where 𝑝 is normally 
varied until indifference is obtained. Often, TTO and SG weights (i.e. 𝑈(𝛽𝑥)) are derived 
under the assumptions of EU and the linear QALY model, which is a special case of the 
general QALY model with 𝐿(𝑇) = 𝑇, 𝑈(𝐹𝐻) = 1, and 𝑉(𝐷) = 0. Under these assumptions, 
indifferences (𝛽𝑥, 𝑇𝑥)~(𝐹𝐻, 𝑇𝑦) and (𝛽𝑥, 𝑇𝑥)~(𝐹𝐻, 𝑇𝑥)𝑝(𝐷) allow derivation of TTO and SG 
weights for health state 𝛽𝑥 by 𝑈(𝛽𝑥) =
𝑇𝑦
𝑇𝑥
 and 𝑈(𝛽𝑥) = 𝑝, respectively. 
Our correction for PT involves deriving TTO and SG weights by means of our theoretical 
model based on PT. The application of our theoretical model requires assumptions about the 
RP used in TTO and SG. Typically, TTO and SG exercises are framed with the impaired 
health state (𝛽𝑥, 𝑇𝑥) as RP. Furthermore, earlier work on SG
21 has suggested that the outcome 
 
20 In our simplified approach, we model PT over life duration by assuming attribute-specific evaluation (as in 
Bleichrodt et al., 2009). Loss aversion is, thus, defined over life duration, as it is not meaningful on 𝑈(𝛽𝑥) when 
health status is considered a qualitative measure (Bleichrodt and Miyamoto, 2003). This does not affect our 
analysis, since we only consider improvements in health status. 
21 No empirical work exists studying the RP for TTO. Here we assumed that it coincides with that of SG, and 
with how TTO is typically framed. If the time spent in perfect health (i.e. 𝐹𝐻, 𝑇𝑦) is taken as RP instead, Eq. 7.3 
cannot be applied. This also holds for SG, i.e. Eq. 7.4 is only valid if the RP is actually (𝛽𝑥, 𝑇𝑥) 
 
 
that remains constant, i.e. the time spent with reduced health status (𝛽𝑥, 𝑇𝑥) usually is taken 
as RP (Bleichrodt et al., 2001, van Osch et al., 2006). Hence throughout the paper we will 
make the following assumption about the RP for TTO and SG: (𝛽𝑟, 𝑇𝑟) = (𝛽𝑥, 𝑇𝑥). 
Under these assumptions, TTO indifferences (𝛽𝑥, 𝑇𝑥)~(𝐹𝐻, 𝑇𝑦) allow the following 
derivation for 𝑈(𝛽𝑥)22: 
𝑈(𝛽𝑥) = 
𝐿−(𝑇𝑦
∗)+1
(1−𝜆)𝐿−(𝑇𝑦
∗)+1
,     (7.3) 
while SG indifference (𝛽, 𝑇𝑥) ~ (𝐹𝐻, 𝑇𝑥)𝑝(𝐷) allows the following derivation for 𝑈(𝛽𝑥) as in 
Bleichrodt et al. (2001): 
𝑈(𝛽𝑥) = 
𝑤+(𝑝)
𝑤+(𝑝)+ 𝜆𝑤−(1−𝑝)
 .      (7.4) 
Parameter elicitation 
In order to correct both TTO and SG weights for PT, i.e. to be able to compute the outcome 
of Eq. 7.3 and Eq. 7.4, one needs to elicit: a) 𝐿𝑖(𝑇∗) with 𝑇𝑥
∗ as RP to allow estimation of 
𝐿−(𝑇𝑦
∗), b) probability weighting functions 𝑤𝑖(𝑝), 𝑖 = +, −, and c) a loss aversion coefficient 
𝜆 which reflects overweighting of losses with 𝑇𝑥
∗ as RP. This means that 𝑡𝑥 should be kept 
constant across TTO and SG and the elicitation of 𝐿𝑖(𝑇∗), to ensure that 𝜆 refers to the same 
theoretical construct throughout (i.e. the same kink around the RP). 
Methods  
We report the results of an experiment in which we compare TTO and SG weights derived 
assuming EU and the linear QALY model to QALY weights corrected for PT (i.e. by Eq. 7.3 
and Eq. 7.4). In this experiment PT parameters were elicited using methodology based work 
by Abdellaoui and colleagues (2016). To reduce the influence of order effects and test for 
consistency, multiple counterbalancing procedures were conducted between participants and 
consistency checks were in place (see the Online Supplements of this dissertation). The 
experiment was computerized in Matlab. Subjects were 99 students of the Rotterdam School 
of Management (58 female), who were rewarded course credits. Experimental sessions lasted 
for approximately 55 minutes and were run on computers in sessions of four subjects sitting 
adjacently in separate cubicles. An instructor was present at all times to answer questions.  
TTO and SG weight elicitation 
We elicited TTO and SG weights for a total of four health states (one practice state) from the 
EQ-5D-5L descriptive system (Herdman et al., 2011). These health states reflected an array 
of mildly aversive health states, in order to avoid health states that could be considered worse 
than death (Dolan, 1997). The following health states were used: 22222 (practice, 𝛽𝑝), 𝛽1 =
 21211, 𝛽2 = 31221, and 𝛽3 = 32341.We applied a bisection choice-based elicitation 
 
22 Eq. 7.3 and Eq. 7.4 apply a scaling of 𝐿𝑖(𝑇∗), where the utility of the lowest outcome is set to -1, for 
simplicity (i.e. 𝐿−(𝑇𝑎) = −1). For elaborate proofs of Eq. 7.3 and Eq. 7.4 under our theoretical model see the 
Online Supplements of this dissertation. 
 
procedure with four consecutive choices, as choice-based procedures produce more 
consistent measurements than matching (Noussair et al., 2004). Subjects were asked to 
imagine having lived until age 50 in perfect health after which they contracted a disease 
which would affect their quality of life for their remaining life expectancy of 20 years. TTO 
and SG were completed for these remaining 20 years (i.e. 𝑡𝑎 = 50). In both cases the 
maximum expected age of death was 70 years, i.e. subjects made decisions with regard to the 
quality of life for age 50 to 70 (followed by death), which ensured that 𝑡𝑥 was constant for 
both TTO and SG.  
Non-parametric method 
We adapted Abdellaoui and colleagues’ (2016) non-parametric methodology to measure PT 
under risk in the health domain. In order to elicit 𝐿𝑖(𝑇∗) with the same 𝑡𝑥 as RP as in TTO 
and SG, we instructed subjects to take living from current age until 70 in perfect health as 
RP, i.e. (𝛽𝑟 , 𝑇𝑟) = (𝐹𝐻, 70 − 𝑡𝑎). Elicitation consisted of four stages (an elaborate 
description of the method and instructions can be found in the Online Supplements of this 
dissertation). The first stage connected utility for gains (𝐿+(𝑇∗)) to the utility for losses 
(𝐿−(𝑇∗)). The second and the third stages employed the trade-off method of Wakker and 
Deneffe (1996) to measure a standard sequence of utility for gains and utility for losses, 
respectively. The fourth stage measured probability weighting, separately for gains and 
losses, i.e. 𝑤+(𝑝) and 𝑤−(𝑝). Our methodology thus makes it possible to completely 
elucidate PT’s tenets in the health domain, without imposing parametric assumptions on 
𝐿𝑖(𝑇∗) and 𝑤𝑖(𝑝). Each of the four stages had slightly different instructions (see the Online 
Supplements of this dissertation), providing the context for the trade-offs subjects were 
required to make. Subjects had to choose between two medicines which could amend their 
situation, but would not affect their life expectancy, which remained constant at perfect 
health. All indifferences were elicited using a bisection choice-based procedure with a slider 
(following Abdellaoui et al., 2016) where subjects first performed three binary choices. This 
procedure zoomed in to the point at which subjects would become indifferent, but still 
allowed subjects to specify the final value and adjust accordingly. To allow estimation of 
𝐿−(𝑇𝑦
∗) in Eq. 7.3 regardless of the amount of years given up in TTO, subjects’ standard 
sequence continued to at least 20 years above and below 𝑡𝑥 (i.e. living until 70), to avoid 
extrapolation beyond the measured curve23.  
Analyses of curvature for 𝐿𝑖(𝑇) 
We used two methods to investigate the curvature of 𝐿𝑖(𝑇∗), i.e. utility curvature: a non-
parametric and a parametric method (similar to Abdellaoui et al., 2016). For these analyses of 
utility curvature, we normalized all durations by dividing through subjects’ highest absolute 
elicited duration for gains and losses, respectively (𝑇𝑘𝐺
∗  or −𝑇𝑘𝐿
∗ ). This resulted in 𝑇∗ being in 
the range [-1,1]. Next, we calculated the area under the curve (AUC) of 𝐿𝑖(𝑇∗) separately for 
both domains, by setting 𝐿+(𝑇𝑘𝐺
∗ ) = 1 and 𝐿−(𝑇𝑘𝐿
∗ ) = −1. If utility of life duration is linear, 
 
23 After 25 steps the standard sequence elicitation was terminated, to avoid overburdening our subjects. When 
necessary, 𝐿−(𝑇𝑦
∗) was obtained by extrapolation. 
 
 
the area under this normalized curve equals one half. Utility for gains in life duration is 
convex (concave) if the AUC is smaller (larger) than one half, while for losses the opposite 
direction holds (convex > ½, concave < ½). This method of analyzing utility curvature is non-
parametric. We also analyzed 𝐿𝑖(𝑇∗) parametrically by employing the most commonly used 
power utility family using non-linear least squares, using the same normalizations. For this 
family, 𝐿+(𝑇∗) = (𝑇∗)𝛼 and 𝐿−(𝑇∗) =−(− (𝑇∗)𝛼 with 𝛼 > 0. For gains [losses], 𝛼 > 1 
corresponds to convex [concave] utility, 𝛼 = 1 corresponds to linear utility, and 𝛼 < 1 
corresponds to concave [convex] utility.  
Analyses of loss aversion 
Several definitions of loss aversion exist, with λ being interpreted in various manners (see 
Köbberling and Wakker, 2005). Köbberling and Wakker (2005) define loss aversion (λ) as 
the kink of utility at the reference point. That is, they define loss aversion as 𝑈↑
′(0) 𝑈↓
′(0)⁄ , 
with 𝑈↑
′(0) representing the left derivative and 𝑈↓
′(0) the right derivative of 𝑈 at the reference 
point. Hence, we computed each subject’s coefficient of loss aversion (𝜆) over the first steps 
in their standard sequence for gains and losses, denoted as 𝑥1
+ and 𝑥1
−. Loss aversion is then 
defined as the ratio of 𝐿−(𝑥1
−) 𝑥1
−⁄  over 𝐿+(𝑥1
+) 𝑥1
+⁄ , which is equal to 𝑥1
+ −𝑥1
−⁄  (Abdellaoui 
et al., 2016). A subject was classified as loss averse if 𝑥1
+ −𝑥1
−⁄  > 1, loss neutral if 𝑥1
+ −𝑥1
−⁄  = 
1, and gain seeking if 𝑥1
+ −𝑥1
−⁄  < 1 (as in Wakker, 2010).  
Probability weighting 
We used certainty equivalences using varying probabilities to elicit the weighting functions, 
similar to Attema and colleagues (2018a). In particular, we used linear interpolation to obtain 
a 𝑤+(𝑝) and 𝑤−(𝑝), using 𝑝 =  0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9. Furthermore, we used Tversky and 
Kahneman’s (1992) one-parameter inverse S-shaped probability weighting function 𝑤𝑖(𝑝) =
𝑝𝛾/(𝑝𝛾 + (1 − 𝑝)𝛾)1/𝛾 with 𝑖 = +, −, estimated by nonlinear least squares. The 𝛾-parameter 
controls for the shape of the probability weighting function. If 𝛾 = 1 there is no probability 
transformation and 𝑤𝑖(𝑝) = 𝑝. However, if 𝛾 < 1, decision makers underweight large 
probabilities and overweight small probabilities. This corresponds to the commonly found 
inverse S-shaped weighting function. If 𝛾 > 1, the opposite pattern holds, corresponding to 
an S-shaped weighting function.  
Results 
Two subjects expressed unwillingness to trade off any life years, which caused the 
experiment to fail. These subjects were removed from further analyses. As can be seen in the 
Online Supplements of this dissertation, we included several repetitions to test for 
consistency. At the aggregate level, we observed significant differences between the 
consistency indifference value and the value for 𝑥2
𝑖  (i.e. the second step) in the standard 
sequence elicitation for both gains and losses (paired t-tests: p’s < 0.01). Furthermore, we 
found a difference for the consistency checks in the probability sequence for gains (paired t-
test: p’s = 0.007), but not for losses (paired t-test: p’s = 0.62). Correlations between 
consistency checks and original values were high, suggesting strong association between 
these values (Kendall’s τ’s > 0.51, p’s < 0.003) 
 
Twenty-nine subjects violated monotonicity for health states, which indicates that they valued 
at least one health state which was better or equal on each dimension lower than their 
dominated counterpart (e.g. 21211 vs. 31221). As we consider it is plausible that all subjects 
prefer more health to less, we reran the full analyses excluding these subjects and found no 
differences in the main results. Hence, we report the results for the full sample (n = 97).  
Curvature of 𝐿+(𝑇) and 𝐿−(𝑇) 
We observed median AUC for gains equal to 0.555, and for losses this non-parametric 
analysis produced a median AUC of 0.561, which were both significantly different from 0.5 
(Wilcoxon signed ranks test: p < 0.001). After parametrically fitting a power function to the 
data, we found a median α of 0.787 for gains and 0.757 for losses (significantly smaller than 
1, Wilcoxon signed ranks test: p < 0.001). Thus, both parametric and non-parametric results 
demonstrated 𝐿+(𝑇∗) to be concave and 𝐿−(𝑇∗) to be convex. 
Table 7.1 shows the classification of subjects’ curvature for gains (𝐿+(𝑇∗)) and losses 
(𝐿−(𝑇∗)) at the individual level, both parametrically and non-parametrically. The most 
common pattern was concave curvature for 𝐿+(𝑇∗) and convex curvature for 𝐿−(𝑇∗) as was 
found in an earlier implementation of this method (Attema et al., 2018a). This conclusion 
holds for both non-parametric (53%) and parametric (53%) results.  
Table 7.1. Classification for curvature of 𝐿+(𝑇∗) and 𝐿−(𝑇∗)at the individual level 
 Losses - 𝐿−(𝑇∗)    
Gains 𝐿+(𝑇∗) Concave Convex Linear Total 
Non-parametric      
Concave 19 51 0 70 
Convex 7 17 1 25 
Linear 0 1 1 2 
     
 Losses - 𝐿−(𝑇∗)    
Gains 𝐿+(𝑇∗) Concave Convex Linear Total 
Parametric     
Concave 19 51 0 70 
Convex 6 18 1 25 
Linear 0 1 1 2 
 
 
Loss aversion 
Utilizing Köbberling and Wakker’s (2005) definition, we found a median loss aversion index 
of 𝜆 = 2 (IQR:1.00 – 3.52). Thus, we found considerable loss aversion at the aggregate level, 
with the median being significantly higher than 1 (Wilcoxon test: p < 0.001). At the 
individual level, the majority of subjects demonstrated loss aversion, with 72% (n = 70) 
classifying as loss averse, 15% (n = 15) and 13% (n = 12) classifying as loss neutral or gains 
seeking, respectively. 
Probability weighting (𝑤𝑖(𝑝)) 
Figure 7.1 shows the median decision weights assigned to 𝑝 = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9. As can 
been seen from the plots, we observe inverse S-shaped probability weighting both for gains 
and losses, with more pronounced overweighting of small probabilities for losses. Using 
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) one-parameter function, we found a median 𝛾 = 0.92 for 
gains and a median 𝛾 = 0.84 for losses (both significantly lower than 1, Wilcoxon test: p’s < 
0.04). Both analyses demonstrated that the typical inverse S-shaped probability 
transformation was the most prevalent in our data, both for gains and losses. Moving to the 
individual level, for gains we found 𝛾 < 1 for 56 subjects (58%), 𝛾 > 1 for 41 subjects 
(42%). For losses we found more pronounced inverse S-shaped probability weighting, with 
71 (73%), and 26 (27%), respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Probability weighting functions for gains (𝑤+(𝑝)) and losses (𝑤−(𝑝)) 
 
Health state correction 
Table 7.2 shows QALY weights for all health states elicited using TTO and SG, where 
uncorrected refers to weights elicited assuming EU and linear QALYs, while corrected 
weights are elicited by means of Eq. 7.3 and Eq. 7.4. To test the sensitivity of our results to 
linear interpolation, we also corrected TTO and SG weights by using power utility to estimate 
𝐿−(𝑇𝑦
∗), and the Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) probability weighting function to estimate 
𝑤+(𝑝) and 𝑤−(1 − 𝑝), these are indicated by ‘Parametric Corrections’ in Table 7.2. An 
initial difference in TTO and SG weights existed (paired t-tests, all p’s <0.001), with SG 
weights being higher than TTO for all 𝛽𝑥. Our results show that the corrected weights were 
 
lower than the uncorrected weights for TTO and SG (paired t-test: all p’s < 0.01). The 
initially significant difference between the uncorrected weights only disappeared for all 𝛽 
after applying non-parametric corrections (paired t-test: all p’s >.09). The parametric 
corrections left significant and substantial differences between TTO and SG weights. 
Finally, we performed four isolated corrections. For the sake of brevity, we only report the 
results of the non-parametric corrections (see the Online Supplements of this dissertation for 
results of these analyses for parametric corrections). First, we corrected TTO for utility 
curvature only, with λ = 1. Second, TTO weights were corrected for loss aversion only, with 
linear utility (i.e. 𝐿𝑖(𝑇∗) = 𝑇∗). Third, we corrected SG for probability weighting only, with λ 
= 1. Finally, SG weights were corrected for loss aversion only, with 𝑤𝑖(𝑝) = 𝑝. This allowed 
us to demonstrate the influence of each correction in isolation. Table 7.3 shows that 
correcting for loss aversion had a stronger downward influence on TTO weights than 
correcting for curvature of 𝐿𝑖(𝑇∗), and both correcting for probability weighting and 
correcting for loss aversion had a substantial negative influence on SG weights. 
Table 7.2. Overview of mean weights [standard deviation] for health states 𝛽1−3 for TTO and 
SG including differences between methodologies under multiple corrections 
Correction Health state 
TTO 
weight 
SD 
SG 
weight 
SD Difference 
Uncorrected 𝛽1: 21211 0.665 [0.268] 0.75 [0.25] -0.085*** 
 𝛽2: 31221 0.605 [0.259] 0.706 [0.261] -0.101*** 
 𝛽3: 32341 0.39 [0.259] 0.518 [0.276] -0.128*** 
Non-Parametric 𝛽1: 21211 0.492 [0.331] 0.506 [0.295] -0.014
 n.s. 
 𝛽2: 31221 0.442 [0.313] 0.456 [0.287] -0.014
 n.s. 
 𝛽3: 32341 0.279 [0.27] 0.319 [0.229] -0.039
n.s. 
Parametric 𝛽1: 21211 0.496 [0.325] 0.598 [0.319] -0.102*** 
 
𝛽2: 31221 0.449 [0.307] 0.558 [0.322] -0.109*** 
 𝛽3: 32341 0.295 [0.272] 0.387 [0.303] -0.092*** 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate that the differences were significant at p < 0.05, p < 0.01, and p 
< 0.001, respectively, for paired t-tests.  
  
 
 
Table 7.3. Isolated effects of corrections for utility curvature (UC), loss aversion (LA) and 
probability weighting (PW) for TTO and SG weights [standard deviation in brackets] 
Health state 
Uncorrected 
 weight 
UC only LA only PW only 
TTO: Implication 𝜆 = 1 & 𝐿𝑖(𝑇∗) = 𝑇∗ 𝜆 = 1 𝐿(𝑇∗) = 𝑇∗  
𝛽1 : 21211 0.665 [0.268] 0.611 [0.296] 0.537 [0.311]   
𝛽2 ∶ 31221 0.605 [0.259] 0.558 [0.287] 0.474 [0.3]   
𝛽3 ∶ 32341 0.39 [0.259] 0.364 [0.278] 0.288 [0.259]   
SG: Implication 𝜆 = 1 & 𝑤𝑖(𝑝) = 𝑝   𝑤𝑖(𝑝) = 𝑝 𝜆 = 1 
𝛽1 ∶ 21211 0.75 [0.25]   0.63 [0.307] 0.643 [0.246] 
𝛽2 31221 0.706 [0.261]   0.584 [0.305] 0.597 [0.249] 
𝛽3 : 32341 0.518 [0.276]   0.387 [0.278] 0.459 [0.218] 
 
Discussion 
This paper provides the first empirical test of Bleichrodt’s (2002) predictions about PT, 
demonstrating that it may be possible to correct the weights typically used in HSV, i.e. to 
reduce bias in TTO and SG.  
We estimated the full set of PT’s parameters in the health domain, in order to obtain more 
descriptively valid outcomes, which can be used in the QALY model. Our results are 
consistent with PT (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979): we observe concave utility curvature for 
gains and convex utility curvature for losses, inverse S-shaped probability weighting and 
considerable loss aversion. In general, the estimates of utility curvature for gains in life 
duration and loss aversion (when applicable) of earlier work are similar to ours (e.g. Attema 
et al., 2013, Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2000, Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2005), but different results are 
found for the utility function for losses in life duration. These differences might be explained 
by methodological differences, which is a hypothesis that could be tested in future work. 
Furthermore, we replicated the typical finding that SG weights are higher than TTO weights. 
By means of corrections similar to those proposed by Bleichrodt and colleagues (2001), we 
attempted to remove the systematic bias in these weights, by simultaneously accounting for 
loss aversion, probability weighting and utility curvature. Consequently, as predicted by 
Bleichrodt (2002), the weights assigned to both TTO and SG were markedly lower than their 
uncorrected counterparts. Moreover, they were no longer significantly different.  
 
Although successful attempts at correcting SG and/or TTO weights using parametric 
methodology are reported in earlier work (Martin et al., 2000, van der Pol and Roux, 2005, 
van Osch et al., 2004), our parametric corrections were not able to fully account for the 
discrepancies between these methods. This seemed to be driven by SG weights remaining 
higher when parametric estimations for probability weighting were used. Given that our non-
parametric estimations of probability weighting allowed full flexibility of the weighting 
function (see Abdellaoui, 2000), these findings suggest that parametric estimations of 
probability weighting may produce different results.  
Our results demonstrate that, considered in isolation, loss aversion had a stronger downward 
influence on TTO weights than utility curvature, while both probability weighting and loss 
aversion lowered SG weights considerably. While these findings are generally in line with 
previous studies, we observed a downward effect of correcting TTO for utility curvature. 
Probably, this is caused by the convexity found for losses in life years and the framing of our 
TTO and SG exercises (which both featured losses in life years from the RP in a reduced 
health state). Future work could shed light on the degree to which this discrepancy may be 
caused by the non-parametric method or the framing used in our work.  
Several limitations of our study need noting. First, several subjects violated monotonicity for 
the health states used. Although excluding these subjects from the sample did not alter our 
results, we expect that these errors in decision-making are to be attributed to either a) 
imprecision of preferences or b) error propagation, i.e. early errors cascading into later stages 
of the task. Considering the use of only relatively mild health states, for which subjects may 
have no precise preference ordering in mind, some overlap may occur within our method. 
Regarding error propagation, it is good to note that during utility elicitation, subjects could 
rectify errors by adjusting the final indifference value on the slider to any non-dominant value 
in life years, i.e. fix their earlier ‘errors’. Testing for error propagation, by performing an 
error simulation as described by Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000), confirmed that errors did not 
have a propagating effect on the standard sequence we elicited for gains and losses24.  
Second, concerns may be raised about the role of the RP in this paper. We find that the 
observed discrepancies between TTO and SG can be removed by correcting under the 
assumption that decision makers utilize the guaranteed outcome (𝛽𝑥, 𝑇𝑥) as RP (which 
ensures that 𝑡𝑥 remains constant). However, earlier work on health-related preferences has 
suggested that individuals may also use their own current health and life expectancy as RP 
(van Nooten and Brouwer, 2004, van Nooten et al., 2009). In our work, we found no evidence 
of such effects25. A related limitation concerns our assumption that subjects use the fixed 
outcome in both TTO and SG as their RP which is crucial for our results as our corrections 
depend on a constant 𝑇𝑟 throughout the multiple parts of the experiment. Earlier work, 
however, demonstrated that SG subjects may also use the time spent in full health as their RP 
(van Osch and Stiggelbout, 2008). To our knowledge, such work does not exist for TTO 
 
24 The difference between TTO and SG weights not was not significant in all simulations (k=1000) for β1 and 
β2, whilst replicating our results in the majority of simulations for β3 (over 70%). These simulations suggest 
that our correction method is quite robust to error propagation. 
25 We tested for associations between subjects' self-reported life expectancy and their estimates for loss 
aversion, utility curvature and probability weighting, nor were such associations observed for raw and corrected 
health state weights (all Kendall’s τ’s < 1.52, all p’s > 0.13). 
 
 
methods. Therefore, future work should explore the possibility of correcting under the 
assumption that subjects use full health as RP, both for TTO and SG.  
Finally and perhaps most importantly, the primary goal of the present research was merely to 
provide the first empirical test of Bleichrodt’s (2002) predictions for TTO and SG weights, 
and our findings should be interpreted in this context. We observed considerable differences 
to nationally representative findings. For example, the Dutch tariff (Versteegh et al., 2016) 
for health state 𝛽1 (21211) is 0.876, while we elicited a raw TTO weight of 0.665. Our 
sample, consisting of young, healthy students will have contributed strongly to this initial 
discrepancy, next to differences in methodology. We also note that after correction, the 
discrepancy between tariffs and corrected weighs increases. After the non-parametric 
correction, the QALY value of state 𝛽1 decreases to 0.492. Clearly, this calls for further 
investigation of the methods used here, also in other (general public) samples, in order to 
further explore the impact of corrections and further refine the methods used. This future 
research may also clarify whether our framing may have yielded relatively low weights and 
how the methods used here can be simplified to be suitable for use in general public samples.  
Conclusion  
With the increasing importance of economic evaluations in healthcare, the question of how to 
best estimate health states valuations has become a crucial one. Conventional methodologies, 
such as TTO and SG, systematically arrived at different valuations of the same health state. 
PT may offer an explanation for this phenomenon (Bleichrodt, 2002), which was never tested 
directly. Using the non-parametric method (Abdellaoui et al., 2016), we demonstrated that it 
may be possible to significantly reduce these biases in health state valuations. After 
correcting for loss aversion, probability weighting and utility curvature, TTO and SG weights 
for three health states were no longer different. This is an encouraging finding, but at the 
same time, the resulting low absolute values highlight the need for future research. 
Notwithstanding these important limitations, our findings do suggest the feasibility and 
relevance of this approach and may prove to be a first step in the move towards QALYs 
without bias. 
 
  
 
  
 
 
Chapter 8: The corrective approach: policy implications of recent 
developments in QALY measurement based on prospect theory. 
 
Chapter based on:  
Lipman, S. A., Brouwer, W. B. F., & Attema, A. E. (2019). The corrective approach: policy 
implications of recent developments in QALY measurement based on prospect theory. Value 
in Health, 22 (7), 816-821.  
 
Abstract: Common health state valuation methodology, such as time trade-off (TTO) and 
standard gamble (SG), is typically applied under several descriptively invalid assumptions, 
for example related to linear Quality-Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) or expected utility (EU) 
theory. Hence, the current use of results from health state valuation exercises may lead to 
biased QALY weights, which may in turn affect decisions based on economic evaluations 
using such weights. Methods have been proposed to correct responses for the biases 
associated with different health state valuation techniques. In this paper we outline the 
relevance of prospect theory (PT), which has become the dominant descriptive alternative to 
EU, for health state valuations and economic evaluations. We provide an overview of work in 
this field, which aims to remove biases from QALY weights. We label this ‘the corrective 
approach’. By quantifying PT parameters, such as loss aversion, probability weighting and 
non-linear utility, it may be possible to correct TTO and SG responses for biases, in an 
attempt to produce more valid estimates of preferences for health states. Through 
straightforward examples this paper illustrates the effects of this corrective approach, and 
discusses several unresolved issues that currently limit the relevance of corrected weights for 
policy. Suggestions for research addressing these issues are provided. Nonetheless, if validly 
corrected health state valuations become available, we argue in favor of using these in 
economic evaluations.   
 
 
Introduction 
Health economic evaluations provide important information to policy makers (Drummond et 
al., 2015), for example by determining incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) of 
interventions, i.e. the incremental costs per unit of health gained. In cost-utility analyses 
health gains are commonly expressed in Quality-Adjusted Life-Years (QALYs), which are 
obtained by multiplying life duration with the utility weight(s) of the health state(s) 
experienced. These QALY weights are normalized such that 0 and 1 represent the utility of 
health states judged equivalent to being dead or perfect health, respectively. It is well-known 
that QALY weights differ between health state valuation (HSV) methods used to obtain 
them: standard gamble (SG) weights are typically higher than weights obtained with time 
trade-off (TTO) methodologies (e.g. Bleichrodt and Johannesson, 1997, Read et al., 1984, 
Torrance, 1976). Bleichrodt (2002) proposed that these differences occur as result of bias due 
to the ‘classical elicitation assumption’, i.e. applying expected utility (EU) theory to analyze 
individual choices (2001). Although research in behavioral economics and psychology has 
established many systematic violations of EU (for a review of these violations in the 
monetary domain, see Starmer, 2000), its axioms still underlie QALY weight calculations 
applied in HSV exercises (Bleichrodt et al., 2007, Llewellyn-Thomas et al., 1982, Treadwell 
and Lenert, 1999). In order to better inform healthcare decisions, it has been suggested that 
these biased QALY weights could be corrected, by applying calculations based on alternative 
utility models such as prospect theory (Bleichrodt et al., 2001, and Chapter 7 of this 
dissertation).  
Prospect theory (PT) (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) by now 
is a well-established behavioral theory, which assumes that people judge states relative to 
some reference point (such as the current position). Changes relative to that point are 
perceived as either losses or gains. Furthermore, utility increases for gains are lower than 
utility decreases for equally sized losses, i.e. people are loss averse. People, moreover, are not 
‘perfect calculators’. They tend to overweight small probabilities and underweight large ones. 
This is labeled probability weighting (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992). It has been suggested that reference points, loss aversion and probability 
weighting affect decisions about health (e.g. Attema et al., 2016, Bleichrodt et al., 2007, 
Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2005, Jonker et al., 2017, and Chapter 7 of this dissertation), perhaps 
more pronouncedly than in financial decision-making (Suter et al., 2016). Importantly, these 
insights may provide an explanation for the systematic differences between HSV methods 
(Bleichrodt, 2002), and can be used in pursuit of obtaining QALY weights that may more 
accurately reflect trade-offs relevant to specific methodologies. For instance, SG responses 
can be corrected for bias due to probability weighting, and TTO responses can be corrected 
for loss aversion. It has been argued that such a ‘corrective approach’ may lead to better (i.e. 
less biased) QALY weights and hence may have relevance for HSV (Bleichrodt, 2002, and 
Chapter 7 of this dissertation). TTO and SG (see Box 8.1 for examples) have been the focus 
of the corrective approach, as these methods are especially relevant to HSV for generic utility 
classifications, with EQ-5D tariffs frequently being determined via TTO (e.g. Versteegh et 
al., 2016), while SF-6D tariffs have been obtained via SG (Walters and Brazier, 2005). 
 
 Hence, in this paper, we focus on the corrective approach in the context of TTO and SG, by 
providing an overview of developments in the corrective approach. These developments 
opened up at least two challenges to research and policy, which are discussed in the next 
section. First, applying the corrective approach (with current estimates) may affect ICER 
calculations and allocation decisions – especially when perfect health is involved. Second, 
even though loss aversion may lead to bias in HSV, it could reflect a real preference many 
individuals may hold. Thus, distinguishing between gains and losses may still be seen as 
relevant in health care decision making. Preventing health losses may, for example, have 
higher societal value than achieving health gains of a similar size (relative to a relevant 
reference point). Hence, we explore how a loss aversion premium for prevented health losses 
could be applied if and when deemed relevant by responsible policy makers. Finally, we 
outline policy implications and important steps for future research.  
The corrective approach: rationale and overview of earlier work 
Acknowledging that decisions about health may be reference-dependent, as is done in 
prospect theory, changes the implications of responses in TTO and SG exercises (Bleichrodt, 
2002). These implications crucially depend on the location of the reference point in HSV 
exercises, which was the topic of some empirical studies (e.g. van Osch et al., 2006). Given 
that this work suggested that the time spent in the imperfect health state was the most 
frequently applied reference point (coinciding with how TTO and SG are typically framed), 
we will assume this reference point in HSV throughout this paper. Under this assumption, 
TTO involves trading off losses in life duration for gains in quality of life, whereas picking 
the risky option in SG indicates a preference for a mixed gamble generating either a gain in 
quality of life or a catastrophic loss of life (i.e. immediate death). As such, loss aversion may 
exert upward bias in both methods, because the negative utility of (possible) losses subjects 
are willing to incur in TTO and SG is amplified by loss aversion and, thus, signifies a larger 
utility decrement than assumed under the classical elicitation assumption (Bleichrodt, 2002).  
Box 8.1 The Time Trade-Off (TTO) and Standard Gamble (SG) methods 
TTO exercises involve choices between living longer (say 10 years) in a poor health state 
or shorter (x < 10) in perfect health. Assuming the linear QALY model, the utility of the 
imperfect health state is given by x/10. The number of years in X is varied until the 
respondent is indifferent between the two options. Hence, if a person considers 6 years in 
perfect health to be equal to 10 years with severe pain, the utility of this health state is 
6/10 = 0.6. The worse the health state, the greater is the reduction in years in perfect 
health that people would be willing to accept. Similarly, SG methods entail asking 
subjects to choose between living some period of time (e.g. 10 years) in some imperfect 
health state for sure and a gamble with two outcomes: full health (FH) for the same period 
of time, or immediate death (D). By varying the probability of immediate death, one may 
derive the utility of the imperfect health state. Under EU (and with the utility of perfect 
health normalized to 1 and that of death to 0) this utility equals probability 1-p. For 
instance, if people accept a maximum risk of 10% of immediate death to live the rest of 
their lifespan in perfect health rather than with moderate back pain, this implies the utility 
of the health state ‘moderate back pain’ is 0.9. If the health state is worse, people would 
accept a higher risk of immediate death to regain health, leading to lower QALY weights. 
 
 
Probability weighting only affects SG, and generally has an upward influence on SG weights. 
This upward bias results from subjects’ overweighting of generally small chances of death, 
and underweighting of the typically large chance of obtaining full health in this method 
(Bleichrodt, 2002). In other words, if subjects weight probabilities in this manner, accepting a 
10% chance of death in SG may signify a larger utility decrement than traditionally assumed. 
Additionally, linear utility of life duration is often assumed in health state valuation (i.e. the 
linear QALY model). However, many authors have found utility of life years to deviate from 
linearity in the ranges typically considered in TTO (e.g. Abellan-Perpinan et al., 2006, 
Attema et al., 2012, Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2005, Wakker and Deneffe, 1996), where the 
severity of this deviation may even depend on how duration is described (Craig et al., 2018). 
Such utility curvature will only affect TTO weights, as this method depends critically on 
trade-offs in duration. As shown in (Bleichrodt, 2002), if utility of life years is concave (i.e. 
each extra year of life is worth less) instead of linear, TTO weights are biased downwards. 
Inversely, when utility of life years is convex (i.e. each subsequent year is worth more than 
the previous) instead of linear, then the TTO weights are biased upwards.  
Although EU is often considered the ‘right’ normative theory (Harsanyi, 1955, Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979, Savage, 1954, Wakker, 2010), retaining the classical elicitation 
assumption mistakes the empirical nature of HSV, in which deviations from EU are likely if 
not inevitable (Bleichrodt et al., 2001), with the normative relevance that QALYs may have 
in economic evaluations. Consequently, several studies exist that applied a corrective 
approach (Attema and Brouwer, 2009, Martin et al., 2000, Oliver, 2003a, Perpiñán et al., 
2009, Stiggelbout et al., 1994, van Osch et al., 2004, Wakker and Stiggelbout, 1995), each 
using the same two steps: 1) quantify the deviations from EU and the linear QALY model, 
such as loss aversion and non-linear utility, and 2) utilize corrective formulas (e.g. Attema 
and Brouwer, 2009, Bleichrodt et al., 2001, and Chapter 7 of this dissertation) to account for 
their confounding effect on HSV. Considerable differences exist between empirical studies 
regarding both steps, with researchers using different techniques to quantify PT, and/or 
applying corrective formulas based on different assumptions about decision-making. A 
frequently applied approach is to preemptively assume a certain degree of loss aversion, 
utility curvature and probability weighting in all respondents (e.g. Pinto-Prades and Abellan-
Perpiñan, 2012). In this type of work, average parameters elicited in earlier work (e.g. loss 
aversion coefficients of 2.25) are applied to each individual. However, typically large 
differences in loss aversion, utility curvature and probability weighting are observed between 
individuals, i.e. not everyone is equally loss averse or weighs probabilities the same way.  
Therefore, other attempts at correcting TTO and/or SG weights apply an individual approach, 
in which PT parameters are elicited separately for each respondent, applying corrections for 
loss aversion (e.g. Oliver, 2003a) or non-linear utility of life duration (e.g. Attema and 
Brouwer, 2009, Stiggelbout et al., 1994), for example. In this work, utility of life duration or 
probability weighting are typically estimated by assuming specific functional forms (Martin 
et al., 2000, Stiggelbout et al., 1994, van der Pol and Roux, 2005, van Osch et al., 2004). 
Although such parametric analyses may be practical and efficient, the mathematical 
properties of the chosen parametrical form may not fit well for some extreme cases (for an 
example, see Wakker, 2008). Indeed, a literature exists documenting that parametric analysis 
may result in biases in individual estimates for PT (Abdellaoui et al., 2016, Abdellaoui et al., 
2007). In Chapter 7 of this dissertation, Abdellaoui and colleagues’ (2016) non-parametric 
method was adapted to correct TTO and SG weights without parametric assumptions. In that 
 
study, as was expected under PT, concave utility for life year gains and convex utility for 
losses was observed, with considerable loss aversion and probability weighting for both gains 
and losses. After applying the corrective approach, TTO and SG weights converged, as 
predicted by Bleichrodt (2002). However, the resulting corrected QALY weights seemed 
quite low and compressed, raising questions about their validity (see the Online Supplements 
of this dissertation for numerical examples of corrections based on this study). 
Collectively, these developments in PT measurement and the corrective approach could be 
important for health policy, as they suggest that it may be possible to move beyond the 
classical elicitation assumption for TTO and SG weights, which still dominates applications 
of HSV.  
The impact of the corrective approach on health policy 
Regardless of these developments, the corrective approach currently does not affect the 
policy domain: only a single study (Perpiñán et al., 2009) exists that estimated corrected tariff 
lists (i.e. without assuming EU), and no country has adopted the corrective approach in 
guidelines for economic evaluations. Of course, this gap between the current state-of-the-art 
in the literature and policy may in part be caused by unresolved questions about validity or 
feasibility of the corrective approach. We return to these important questions in a subsequent 
section, for now disregarding them in order to address two currently understudied corollaries 
of applying the corrective approach. First, we illustrate with currently available weights that 
moving from the classical elicitation assumption to a corrective approach may substantially 
affect ICERs and allocation decisions, especially when treatments involve perfect health. 
Second, we explore how loss aversion, which produces bias that we argued needs correction 
in HSV, could still have relevance in the context of health policy. 
Box 8.2. The impact of the corrective approach on ICERs 
Imagine a group of patients who experience moderate problems with walking about, slight 
problems with usual activities and slight pain or discomfort (31221 in EQ-5D 
nomenclature, 𝛽2 in the Online Supplements of this dissertation). In Chapter 7 of this 
dissertation, the classical TTO and SG weights for 𝛽2 were elicited at 0.605, and 0.706, 
respectively. We let 𝑈(∙) represent the utility assigned to health states. Assume that a 
treatment is evaluated that returns these patients to full health for 30 years, and the costs 
for treatment are € 20,000 per year. Without discounting, we then obtain the following 
ICERs:    
𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑂 =
€20,000 ∗ 30 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 = €600,000
30 ∗(𝑈(𝐹𝐻)− 𝑈(𝛽2) ) = 30 ∗ 0.395 = 11.85 
 = 50,632€/QALY, 
 
𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐺 =
€20,000 ∗ 30 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 = €600,000
30 ∗(𝑈(𝐹𝐻)− 𝑈(𝛽2) ) = 30 ∗ 0.294 = 8.82 
 = 68,027€/QALY. 
If we repeat our calculations using corrected SG and TTO weights, which were 0.442 and 
0.456 respectively (see the Online Supplements of this dissertation), we obtain the 
following ICERs:  
𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑂−𝐶 =
€20,000 ∗ 30 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 = €600,000
30 ∗(𝑈(𝐹𝐻)− 𝑈(𝛽2) ) = 30 ∗ 0.558 = 16.74
 = 35,842€/QALY, 
 
𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐺−𝐶 =
€20,000 ∗ 30 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 = €600,000
30 ∗(𝑈(𝐹𝐻)− 𝑈(𝛽2) ) = 30 ∗ 0.551 = 16.32 
 = 36,765€/QALY. 
 
 
 
To correct or not to correct: it makes a difference!  
Currently, TTO and SG weights (or weights derived from classification systems using these 
methods) are commonly elicited assuming EU and/or the linear QALY model. Hence, at least 
implicitly, the classical elicitation assumption is still applied. Our focus is to compare this 
status quo to the situation in which the corrective approach would be applied. We will refer to 
TTO and SG weights calculated under the classical elicitation assumption as classical 
weights, and refer to corrected weights when the corrective approach is applied. Without 
correction, TTO and SG typically yield different QALY weights (e.g. Bleichrodt and 
Johannesson, 1997, Read et al., 1984, Torrance, 1976), and hence, it is obvious that ICERs 
for the same treatment could vary substantially (and systematically) depending on which 
method is utilized to value health benefits – especially for treatments dealing with full health. 
If we choose to apply corrections, we could observe converging TTO and SG weights, and 
hence converging ICERs for both methods (see Box 8.2 for an example using currently 
available estimates). Similarly, applying the corrective approach may affect allocation 
decisions in different situations compared to using classical weights (see Box 8.3 for an 
example). In both cases, applying the corrective approach will likely lead to a lower 
valuations of impaired health states (see Chapter 7 of this dissertation). Although applying a 
corrective approach in calculations of QALY weights from HSV exercises will likely 
improve understanding of choices in TTO and SG, it is not yet clear to what extent this 
corrective approach ultimately yields QALY weights that better reflect preferences for health 
states. Obviously, the exact impact of utilizing corrected weights instead of classical weights 
on subsequent economic evaluations will depend on the respective valuations of health states 
associated with the treatment and control groups, which raises two crucial issues. First, 
whereas Box 8.2 and Box 8.3 illustrate that the corrective approach may have considerable 
effects on ICERs and allocation decisions for treatments moving patients between impaired 
health states and full health, the effects of correction on movements between health states that 
differ only slightly is currently unknown. Given that treatments yielding full recovery are 
likely to be rare, more insight into how such small improvements or deteriorations in health 
status are affected by deciding to correct or not to correct (for both SG and TTO) is an 
important avenue for future research. Second, as can be seen from Box 8.2 and Box 8.3, 
another corollary of applying the corrective approach is that a ‘perfect-health gap’ may be 
exacerbated. Note that whether or not such a gap emerges depends on final corrected weights. 
However, currently available corrected weights suggest that the distance in utility between 
the mildest impaired health states, which in current estimates receive lower QALY weights 
after correcting for bias due to loss aversion, utility curvature and probability weighting, and 
the utility of perfect health, which remains stable at 1.00, increases. As a result, applying the 
corrective approach may especially impact ICERs of and allocation decisions for treatments 
involving patients losing or returning to perfect health. Incremental cost-effectiveness thus 
increases (as shown in Box 8.2) for treatments that return patients to full health, with 
potential policy and allocation implications (as in Box 8.3).  
It is yet unclear whether this ‘perfect health gap’ is simply the result of poor correction of 
bias in TTO and SG, and as such an unintended and undesirable by-product of applying the 
corrective approach, or reflects actual individual or societal preferences. Implicitly, a perfect 
health gap already exists in many applications of tariff estimations for utility classification 
systems (e.g. Kim et al., 2016, Versteegh et al., 2016, Xie et al., 2016). Whether the larger 
 
gap aligns with preferences needs to be established further, especially since correction may 
enlarge the gap, emphasizing the special status perfect health may have. However, earlier 
work applying a similar corrective approach outside the health domain found that correcting 
for PT may lead to compression of utility weights (Bleichrodt et al., 2001). It was suggested 
that this compression was unrelated to individuals’ preferences, but rather resulted from the 
specific parametrized correction process applied. Such compression of corrected weights 
could explain the enlarged perfect health gap. Indeed, if the utility estimates of impaired 
health states are compressed, and come closer to the midpoint of the 0 to 1 scale (as can be 
seen in the Online Supplements of this dissertation), while perfect health remains fixed at 1, 
this inevitably leads to a (larger) gap.  
Moreover, if this compression effect is strong enough, it could also explain the convergence 
of TTO and SG valuations (as all values cluster in the middle of the scale). The convergence 
of valuations using both methods has been interpreted in earlier work as evidence of 
Box 8.3. The impact of the corrective approach on allocation decisions  
Imagine two patient populations that have the same initial quality of life: a mild health 
state characterized by slight problems in mobility and self-care (21211, β1 in the Online 
Supplements of this dissertation). Treatment A will return population 𝑃𝑎 to perfect health, 
i.e. Treatment A is curative. Treatment B, on the other hand, will prevent population 𝑃𝑏 
from a sure loss in quality of life, from state β1 to β3 (32341), a health state characterized 
by moderate problems with mobility, slight problems with self-care, moderate problems 
with usual activity, and severe pain. In other words, we have to choose between funding 
A, which involves 𝑃𝑎 gaining 𝑈(𝐹𝐻) − 𝑈(𝛽1), while funding B prevents a loss in quality 
of life of 𝑈(𝛽3) − 𝑈(𝛽1) for 𝑃𝑏. Under the classical elicitation assumption, we observe 
that the utility differences between 𝑈(𝛽3) − 𝑈(𝛽1) and 𝑈(𝐹𝐻) − 𝑈(𝛽1) are of similar 
magnitude, independent of which method is used to elicit these weights (see Figure 
B8.3a). After correction, however, utility for 𝛽1 (see Figure B8.3b) has dropped 
substantially, which could change the allocation decision problem between A and B in 
favor of Treatment A (ceteris paribus).  
 
Figure B8.3a. TTO and SG weight   Figure B8.3b. TTO and SG weight 
differences with classical estimation   under the corrective approach  
 
 
 
 
 
 
successful correction (van Osch et al., 2004, and in Chapter 7 of this dissertation). Hence, it is 
crucial to determine whether the corrective approach leads to such unwarranted compression 
of QALY weights, and indeed whether corrected weights better reflect preferences for health 
states than classical weights. The move towards individual corrective approaches (see 
Chapter 7 of this dissertation), combined with for example ex-post validation of corrected 
weights in personal interviews in future work, could shed light on this issue. Such insight in 
the validity of classical and corrected weights is pivotal in interpreting the observed 
convergence of health state valuations obtained through different methods as well as the 
increased perfect health gap, and we believe is required before the corrective approach is 
applied in economic evaluation. 
To prevent is better than to cure: exploring the loss aversion premium 
Applying the corrective approach implies correcting for bias in TTO and SG weights that 
results from loss aversion, probability weighting and utility curvature. This may be desirable, 
because TTO and SG are not designed to reflect these time and risk preferences; they were 
designed to reflect preferences for health states. As such, in our view, if time and risk 
preferences are deemed relevant for health policy, HSV is not the context in which they 
should be considered. Rather, this should occur within economic evaluations if deemed 
appropriate. For time preferences this is already common practice: often a discount rate is 
applied to future life years in cost-effectiveness analyses (Drummond et al., 2015), which 
may reflect societal time preferences for health outcomes (Attema et al., 2018b). However, to 
avoid ‘double discounting’, TTO weights should be adjusted for individual utility curvature 
(or time preferences) before applying such societal discount rates in economic evaluations 
(MacKeigan et al., 2003). Thus, i) individuals’ discounting in TTO should be corrected for 
initially in HSV and ii) policy makers can decide if and which societal time preference is to 
be incorporated in economic evaluations. Application of the corrective approach would 
extend the first step of this sequence to also correct for loss aversion and probability 
weighting. However, no work exists on providing a rationale or methods for also applying the 
second step for loss aversion or probability weighting, even though it is well-known that loss 
aversion and probability weighting apply to health outcomes as well (Attema et al., 2018a, 
Attema et al., 2013, Attema et al., 2016, Kemel and Paraschiv, 2018, and Chapter 7 of this 
dissertation). 
Several authors provided arguments that loss aversion and probability weighting, although 
yielding bias in TTO and SG, need not be irrelevant or irrational. For example, Huber and 
colleagues (Huber et al., 2002) wrote: ‘In many settings, one cannot tell whether loss 
aversion is a bias or merely a reflection of the fact that losses have more emotional impact 
than gains of equal magnitude’. Similarly, Diecidue and Wakker (Diecidue and Wakker, 
2001) argued that probability weighting could reflect individuals’ decision that some 
outcomes are especially important and should receive more attention than equally likely 
outcomes. As such, just as societal time preference, both probability weighting and loss 
aversion could provide information, relevant for economic evaluations and health care 
decision-makers. They may signal that (possible) health losses are perceived to have large 
emotional impact by many members of society. Hence, this preference information could be 
viewed as a relevant input in decisions based on economic evaluations of health technologies 
dealing with (risks of) health losses. Below, we will explore how policy makers may include 
such behavioral insights in such economic evaluations, with a focus on loss aversion 
 
(developing a similar approach for probability weighting is beyond the scope of this paper 
and less intuitive in the context of economic evaluation). 
To interpret or apply insights based on loss aversion in economic evaluations, it is important 
to consider which reference point is taken – otherwise losses and gains are undefined. For 
example, one could take individuals’ current health as reference point, which implies that 
preventive treatments reduce health losses, while curative treatments generate health gains 
(typically after some loss is incurred). Loss aversion could then refer to a social preference 
for preventive treatments over curative treatments (ceteris paribus). However, an extensive 
literature on equity weighting in health exists suggesting that people on average prefer to treat 
those worse off (e.g. Van de Wetering et al., 2013). Furthermore, research has also 
documented that age-dependent expectations about length and quality of life could also serve 
as reference point (Brouwer et al., 2005, van Nooten and Brouwer, 2004, Wouters et al., 
2015). Collectively, these findings indicate that if a similar approach is to be developed as for 
time preference, more research on reference points in decisions about health is required. 
Nonetheless, in the Online Supplements of this dissertation, we provide a first suggestion as 
to how insights from loss aversion may be included in economic evaluations, by 
incorporating a loss aversion premium. When and why policy makers should include a loss 
aversion premium in economic evaluations, may be explored in future work taking a broad 
view of relevant factors in the decision making process. For simplicity, this approach, that 
involves deliberately adjusting the value assigned to changes between health states that 
involve losses, was applied with current health as reference point. Such a loss aversion 
premium could be used when this is deemed relevant and normatively acceptable.  
Conclusion: Research agenda and policy implications 
Besides more discussion on corollaries of the corrective approach, such as the perfect health 
gap and a loss aversion premium, several steps can be outlined for future research. We 
suggest that these are necessary for successful potential application of the corrective approach 
in the policy context. First, the robustness and validity of PT parameters obtained through the 
corrective approach should be determined, both individually and combined, since differences 
were observed between studies using different methods (Attema et al., 2018a, Attema et al., 
2013, Attema et al., 2016, Kemel and Paraschiv, 2018, and Chapters 3 and 7 of this 
dissertation). A head-to-head comparison of these methods could provide a more in-depth 
analysis of these differences and their impact on correction. Second, research could focus on 
replicating and extending earlier work on the corrective approach, preferably with a sample 
representative of the relevant population and test the validity of individually corrected QALY 
weights. Third, future research should aim to clarify the effect of PT on QALY weights 
elicited with discrete choice experiments (DCE), as these are employed more frequently in 
large scale valuation studies (e.g. Versteegh et al., 2016). Given that orthogonal comparisons 
of TTO, SG and DCE are non-existent, only suggestive evidence exists showing that DCE 
weights are similar to classical TTO and SG weights (McCabe et al., 2006, Stolk et al., 2010). 
However, given that DCEs are typically applied assuming random utility models and since 
they use an aggregate approach to HSV, it may be difficult to reconcile with corrections at 
the individual level. Fourth, as mentioned, the corrective approach crucially depends on 
assumptions about the reference point. Future work should explore the role and nature of the 
reference point(s) further, especially for TTO (for example with an approach as in van Osch 
et al., 2006), and develop corrections for PT that are applicable when outcomes other than the 
 
 
time spent in reduced health are taken as reference point. Finally, if the results of future 
research on correcting biases are encouraging, national tariffs using the corrective approach 
for the relevant health-utility classification, for example EQ-5D-5L or SF-6D, could be 
obtained to facilitate the incorporation of the corrective approach within health policy (as in 
Perpiñán et al., 2009). 
Summarizing, if future research indeed demonstrates the merit of the corrective approach, our 
suggestion would be to apply the corrective approach in QALY measurement also in the 
context of actual decision making, which entails several steps: 
1. In HSV exercises, for example in large scale valuation studies, measure each subject’s 
degree of deviation from EU with the most accurate methods available and adjust 
individuals’ responses accordingly. Although work exists that challenges some of its core 
presuppositions (e.g. suggesting no stable preferences exist at all: Slovic, 1995), PT appears 
to best capture these deviations.  
2. If these corrected weights are found to be valid (and a better representation of health state 
preferences than classical weights), national tariffs could be calculated based on corrected 
weights. These could be used in economic evaluations informing policy makers.  
3. Some of the correction factors used to ‘clean’ health state valuations, may still be 
informative for policy makers outside the context of HSV. We have explored how this may 
be true for loss aversion, in relation to the distinction between interventions producing health 
gains and those preventing health losses.  
To conclude, despite developments and increased research efforts into the corrective 
approach, many unresolved issues still exist that caution against its widespread use. This 
suggests that the quest for improving methods for HSV, economic evaluations and decision 
making has clearly not ended yet. With this paper we hope to have encouraged both 
researchers and policy makers alike to explore these new opportunities.  
  
 
  
 
 
Chapter 9: Living up to expectations: Experimental tests of 
subjective life expectancy as reference point in time trade-off and 
standard gamble 
 
Chapter based on:  
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Experimental tests of subjective life expectancy as reference point in time trade-off and 
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Abstract: Earlier work suggested that subjective life expectancy (SLE) functions as 
reference point in time trade-off (TTO), but has not tested or modeled this explicitly. In this 
paper we construct a model based on prospect theory to investigate these predictions more 
thoroughly. We report the first experimental test of reference-dependence with respect to 
SLE for TTO and extend this approach to standard gamble (SG). In two experiments, 
subjects’ SLEs were used to construct different versions of 10-year TTO and SG tasks, with 
the gauge duration either described as occurring above or below life expectation. Our 
analyses suggest that both TTO and SG weights were affected by SLE as predicted by 
prospect theory with SLE as reference point. Subjects gave up fewer years in TTO and were 
less risk-tolerant in SG below SLE, implying that weights derived from these health state 
valuation methods for durations below SLE will be biased upwards. 
  
 
 
Introduction 
Time trade-off (TTO) and standard gamble (SG) are two popular methods to value health 
states, i.e. to obtain utility weights relevant for determining quality adjusted life-years 
(QALYs)26. Although the methods share a similar purpose, their framing and outcomes differ 
substantially (Bleichrodt, 2002, Bleichrodt and Johannesson, 1997), with SG weights 
typically being higher than TTO weights (e.g. Read et al., 1984, Torrance, 1976). Bleichrodt 
(2002) proposed that these differences could be explained by differences in the theoretical 
assumptions underlying TTO and SG. Both methods’ QALY weights are typically calculated 
using theoretical models that have been shown to be empirically invalid, i.e. expected utility 
theory (for violations, see: Llewellyn-Thomas et al., 1982, Starmer, 2000) and the linear 
QALY model (for violations, see: Abellan-Perpinan et al., 2006, Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2005). 
More specifically, TTO and SG weights are biased, according to Bleichrodt (2002), because 
individuals show several empirical deviations from these simplified models, including loss 
aversion, probability weighting, utility curvature and scale compatibility. The first three of 
these deviations can be modeled through prospect theory, and Bleichrodt (2002) proposed 
that such modelling could reduce the difference between TTO and SG, for which some 
empirical support was found in Chapter 7 of this dissertation. 
Prospect theory was originally developed as an alternative to expected utility (EU) theory for 
decision making under risk and uncertainty (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992). Most importantly, prospect theory assumes reference-dependence, i.e. 
outcomes are not evaluated in final terms, but as changes relative to a reference point (RP). 
The RP is a neutral outcome, such as the status quo (i.e. current health), but many alternative 
comparators have been argued to be able to serve as RP, such as the lowest possible outcome 
(Attema et al., 2012, Bleichrodt et al., 2001), the guaranteed outcome in TTO or SG (van 
Osch and Stiggelbout, 2008, van Osch et al., 2004), or the best outcome available (van Osch 
et al., 2006). Furthermore, the RP may be influenced or formed by aspirations, expectations, 
norms, and social comparisons (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). It is, however, paramount to 
determine the exact location of the RP, as this ‘neutral outcome’ will divide all other 
outcomes into gains and losses. Within prospect theory, this is especially relevant, as it 
assumes loss aversion, i.e. losses (relative to the RP) carry more weight than gains of the 
same size. Furthermore, in prospect theory probabilities can be transformed non-linearly by 
means of a probability weighting function, which may also differ between gains and losses. 
Often it remains unclear exactly how RPs are selected, and how RP selection should be 
modeled within prospect theory (Wakker, 2010). Two different streams of literature have 
produced insights on the role of RPs in health-related decision making, which we try to unify 
in this paper. First, in applications of prospect theory to health outcomes, typically some 
plausible assumption is made about which outcome could serve as RP. This approach, where 
typically the RP is selected from the outcomes available within the scenarios presented to 
respondents, allows for tractable modelling and the formation of empirical predictions based 
on these assumptions. For example, earlier work on RP location for TTO and SG has 
suggested that the certain outcome, i.e. the impaired health state, will likely serve as RP in 
these health state valuation exercises (van Osch et al., 2006). Using such an approach to RP 
 
26 These weights are sometimes referred to as ‘utilities’. We will use the term QALY weights, and TTO or SG 
weights to refer to QALY weights elicited by TTO and SG respectively.  
 
selection, prospect theory has been successfully applied in the health domain, for example, 
earlier work showed that the main tenets of prospect theory (e.g. loss aversion and probability 
weighting) apply to decisions about human lives (Kemel and Paraschiv, 2018), length of life 
(Attema et al., 2013, Treadwell and Lenert, 1999, Verhoef et al., 1994, and Chapters 3 and 7 
of this dissertation), and quality of life (Attema et al., 2016). Second, a literature exists 
suggesting that RPs that originate outside the specific decision task at hand may also be 
selected by respondents. Such studies typically observe some effect of these reference-
outcomes on decision-making or well-being, and conjecture that this effect may be due to 
reference-dependence. Examples of such suggested reference-dependence are RPs based on 
expectations for length (van Nooten and Brouwer, 2004, van Nooten et al., 2009) and quality 
of life (Brouwer et al., 2005, Wouters et al., 2015), or social comparisons (Wouters, 2016).  
In this paper, we focus on the effects of individuals’ subjective life expectancy (SLE), i.e. 
self-reported anticipated length of life, which could serve as an RP as defined within prospect 
theory in health state valuations. It is well-known that many individuals expect to live longer 
than actuarial life expectancy (Brouwer and van Exel, 2005, Péntek et al., 2014, Rappange et 
al., 2016). Gauge durations in TTO typically do not coincide with these expectations; 
frequently, projected life span in TTO is considerably shorter. Although individuals may not 
be fully aware of this reduction during health state valuation (van Nooten et al., 2014), earlier 
work on SLE has consistently found that individuals with higher SLE gave up fewer years in 
TTO, and thus associated QALY weights were higher. We will refer to these changes in 
QALY weights for durations further away from expectations about length of life as the ‘SLE 
effect’. This SLE effect was found for 10-year TTOs (van Nooten et al., 2009), for patients 
valuing their own health state (Heintz et al., 2013), and for TTOs using a lifetime time-
horizon (van Nooten and Brouwer, 2004). Considering that in most cases life years traded off 
in TTO fall short of SLE, it may seem plausible to assume that these life years are perceived 
as being in the loss domain already, and thus given up reluctantly (van Nooten and Brouwer, 
2004, van Nooten et al., 2009). This earlier work postulated that the SLE effect may occur as 
a result of loss aversion, yielding unwillingness in TTO exercises to further reduce lifetime 
compared to individuals’ SLE which serves as RP.  
However, this explanation of the SLE effect has never been modeled adequately or tested 
directly, as earlier work on the SLE effect has relied on investigation of heterogeneity in SLE 
by means of an observational between-subjects approach, i.e. explaining differences in TTO 
responses by differences in SLE. Furthermore, if the SLE effect applies to TTO weights as a 
result of reference-dependence, one could also expect such effects on SG, as this method may 
also be affected by loss aversion (Bleichrodt, 2002). This has not yet been tested to our 
knowledge. Therefore, in this paper we extend earlier work on SLE effects in health state 
valuation by: 
i) Constructing a model based on prospect theory with reference-dependence with 
respect to SLE. 
ii) Reporting an elaborate test of the SLE effect by experimentally varying the 
tradable life years above and below SLE for both TTO and SG. 
More specifically, by developing a model based on prospect theory we are able to construct 
tractable predictions about the SLE effect for TTO and SG responses, if it indeed serves as 
RP. We test these predictions by means of within-subjects experimental methodology in 
which we construct different versions of TTO and SG, to directly compare QALY weights 
 
 
for life years both under and above SLE for each individual. Through this procedure we test 
if QALY weights differ for durations that can be perceived as either gains or losses compared 
to SLE and, hence, whether SLE functions as a formal reference point. This approach is 
applied in two experiments (labeled Study 1 and Study 2).  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we define our theoretical model 
based on prospect theory and, next, we derive predictions. Study 1 and Study 2 are reported 
in separate sections. Study 1 applied the experimental methodology with a convenience 
sample of students. The results of this study suggest that SLE indeed serves as RP for TTO 
and SG. In Study 2, the external validity of these findings is tested by recruiting a sample of 
individuals aged 60 years and older, largely confirming the results from Study 1. In the final 
sections we discuss these results and conclude. 
Theoretical framework  
Notation  
TTO and SG are denoted as health profiles described as (𝑄, 𝑡), where 𝑄 represents health 
status and 𝑡 denotes the age at which the profile ends (e.g. living in a wheelchair until age 
85), with 𝐷 and 𝐹𝐻 denoting the states Dead and Full Health, respectively. Subscripts (e.g. 
𝑎, 𝑟, 𝑥, 𝑦) are used to indicate chronic health profiles faced by a decision-maker with age 𝑡𝑎, 
where duration is defined as 𝑇𝑥 = 𝑡𝑥 − 𝑡𝑎. Importantly, 𝑡𝑎 can, but need not, be the decision 
maker’s current age (it could be any 𝑡𝑎 > 0). Risky prospects are defined as 
(𝑄𝑥, 𝑇𝑥)𝑝(𝑄𝑦, 𝑇𝑦), i.e. health profile (𝑄𝑥, 𝑇𝑥) with probability 𝑝, and health profile (𝑄𝑦, 𝑇𝑦) 
with probability 1 − 𝑝. Preference relations are defined as usual, i.e. they are weak-ordered 
(complete and transitive), and denoted by ≻ (strict preference), ≽ (weak preference), and ∽ 
(indifference).  
The TTO method asks for a time equivalent in perfect health which yields indifference 
between 𝑇𝑥 years in health state 𝑄 and 𝑇𝑦 years in FH. The number of years in 𝑇𝑦 is varied 
until the respondent is indifferent between the two options, i.e. (𝑄𝑥, 𝑇𝑥)~(𝐹𝐻, 𝑇𝑦). The SG 
method involves a choice between a number of years (𝑇𝑥) in health state 𝑄𝑥 for certain and a 
gamble with two outcomes, which are FH during the same time period (𝑇𝑥) and D. 
Probability 𝑝 is varied until the respondent is indifferent between the two alternatives, i.e. 
(𝑄𝑥, 𝑇𝑥)~(𝐹𝐻, 𝑇𝑥)𝑝(𝐷). Typically, preferences in TTO and SG are modeled within the 
general QALY model (Miyamoto and Eraker, 1989), which assumes that chronic health 
profiles (𝑄𝑥, 𝑇𝑥) can be evaluated by the utility function 𝑉(. ): 
𝑉(𝑄𝑥, 𝑇𝑥) = 𝑈(𝑄𝑥) ∗ 𝐿(𝑇𝑥),      (9.1) 
with 𝑈(𝑄) denoting utility of health status and 𝐿(𝑇) denoting the utility of 𝑇 life years.  
Assuming 𝐿(𝑇) = 𝑇 (i.e. the linear QALY model27), with the common normalization such 
that 𝑈(𝐹𝐻) = 1, TTO indifferences can be evaluated by:  
𝑈(𝑄𝑥) =  
𝑇𝑦
𝑇𝑥
.          (9.2) 
 
27 Note that this framework assumes no discounting of future life years, i.e. linear utility. This framework has 
been generalized to include non-linear utility by Miyamoto and Eraker (1989). 
 
SG indifference, on the other hand, additionally assuming EU and 𝑉(𝐷) = 0, can be 
evaluated by: 
𝑈(𝑄𝑥) = 𝑝.       (9.3) 
Although Eq. 9.2 and Eq. 9.3 are only valid under these strict assumptions (more general 
derivations are available in Chapter 7), these equations are often used in large scale health 
state valuations (Brazier et al., 2002, Versteegh et al., 2016).  
Reference-dependence model for SG and TTO 
Reference points play no role within the frameworks of EU and the general QALY model. 
Thus, in order to test whether SLE serves as RP, we will supplement the generalized QALY 
model with prospect theory, following closely the model developed in Chapter 7 of this 
dissertation. This means that we assume that the general QALY model holds with the 
additional assumptions outlined below included.  
We assume separate evaluations of gains and losses in life duration compared to an RP, 
denoted 𝑇𝑟 . This RP is an expected health profile, which is taken to last for 𝑇𝑟 years, starting 
from the age (𝑡𝑎) of the decision maker until their SLE (𝑡𝑟), i.e. 𝑇𝑟 = [𝑡𝑎, 𝑡𝑟] = 𝑡𝑟 − 𝑡𝑎. 
Throughout we will denote durations of health profiles (𝑄𝑥, 𝑇𝑥) as deviations with respect to 
this RP as follows: we will write (𝑄𝑥, 𝑇𝑥
∗) with 𝑇𝑥
∗ =  𝑇𝑥 − 𝑇𝑟. For example, imagine a 50-
year old subject with SLE of living until 80. The health profile of living in a wheelchair until 
age 70 will be denoted as (𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟, 𝑇𝑥
∗) with 𝑇𝑥
∗ = (𝑡𝑥 − 𝑡𝑎) − (𝑡𝑟 − 𝑡𝑎) =
(70 − 50) − (80 − 50) =  −10 (for more examples, see the Online Supplements of this 
dissertation). We restrict our prospect theory model to life duration, even though it has been 
suggested that reference-dependence may also exist for health status (Brouwer et al., 2005, 
Wouters et al., 2015). However, both from a theoretical and from an empirical point of view 
such reference-dependence for 𝑄 is hard to approximate. That is, prospect theory is typically 
applied to single-attribute outcomes, such as money, while health profiles consist of both life 
duration and health status. Multi-attribute characterizations of prospect theory exist, but 
because health status is a qualitative measure, loss aversion is not theoretically meaningful 
for this attribute (Bleichrodt and Miyamoto, 2003).  
As a solution, we apply an attribute-specific evaluation (Bleichrodt et al., 2009) by making 
three modifications to the general QALY model, to allow testing for reference-dependence 
with SLE as RP. First, we modify 𝐿(𝑇) in the general QALY model to 𝐿𝑖(𝑇∗), which is a 
standard ratio scale utility function, that can differ between gain outcomes (i.e. (𝑄𝑥, 𝑇𝑥
∗) 
with 𝑇𝑥
∗ ≥ 0, 𝑖 = +) and loss outcomes (i.e. (𝑄𝑥, 𝑇𝑥
∗) with 𝑇𝑥
∗ < 0, 𝑖 = −), and is strictly 
increasing and real-valued. Second, loss aversion is incorporated into our model by taking 
𝐿−(𝑇∗) = 𝜆𝐿𝑖(𝑇∗) for 𝑇∗ < 0, where 𝜆 denotes a loss aversion index, with 𝜆 > 1 [𝜆 = 1, 𝜆 <
1] indicating loss aversion [loss neutrality, gain seeking]. Third, we incorporate probability 
weighting, by evaluating probabilities in risky prospects by probability weighing functions 
𝑤𝑖, 𝑖 = +, −, that assign a number to each probability, with 𝑤𝑖(0) = 0 and 𝑤𝑖(1) = 1. These 
probability weighting functions can be different for gains and losses. We do not modify 𝑈(𝑄) 
of the general QALY model, but we attempt to control for possible effects of reference-
dependence of health status by applying our model only to health profiles where health status 
is better than what is considered acceptable at the ages under consideration. If, as Wouters et 
al. (2015) suggested, such acceptability serves as RP for health status, this restriction to 
 
 
acceptable health states may avoid confounding effects as losses will only occur in terms of 
duration while health status will always be above expectation.  
Thus, as in Chapter 7 of this dissertation, references over risky prospects with both gain and 
loss outcomes, i.e. (𝑄𝑥, 𝑇𝑥
∗)𝑝(𝑄𝑦, 𝑇𝑦
∗), with 𝑇𝑥
∗ ≥ 0 > 𝑇𝑦
∗ are evaluated by: 
𝑤+(𝑝)𝑈(𝑄𝑥)𝐿
+(𝑇𝑥
∗) + 𝑤−(1 − 𝑝)𝑈(𝑄𝑦)𝐿
−(𝑇𝑦
∗),    (9.4) 
while preferences over risky prospects (𝑄𝑥, 𝑇𝑥
∗)𝑝(𝑄𝑦, 𝑇𝑦
∗) for either gains or losses are 
evaluated by: 
𝑤𝑖(𝑝)𝑈(𝑄𝑥)𝐿
𝑖(𝑇𝑥
∗) + (1 − 𝑤𝑖(𝑝)) 𝑈(𝑄𝑦)𝐿
𝑖(𝑇𝑦
∗), 𝑖 = +, −    (9.5) 
where 𝑖 = + [−] when 𝑇𝑥
∗, 𝑇𝑦
∗ > [<] 0, i.e. both outcomes are gains or losses. In Chapter 7 of 
this dissertation we show that when 𝑤𝑖(𝑝) = 𝑝, 𝜆 = 1, and no distinction is made between 
gains and losses (i.e. no reference-dependence), this model reduces to the general QALY 
model. 
Predictions 
In this paper we consider two versions of TTO and SG. Typically, TTO and SG involve 10-
year durations that start at current age. Instead, in this paper, we let the 10-year period in a 
reduced health state, which occurs in both TTO and SG, a) start at SLE, i.e. 𝑡𝑎 = 𝑡𝑟 or b) end 
at each individual’s SLE, i.e. 𝑡𝑎 = 𝑡𝑟 − 10. If SLE functions as RP, for a) the gauge duration 
occurs completely above SLE and thus always involves considerations in the gain domain 
(because 𝑡𝑎 = 𝑡𝑟 gives 𝑇𝑥
∗, 𝑇𝑦
∗ > 0). Similarly, for b) the gauge duration occurs completely 
below SLE and thus involves trade-offs in the loss domain (because 𝑡𝑎 = 𝑡𝑟 − 10 gives 
𝑇𝑥
∗, 𝑇𝑦
∗ ≤ 0). Therefore, we label versions with gauge durations completely above SLE as gain 
versions (i.e. TTO-gains and SG-gains), while those versions with life years occurring 
completely below SLE are labeled as loss versions (i.e. TTO-losses and SG-losses). To 
distinguish between the starting ages in these versions for gains and losses, we add 
superscripts 𝑔 and 𝑙, i.e. 𝑡𝑎
𝑔
= 𝑡𝑟 and 𝑡𝑎
𝑙 = 𝑡𝑟 − 10. As a final notational convention, given 
that both versions have the same durations 𝑇𝑥 (10 years starting at different ages), for clarity, 
we will add superscripts to health status for health profiles (𝑄𝑥, 𝑇𝑥
∗), such that (Q𝑥
𝑔
, 𝑇𝑥
∗) and 
(Q𝑥
𝑙 , 𝑇𝑥
∗) refer to profiles in gain (starting at 𝑡𝑎
𝑔
) or loss versions (starting at 𝑡𝑎
𝑙 ), respectively. 
For example, consider a subject expecting to live until age 80 (𝑡𝑟 = 80). She would receive 
gain versions with 𝑡𝑎
𝑔
= 80 and loss versions with 𝑡𝑎
𝑙 = 70. If SLE indeed serves as RP, this 
shift from 𝑡𝑎
𝑔
 to 𝑡𝑎
𝑙  allows us to test the SLE effect, as it changes the perception of life years 
with respect to the RP. 
In the remainder of this section, we will employ our theoretical model based on prospect 
theory with SLE as RP to derive predictions about the SLE effect on TTO and SG. We will 
obtain these predictions by illustrating the implications of our prospect theory model as 
opposed to a reference case, in which linear QALYs and EU hold (i.e. Eq. 9.2 and Eq. 9.3 can 
be applied). For the sake of brevity and clarity, we focus on providing graphical illustrations 
of these predictions in Figure 9.1 and Figure 9.2. A complete and formal proof of these 
predictions can be found in the Online Supplements of this dissertation 
 
SLE effects for TTO 
For TTO, consider as reference case, a subject willing to give up 2 years with reduced health 
status (𝑄𝑥) to obtain full health for 8 more years in the gain version. Using our notation with 
SLE as RP, this yields the following indifference: (𝑄𝑥
𝑔
, 10)~(𝐹𝐻𝑔, 8). That is, in the gain 
version the subject is indifferent between gaining 10 years beyond SLE in health state 𝑄𝑥 and 
gaining 8 years in full health. We will derive predictions from our model as to what this 
indifference implies for the years given up in loss versions, i.e. predict 𝑇𝑦
∗ in 
(𝑄𝑥
𝑙 , 0)~(𝐹𝐻𝑙, 𝑇𝑦
∗). We first consider the reference case, with linear utility (i.e. 𝐿−(𝑇∗) =
𝐿+(𝑇∗) = 𝑇∗)) and no loss aversion (𝜆 = 1), which yields the following indifferences: 
(𝑄𝑥
𝑔
, 10)~(𝐹𝐻𝑔, 8) and (𝑄𝑥
𝑙 , 0)~(𝐹𝐻𝑙, −2) for gain and loss versions, respectively (as each 
year has the same value). In Figure 9.1, we have represented such a combination of 
indifferences more generally. Initially for the reference case, we observe symmetric 
indifferences: (𝑄𝑥
𝑔
, 𝑇x
∗)~(𝐹𝐻𝑔, 𝑇y
∗) and (𝑄𝑥
𝑙 , 𝑇𝑥
∗)~(𝐹𝐻𝑙, 𝑇y
∗). That is, shifting 𝑡𝑎
𝑔
 to 𝑡𝑎
𝑙 , which 
in our experiments with 10 year durations gives 𝑇r = 𝑇x
∗ for losses, does not affect 
preferences, as (𝑇𝑥
∗ − 𝑇y
∗) is equal between gains and losses. These indifferences indicate that 
in both scenarios each year given up in 𝑄𝑥 (i.e. 𝑇𝑥
∗ − 𝑇y
∗) exactly offsets an equal part of the 
value of the quality of life gained Δ(𝑈(𝐹𝐻) − 𝑈(𝑄𝑥)). However, such a combination of 
indifferences does not take into account any discrepancies between gains and losses. In 
Figure 9.1 we provide two illustrations of how the SLE effect for TTO responses due to: a) 
non-linear utility curvature, and b) loss aversion.  
 
Figure 9.1. Indifference curves for time trade-off above and below SLE. 
 
 
 
First, whereas TTO typically is derived assuming that utility of life duration is linear, i.e. 
𝐿−(𝑇∗) = 𝐿+(𝑇∗) = 𝑇∗, earlier work on prospect theory has shown that this assumption is 
likely to be invalid for health outcomes (e.g. Attema et al., 2013, Kemel and Paraschiv, 2018, 
and Chapters 3 and 7 of this dissertation) and monetary outcomes (e.g. Abdellaoui, 2000, 
Abdellaoui et al., 2008, Abdellaoui et al., 2016, Bruhin et al., 2010). Instead, in prospect 
theory utility for gains is typically concave, and utility for losses is convex – i.e. utility for 
life duration is S-shaped. This inflection point in the utility curve may affect years given up 
in TTO-gains and TTO-losses versions, as it implies diminishing marginal sensitivity for 
additional life years gained or lost further away from 𝑇r, as opposed to the linearity assumed 
in the reference case. Hence, it becomes important to consider where the life years given up 
in 𝑄𝑥, and the years in which improved quality of life Δ(𝑈(𝐹𝐻) − 𝑈(𝑄𝑥)) is realized, fall 
along this S-shaped curve (we illustrate these effects in Figure 9.1). For TTO-gains, the years 
given up in 𝑄𝑥 (e.g. between 8 and 10) are further away from 𝑇r than the years in which 
improved quality of life Δ(𝑈(𝐹𝐻) − 𝑈(𝑄𝑥)) is realized (e.g. between 0 and 8). Given that 
utility for gains is concave, in contrast to the reference case where each year is valued 
equally, we should find that each year given up in 𝑄𝑥 gets less weight than each year in which 
improved quality of life (Δ(𝑈(𝐹𝐻) − 𝑈(𝑄𝑥))) is experienced. Compared to the linear 
reference-case, this yields a convex indifference curve, and the respondent will give up more 
life years to offset the improvement in quality of life (Δ(𝑈(𝐹𝐻) − 𝑈(𝑄𝑥)) and restore 
indifference. Hence, we obtain (𝑄𝑥
𝑔
, 𝑇x
∗)~(𝐹𝐻𝑔, 𝑇y
∗′), with 𝑇y
∗′ < 𝑇y
∗. For TTO-losses, 
however, the years given up in 𝑄𝑥 (e.g. between 0 and -2) occur closer to 𝑇r than the years in 
which Δ(𝑈(𝐹𝐻) − 𝑈(𝑄𝑥)) is realized (between -10 and -2). As such, when utility for losses 
in life duration is convex, each year in which the improvement in quality of life is obtained 
gets less weight than each year given up. As a result, as compared to the reference case, this 
yields a concave indifference curve, and the respondent should give up fewer years to offset 
the improvement in quality of life (Δ(𝑈(𝐹𝐻) − 𝑈(𝑄𝑥)) and restore indifference. Hence, we 
obtain (𝑄𝑥
𝑙 , 𝑇x
∗)~(𝐹𝐻𝑙, 𝑇y
∗′), with 𝑇y
∗′ > 𝑇y
∗. 
Second, we take into account loss aversion, i.e. increased sensitivity to losses relative to 𝑇r. 
Loss aversion yields reluctance to give up life years, and to account for this effect each year 
given up in 𝑄𝑥 should offset a larger part of the quality of life gained Δ(𝑈(𝐹𝐻) − 𝑈(𝑄𝑥)). 
This yields the steeper indifference curve in Figure 9.1, compared to the reference case where 
people are equally sensitive to gains and losses. As a result, if one is loss averse and durations 
in TTO occur below 𝑇r, fewer years (𝑇y
∗′′) should be given up to restore indifference, yielding 
(Q𝑥
𝑙 , 𝑇𝑥
∗)~(𝐹𝐻𝑙, 𝑇y
∗′′). Thus, we predict that loss aversion with respect to SLE will decrease 
the years given up for TTO-losses versions as compared to gain versions. This conclusion 
also holds when taking into account non-linearity in the utility curve for life duration (see 
Figure 9.1).  
SLE effects for SG 
For SG, consider a subject willing to accept at most a 20% risk of immediate death for SG-
gains. In our notation, this yields the following indifferences for gains: 
(𝑄𝑥
𝑔
, 10)~(𝐹𝐻𝑔, 10)0.8(𝐷). We will derive predictions from our model as to what this 
indifference implies for probability of death accepted in loss versions. In the reference case, 
linear QALYs and EU hold, i.e. the subject will also accept at most a risk of 20% of 
immediate death for the loss version, i.e. (𝑄𝑥
𝑙 , 0)~(𝐹𝐻𝑙, 0)0.8(𝐷). In Figure 9.2, we have 
 
represented such a combination of preferences more generally. Initially we observe the same 
indifference, i.e. (𝑄𝑥
𝑔
, 𝑇𝑥
∗)~(𝐹𝐻𝑔, 𝑇𝑥
∗)𝑝𝑔(𝐷) and (𝑄𝑥
𝑙 , 𝑇𝑥
∗)~(𝐹𝐻𝑙, 𝑇𝑥
∗)𝑝𝑙(𝐷) with 𝑝𝑔 =
𝑝𝑙. That is, shifting 𝑡𝑎
𝑔
 to 𝑡𝑎
𝑙  does not affect preferences, i.e. people are willing to risk the 
same probability of (𝐷) for both SG-gains and SG-losses. This combination of indifferences 
in the reference case indicates that in both scenarios the possibility of an improvement in 
quality of life Δ(𝑈(𝐹𝐻) − 𝑈(𝑄𝑥)) for 𝑇x exactly offsets the generally small chance of dying 
immediately. In case the difference in quality of life increases, i.e. when (Δ(𝑈(𝐹𝐻) −
𝑈(𝑄𝑥)) increases, a larger chance of dying immediately will be accepted. However, just as 
for TTO, such a combination of indifferences does not take into account any discrepancies in 
the evaluation of gains and losses. 
In Figure 9.2 we provide two illustrations of how SG responses are affected when SLE serves 
as RP: a) probability weighting (which may be different between gain and loss versions), and 
b) loss aversion. First, whereas in the reference case, probabilities are treated linearly (and 
thus also identically between gains and losses), our model based on prospect theory allows 
non-linear probability weighting. Importantly, it is typically observed that probability 
weighting is less pronounced for losses compared to gains, that is probability weighting is 
less inverse-S shaped, which has been found for health outcomes (e.g. Attema et al., 2013, 
Attema et al., 2016) and monetary outcomes (e.g. Abdellaoui, 2000, Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979, Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). This implies that if SLE serves as RP, the same (small) 
probability of an extreme outcome receives more decision weight for SG-gains version 
compared to SG-losses versions. Inversely, when we observe a gain version indifference 
(Q𝑥
𝑔
, 𝑇𝑥
∗)~(𝐹𝐻𝑔, 𝑇𝑥
∗)𝑝𝑔(𝐷), then a higher probability of the extreme outcome (𝐷) may be 
accepted in the equivalent loss version (Q𝑥
𝑙 , 𝑇𝑥
∗)~(𝐹𝐻𝑙, 𝑇𝑥
∗)𝑝𝑙(𝐷). For example, imagine a 
subject with 𝑝𝑔 = 20%, which implies that immediate death with decision weight 𝑤
+(0.20) 
offsets28 the possible gain of quality of life for ∆(𝑈(𝐹𝐻) − 𝑈(𝑄𝑥)) with duration 𝑇𝑥
∗. When 
we have 𝑤+(𝑝𝑔) > 𝑤
−(𝑝𝑙) for 𝑝𝑔 = 𝑝𝑙, an increase in 𝑝𝑙 to 𝑝𝑙′ is required to restore 
indifference, i.e. for the disutility of (𝐷) to offset ∆(𝑈(𝐹𝐻) − 𝑈(𝑄𝑥)). 
Second, we take into account loss aversion by again assuming increased sensitivity to the 
possibility of losing compared to SLE, i.e. to durations below 𝑇𝑟 . Importantly, the 
consequence of immediate death (𝐷) differs between gain and loss versions; in the SG-gain 
version, entails a 20% chance of living up to SLE, while for loss versions dying immediately 
means living 10 years shorter than expected (i.e. a loss). Hence, SG-gain versions, in our 
experiment, involved no losses compared to 𝑇r, and were not affected by loss aversion. 
Hence, if losses are incurred more reluctantly, smaller probabilities (𝑝𝑙′′ < 𝑝𝑔) of a loss are 
accepted for the same difference in quality of life (∆(𝑈(𝐹𝐻) − 𝑈(𝑄𝑥)). In Figure 9.2 we 
illustrate this by a steeper indifference curve.  
 
 
28 Typically, in applications of prospect theory outcomes are rank-ordered, where in binary gambles such as SG, 
probability 𝑝 is taken to reflect the probability of the extreme outcome in that domain. For the sake of clarity, in 
these illustrations we deviated from these conventions by taking 𝑝𝑔 and 𝑝𝑙  to refer to the chance of immediate 
death in both versions. The Online Supplements of this dissertation shows how the conventional notation can be 
applied without loss of generality.  
 
 
Figure 9.2. Indifference curves for standard gambles above and below SLE (superscripts 
refer to gains and losses). 
 
Summarizing, for TTO our model predicts two SLE effects, both decreasing the life years 
given up for losses, while for SG our model predicts SLE effects in opposite directions, 
where the net direction is determined by the degree of loss aversion and differences in 
probability weighting for gains and losses. Given that these predictions differ between TTO 
and SG, shifting gauge duration from above to below SLE (i.e. moving from 𝑡𝑎
𝑔
 to 𝑡𝑎
𝑙 ) may 
yield different SLE effects between these two methods. We can derive no predictions about 
differences in magnitude of these SLE effects for TTO and SG, as they are affected by 
different components of prospect theory.  
Study 1 
In this first experiment, we tested our predicted SLE effects for TTO and SG in a lab 
experiment with a convenience sample of students. 
Methods  
This lab experiment started with several questions regarding expectations about length and 
quality of life followed by an elicitation of TTO and SG. Example instructions and 
screenshots can be found in the Online Supplements of this dissertation. The experiment used 
a 2 by 2 (method: TTO vs. SG, version: losses vs. gains) within-subjects design, with 
randomization by method. The experiment was completed by 102 Business Administration 
 
students29, recruited in the Erasmus Behavioral Lab in Rotterdam. A total of 71 males 
participated, and mean age for our sample was 20.25 (SD = 1.22). All students were rewarded 
course credit for participation in this 30-minute study.  
Measures of expectations about length and quality of life 
We measured students’ expectations about length of life with the following questions (in this 
order): a) ‘What is the minimum age you would hope to become?’, b) ‘What is the maximum 
age you would want to become?’, and c) ‘How old do you expect to become?’. The first two 
measures were obtained to explore how the typical estimates for SLE fall in between 
individuals’ aspired minimum and maximum age, while question c) measures SLE, using a 
similar phrasing as van Nooten and et al. (2009). Students answered all three questions using 
a drop-down menu with answers in full years ranging from 30 to 120. To check if health 
states were considered acceptable, we also explored expectations about quality of life by 
obtaining a measure of acceptability for the health states that were used to apply TTO and SG 
(see Table 1). These questions were included as a manipulation check, to determine whether 
our model, which pertained to acceptable health states, can be applied. To introduce this 
concept, we used the following instruction (adapted from Wouters et al., 2015): ‘In what 
follows you will receive questions regarding health at different ages. Generally, health 
deteriorates when we get older. Consider for example an 80 year-old person who is not able 
to walk further than 1 km. You might find this an acceptable condition for someone of 80, but 
less acceptable for 20 year old persons.’ Next we asked them to rate all three health states 
using an identical drop-down menu ranging from 30 to 120, using the following question: 
‘Could you please indicate from which age onwards you find the following three health states 
acceptable?’ Students could also answer ‘Never’, if they felt that a deteriorated health state 
was not acceptable at any age. 
Operationalization of TTO and SG 
All versions of TTO and SG featured a gauge duration of 10 years followed by immediate 
death, which is typical for this type of valuation exercises (van Nooten et al., 2009). These 
four valuation exercises (TTO-gains, TTO-losses, SG-gains and SG-losses) were all 
completed for three health states described by means of the EQ-5D-5L classification system 
(see Table 9.1 for the selected health states). TTO and SG were operationalized by using two-
stage choice lists (see the Online Supplements of this dissertation), which were computerized 
via Qualtrics to prohibit multiple switching and violations of (stochastic) dominance within 
each choice list. For TTO, a first choice list identified indifference in years, and afterwards in 
months in a second choice list. For SG, choice lists elicited indifference with a first choice list 
identifying indifference at probability intervals of 10%, and afterwards specifying this in 
percentage points in a second choice list. 
 
  
 
29 Power analysis for paired t-tests with n = 102, the recommended power of 0.8 (Cohen, 1988) and a 
significance level of 0.05 indicated that it is adequately powered to detect differences with effect sizes as low as 
Cohen’s d=0.28, indicating medium to small effect sizes (Cohen, 1988). 
 
 
Table 9.1. Health states used in experiment 
Dimension (EQ-5D) Description Best (Q1): 
21211 
Middle (Q2): 
31221 
Worst (Q3): 
32331 
Mobility You have … problems with 
walking 
Slight Moderate Moderate 
Self-care You have … problems with 
washing and dressing yourself 
No No Slight 
Usual activities You have … problems with 
your usual activities 
Slight Slight Moderate 
Pain/discomfort You have … pain or discomfort No Slight Moderate 
Anxiety/depression  You are … anxious or 
depressed. 
Not Not Not 
 
Results 
Table 9.2 reports descriptive statistics for our measures of expectations about length and 
quality of life. On average, students expected to become close to 85 years old, while wishing 
to become at least around 77 and at most close to 100 years. As we restricted our theoretical 
analyses to health states considered acceptable, we determined if students deemed health 
states Q1, Q2 and Q3 acceptable at all ages used in implemented TTO or SG versions. 
Overall, health states Q1 and Q2 were considered acceptable by most students, for all ages 
considered in this experiment, with 84% (Q1) and 72% (Q2) of our sample indicating that 
such a health status is acceptable from a lower age than the ages considered in our 
experiment. The most severe health state (Q3) was not considered acceptable at the lowest 
age considered (i.e. 𝑡𝑎
𝑙 ), with only 34% of our sample considering such health problems 
acceptable at the ages presented in the loss versions of TTO and SG. For gain versions, this 
percentage was considerably higher, at 80%. This indicates that if reference-dependence 
exists for health status (as proposed by Wouters et al., 2015), this RP may fall in between the 
ages considered in the gain and loss versions of TTO and SG for health state Q3. However, 
we find relatively little non-trading (i.e. QALY weights of 1), with rates of non-trading from 
as low as 2% to 18% of the sample. Hence, to see if acceptability affected our main results, 
we ran several tests to explore whether this violation of the simplifying assumptions as 
described in our theoretical model affects TTO and SG responses (see the Online 
Supplements of this dissertation). We did not observe such an effect of acceptability of health 
status on TTO and SG responses. As such, we report our main results without excluding 
respondents from the sample.  
 
 
Table 9.2. Medians, inter-quartile range (first quartile, third quartile), means and standard 
 deviations for measured health outcomes for full sample (n = 102) 
Outcomes Median IQR Mean SD 
SLE 85.0 (80.00, 90.00) 84.68 9.56 
SLE-min 80.0 (70.00, 85.00) 77.20 11.42 
SLE-max 100.0 (93.00, 105.00) 99.91 11.80 
Acceptable age Q1 60.0 (55.00, 67.00) 59.55 11.23 
Acceptable age Q2 70.0 (63.50, 75.00) 67.92 10.08 
Acceptable age Q3 79.5 (70.00, 82.75) 76.35 9.71 
 
Testing predicted SLE effects for TTO 
First, we tested our predictions about SLE effects in the two versions of TTO (i.e. TTO-gains 
and TTO-losses). Table 9.3 shows aggregate results for TTO responses in both versions. In 
accordance with our predictions, fewer life years were given up in loss versions of TTO 
compared to gain versions for all health states (Wilcoxon tests, all p’s <0.001). According to 
our model, this suggests that students would either be loss averse or showed less pronounced 
utility curvature for losses in life duration. Inversely, giving up fewer life years for loss 
versions will yield higher TTO weights, i.e. higher QALY weights assigned to the same 
health state. When we analysed our data at within-subjects, we observed that for Q1, Q2 and 
Q3 respectively, 61, 65, 68% of sample gave up fewer life years in loss-versions. For all three 
health states, these proportions were significantly larger than the part of our sample that gave 
up equal life years for both versions, or more life years for loss-versions (all 𝜒2’s (2, 𝑁 = 
102) > 39.71, all 𝑝’s < 0.001). 
 
Testing SLE effects for SG 
Next, we compared the probabilities of immediate death risked in SG between the two 
versions (i.e. SG-gain and SG-losses). As can be seen from Table 9.3, lower probabilities of 
immediate death were risked for loss versions of SG compared to gain versions (Wilcoxon 
tests, all p’s <0.001). According to our theoretical model, this implies that the effect of loss 
aversion was more pronounced than that of differences in probability weighting. Inversely, 
this leads to the conclusion that SG with durations below SLE will yield higher QALY 
weights for the same health state. When we analyzed our data within-subjects, we observed 
that for Q1, Q2 and Q3 respectively, 51, 49, 51% of our sample was willing to take a smaller 
risk of immediate death in loss versions. For all three health states, these proportions were 
significantly larger than the part of our sample that assigned equal probabilities to both 
versions, or was willing to risk a higher chance of immediate death for loss versions (all 𝜒2’s 
(2, 𝑁 = 102) > 10.65, all 𝑝’s < 0.005). 
 
 
 
Table 9.3. Median years given up in TTO and probability of death risk in SG, including 
within-subject differences between gain and loss versions 
Note: *, **, *** indicate that differences between gain and loss version were significant at p 
< 0.05, p < 0.01, and p < 0.001, for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.  
Comparing SLE effect between TTO and SG weights 
In order to compare SLE effects between TTO and SG we needed to normalize weights 
obtained by these two health state valuation methods to fit on the same scale. We will achieve 
this normalization by applying the derivation of TTO and SG weights under EU and the 
linear QALY framework (i.e. Eq. 9.2 and Eq. 9.3)30. Although this is inconsistent with our 
theoretical model based on prospect theory, it is in line with how TTO and SG responses are 
typically transformed into QALY weights (see for example: Brazier et al., 2002, Versteegh et 
al., 2016). Hence, these comparisons may also illustrate the direction and magnitude of 
reference-dependence with respect to SLE when TTO and SG weights are obtained when this 
is not accounted for. 
Figure 9.3 illustrates the aggregate results for our sample. Within versions (i.e. gains or 
losses), SG weights were significantly higher than TTO weights (Wilcoxon tests, all p’s < 
0.037). When comparing within valuation methods (i.e. TTO or SG), QALY weights for 
health state valuation exercises involving losses produced significantly higher QALY 
weights, both for TTO and SG (Wilcoxon tests, all p’s < 0.002). For both methods, the 
differences between gain and loss versions were of similar magnitude for Q1, Q2 and Q3 (not 
significantly different, Wilcoxon tests, p’s > 0.52). These findings indicate that shifting gauge 
duration below SLE resulted in an average increase in TTO weights of between 0.15 and 
0.23. For SG, a similar pattern was observed, with significant differences between gains and 
losses visible, where moving life years below SLE increased SG weights on average by 0.02 
 
30 Derivations of TTO and SG weights under PT are available (see Chapter 7 of this dissertation), but require 
assumptions about or measurements of 𝐿𝑖(𝑇), 𝑤𝑖(𝑝) and 𝜆. This is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 Gains Losses Diff. 
TTO 
Years given up Median IQR Median IQR Median IQR 
Best (Q1) 4.00 (2.00, 5.50) 2.13 (0.17, 4.23) 1.08*** (0.00, 3.48) 
Middle (Q2) 5.00 (2.94, 6.50) 3.17 (1.04, 5.00) 1.00*** (0.00, 3.00) 
Worst (Q3) 6.00 (4.50, 8.00) 5.00 (3.00, 6.67) 1.23*** (0.00, 3.00) 
SG 
Probability of D Median IQR Median IQR Median IQR 
Best (Q1) 20.5 (5.75, 35.00) 14.50 (2.25, 30.00) 1.00*** (0.00, 9.75) 
Middle (Q2) 25.00 (20.00, 40.00) 21.00 (10.00, 35.00) 0.00** (0.00, 10.00) 
Worst (Q3) 38.00 (24.00, 50.00) 31.50 (20.00, 45.75) 1.00*** (0.00, 11.00) 
 
to 0.12. These SLE effects were significantly larger than 0, and larger for TTO weights 
compared to SG weights across all three health states (Wilcoxon tests, p’s <0.002). We 
validated these SLE effects using a mixed effects regression, which also showed that our 
conclusions appear to be unaffected by acceptability of the health states Q1, Q2 and Q3 or 
gender (see the Online Supplements of this dissertation). Finally, we tested whether the 
typical difference between TTO and SG weights is affected by moving the gauge duration 
below SLE. To this end, for each subject, we calculated a difference score between TTO and 
SG per health state, with difference scores being obtained within versions (e.g. TTO-gains vs. 
SG-gains). This TTO-SG difference was smaller for losses compared to gains (Wilcoxon 
tests, all p’s <0.02), but differences remained significantly larger than 0 (Wilcoxon tests with 
𝜂 = 0, all p’s <0.04). Collectively, these findings suggest that moving the gauge duration 
below SLE increases QALY weights, with this SLE effect being larger for TTO than for SG. 
Discussion  
This section briefly discusses the results of Study 1 and the main limitations of this 
experiment that are remedied in Study 2. In accordance with our theoretical predictions, we 
observed a reduced willingness to give up life years in the TTO-loss version compared to the 
TTO-gain version (i.e. SLE-effect for TTO). For SG, similar to the TTO results, subjects 
were reluctant to risk losing life years when deciding about life years that fell short of their 
expectations (i.e. SLE-effect for SG). When comparing normalized TTO and SG weights 
(calculated in the common way, based on EU and the linear QALY model), we observed that 
QALY weights increased when gauge durations were moved below SLE, albeit to a larger 
extent for TTO. Hence, the difference between TTO and SG was smaller for loss versions. 
However, the QALY weights elicited for Q1, Q2, and Q3 were low, especially compared to 
earlier work on health state valuation with general population samples (Devlin et al., 2018, 
Versteegh et al., 2016). The results from Versteegh et al. (2016) allowed calculating a QALY 
weight for health states representative of the Dutch general public’s valuation (i.e. tariffs). 
For example, Q1, Q2 and Q3 were assigned valuations of 0.88, 0.79 and 0.68, respectively, 
which is considerably larger than the valuations in Study 1 (especially those elicited with gain 
versions).  
The low QALY weights elicited in Study 1 suggest that students were willing to give up large 
proportions of their remaining life or accept high risks of immediate death, just to avoid 
living in health states with relatively minor problems. At least two reasons can be provided to 
doubt the validity of such responses to TTO and SG. First, students were paid course credits 
for participation in this study. Generally, in behavioral experiments in health it is preferred to 
use financial incentives to motivate respondents to carefully consider their responses (Galizzi 
and Wiesen, 2018). As such, without an incentive to provide effort in our modified versions 
of TTO and SG, it could be hypothesized that students invested too little effort in considering 
the consequences of their choices. Hence, to resolve this issue, in Study 2 respondents were 
provided with a monetary reward for participation. Second, this first exploration of the 
process by which SLE affects valuations relied on a convenience sample of students. 
Obviously, this sample is small and not representative for the Dutch population in terms of 
age and education level. All students were required to imagine being much older than their 
current age and living in health states they were unlikely to have experienced. This could be 
problematic, as earlier work has shown that individuals may experience difficulty accurately 
predicting their future choices (i.e. projection bias, see: Loewenstein et al., 2003). 
 
 
Furthermore, earlier work has found that SLE is associated with both age and education level 
(Brouwer and van Exel, 2005, Péntek et al., 2014, Rappange et al., 2016), and TTO depends 
on attitudes regarding ageing and end-of-life (Van Nooten et al., 2016), which may also be 
different for students compared to older populations. Hence, in Study 2 we applied our 
empirical tests in a sample of older persons to investigate the external validity of our findings 
 
Figure 9.3. Median QALY weights for different versions and health states. 
Study 2 
In the second experiment, to test the external validity of our findings, we aimed to replicate 
our predicted SLE effects for TTO and SG in an online experiment with individuals aged 60 
years and older. The methods were almost identical to that of Study 1, and as such we will 
only highlight modifications to the method below. Furthermore, seeing as we applied a 
similar analysis strategy, we will present the results of Study 2 without repeating the details. 
Methods 
Study 2 used the same measures of expectations about length and quality of life, health states 
and operationalizations of TTO and SG as were used in Study 1. However, the experimental 
task (programmed in Qualtrics) was now distributed online to a sample of 328 people aged 60 
years and older. This was done through Prolific, a platform for online research with a large 
sample of individuals, who mostly live in the UK and US. It allows screening for a wide 
array of demographics, including age. When this experiment was run, Prolific had around 
2600 users that were eligible (i.e. 60 years and older) and active in the last 90 days. 
Respondents were rewarded 3₤ for taking part in this experiment. On average it took 
respondents 24 minutes to complete the experiment. Only a single question was added to the 
original set up in Study 1, i.e. a question to investigate experience with chronic illness.31 
Demographic characteristics for this sample of older people can be found in Table 9.4.   
 
31 ‘Do you have a health condition or disease with long lasting effects (i.e. a chronic condition)? Examples of 
chronic conditions are: arthritis, COPD, asthma, diabetes, hepatitis, AIDS, and cancer.’. 
 
Table 9.4. Sample characteristics for sample older respondents (Study 2) 
Demographic Categories  Frequency  % 
Age 60 – 65 202 61.6 
66 – 70 81 24.7 
70+ 41 12.5 
Sex Male 127 38.7 
Female 201 61.3 
Has chronic disease Yes 120 36.6 
No 208 63.4 
Nationality United Kingdom 220 67.1 
 United States 84 24.4 
 Other 24 7.3 
Relationship status Married/in a relationship 187 57.0 
 Divorced/Separated/Single 58 17.7 
 Widowed 24 7.3 
Highest education 
completed 
Doctorate degree (e.g. Ph.D.) 6 1.8 
Graduate degree (e.g. M.Sc.) 39 11.9 
Undergraduate degree (e.g. B.Sc.) 93 28.4 
Technical/Community college 45 13.7 
High school diploma 77 23.5 
No formal diploma 6 1.8 
Household income (GBP) £10,000 - £29,999 127 38.7 
£30,000 - £49,999 68 20.7 
£50,000 - £69,999 34 10.4 
£70,000 - £99,999 13 4.0 
£100,000 or more 12 3.7 
Results 
Table 9.5 reports descriptive statistics on expectations about length and quality of life. The 
findings for SLE were similar to Study 1 with median SLE being 85 years old. Compared to 
the students in Study 1, respondents wished to become significantly less old (i.e. SLE-max 
was smaller) and considered impaired health states acceptable from a higher age onwards 
(Wilcox tests, p’s <0.001). Consequently, only 53% (Q1), 36% (Q2) and 16% (Q3) of the 
 
 
respondents considered presented health states acceptable at all ages considered in the 
experiment. These were significantly smaller proportions than observed in Study 1 (all 𝜒2’s 
(2, 𝑁 = 328) > 47.95, all 𝑝’s < 0.001). A risk of having older respondents completing the 
experiment is that 𝑡𝑎
𝑙  (i.e. the age they are asked to imagine to be in the loss versions of TTO 
and SG) is lower than their current age. This was the case for 32 respondents (10% of the 
sample). However, excluding these respondents did not affect our results (see the Online 
Supplements of this dissertation). Furthermore, compared to Study 1 for all conditions and 
health states we found larger amounts of non-trading with rates of non-trading ranging from 
12.5% to 34% of the sample (all 𝜒2’s (2, 𝑁 = 328) > 3.93, all 𝑝’s < 0.05). As for Study 1, 
several analyses were performed to check if acceptability of health states affected QALY 
weights or the main conclusions of our study (see the Online Supplements of this 
dissertation). We also included having a chronic disease in these analyses. Acceptability did 
not affect QALY weights, but experience with chronic disease was associated with higher 
QALY weights. However, our main results were similar for those with and without 
experience with disease (see the Online Supplements of this dissertation). Hence, we report 
on the full sample below.  
Table 9.5. Medians, inter-quartile range (first quartile, third quartile), means and standard 
 deviations for measured health outcomes for older sample (n = 328) 
Outcomes Median IQR Mean SD 
SLE 85.00 (80.00, 90.00) 84.68 9.56 
SLE-min 84.00 (80.00, 86.00) 82.43 7.30 
SLE-max 95.00 (90.00, 100.00) 93.93 9.38 
Acceptable age Q1 70.00 (65.00, 80.00) 70.21 11.23 
Acceptable age Q2 75.00 (70.50, 82.00) 75.50 10.52 
Acceptable age Q3 80.00 (75.00, 86.25) 80.79 9.79 
 
Testing predicted SLE effects for TTO and SG 
Table 9.6 shows aggregate results for TTO and SG responses in both versions. As in Study 1, 
fewer life years were given up in the loss versions of TTO compared to gain versions for all 
health states (Wilcoxon tests, all p’s <0.001). We observed that for Q1, Q2 and Q3 
respectively 50%, 49%, and 41% of the sample gave up fewer life years in loss versions 
(rather than more or the same), which was a significant majority (all 𝜒2’s (2, 𝑁 = 328) > 
36.67, all 𝑝’s < 0.001). As can be seen by comparing Tables 9.3 and 9.6, the SLE effect for 
TTO appears smaller for this older sample, but this difference was never significant 
(Wilcoxon test, all p’s > 0.06). In contrast to Study 1, we found no SLE-effect for SG, i.e. no 
evidence for lower probabilities of immediate death risked for the loss version compared to 
the gain version. We observed that for Q1, Q2 and Q3 respectively, 35, 30, 31% of our 
sample was willing to take a smaller risk of immediate death in loss versions (with similar 
proportions of the sample taking higher risks for loss versions). As can be seen by comparing 
Tables 9.3 and 9.6, the SLE effect for SG was smaller in Study 2, and this difference was 
 
indeed significant for all three health states (Wilcoxon test, all p’s < 0.002). Finally, we 
explored whether excluding non-trading responses affected our findings for SLE effects for 
TTO and SG. Although this indeed increased effect sizes for TTO, the conclusions remained 
qualitatively similar (see the Online Supplements of this dissertation). 
Table 9.6. Median years given up in TTO and probability of death risk in SG, including 
within-subject differences between gain and loss versions 
Note: *, **, *** indicate that differences between gain and loss version were significant at p 
< 0.05, p < 0.01, and p < 0.001, for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.  
 
Comparing SLE effect between TTO and SG weights 
Figure 9.4 illustrates the aggregate normalized QALY weights for each version. For each 
condition, QALY weights were significantly higher compared to Study 1 (Wilcoxon tests, p’s 
< 0.04), except for SG losses for Q1 (Wilcoxon test, p = 0.11). We also compared our results 
against the QALY weights calculated using the results by Devlin et al. (2018), which 
represent QALY weights for a sample representative of the UK (i.e. the country of residence 
for most of our sample). We found that the QALY weights elicited in Study 2 were 
significantly closer to the estimates by Devlin et al. (2018) than those elicited in Study 1 
(Wilcoxon test, p’s < 0.04), except for SG-losses for Q1 (Wilcoxon test, p = 0.11). Still, our 
older persons sample reported QALY weights that were significantly different from the 
Devlin et al. (2018) estimates for all conditions (Wilcoxon tests, p’s <0.01), except for SG-
gains and losses for Q2 and SG-gains for Q3 (Wilcoxon tests, p’s > 0.16). Within versions 
(i.e. gains or losses), SG weights were significantly higher than TTO weights (Wilcoxon 
tests, all p’s < 0.007). QALY weights for health state valuation exercises involving losses 
(compared to gains) produced significantly higher QALY weights for TTO (Wilcoxon tests, 
all p’s < 0.002), but not for SG (Wilcoxon tests, all p’s > 0.09). Shifting gauge duration 
below SLE resulted in an average increase in TTO weights of between 0.10 and 0.11. For SG, 
 Gains Losses Diff. 
TTO 
Years given up Median IQR Median IQR Median IQR 
Best (Q1) 2.92 (0.25, 5.31) 1.17 (0.00, 3.50) 0.00*** (0.00, 2.63) 
Middle (Q2) 3.29 (1.00, 5.71) 2.00 (0.08, 4.40) 0.08*** (0.00, 2.00) 
Worst (Q3) 4.92 (2.00, 6.65) 3.08 (0.92, 5.50) 0.08*** (0.00, 2.31a) 
SG 
Probability of D Median IQR Median IQR Median IQR 
Best (Q1) 10.00 (5.75, 35.00) 10.00 (2.25, 30.00) 0.00 (0.00, 5.00) 
Middle (Q2) 13.00 (20.00, 40.00) 12.00 (1.00, 30.00) 0.00 (0.00, 2.00) 
Worst (Q3) 22.00 (24.00, 50.00) 21.00 (3.00, 40.75) 0.00 (-1.00, 3.00) 
 
 
no such pattern was observed, where moving life years below SLE increased SG weights by 
0.001 to 0.02. As in Study 1, the Online Supplements of this dissertation report a 
qualification of these findings by means of linear mixed-effects regression. The TTO-SG 
difference was smaller for losses compared to gains (Wilcoxon tests, all p’s < 0.001), but 
differences remained significantly larger than 0 for all health states (Wilcoxon tests with 𝜂 =
0, all p’s <.007). Collectively, these findings suggest that moving gauge duration below SLE 
increases QALY weights for TTO, but not for SG (which leads to smaller TTO-SG 
differences for loss versions).  
 
 
Figure 9.4. Median QALY weights for different versions and health states for older sample (n 
= 328) 
 
General discussion 
The goal of this paper was to (further) explore SLE effects for TTO and SG by means of a 
within-subjects approach. We constructed a theoretical model based on prospect theory, 
which allowed us to test its predictions using different versions for TTO and SG, with a 
gauge duration occurring either completely below (i.e. losses) or above SLE (i.e. gains). 
Although EU and the QALY model give no reason to expect differences between these TTO 
and SG versions, prospect theory, on the other hand, implies that if SLE functions as RP, loss 
aversion and sign-dependent evaluation of life years and probabilities can give rise to 
discrepancies between different versions. It was predicted that fewer years would be given up 
in TTO when elicited below SLE, i.e. TTO weights would be higher. Furthermore, for SG our 
predictions based on prospect theory suggest that, depending on their loss aversion and 
 
probability weighting functions, individuals would be willing to either increase or decrease 
their risk of immediate death, i.e. the effect on SG weights is ambiguous.  
We tested these predictions in two studies with a student (Study 1) and sample of individuals 
aged 60 years and older (Study 2). We find SLE to be similar to estimates from earlier work 
(Brouwer and van Exel, 2005, Péntek et al., 2014, Rappange et al., 2016, van Nooten et al., 
2009). Furthermore, SLE falls in between maximum and minimum aspired ages, suggesting 
that it could indeed be taken as RP within prospect theory, as this is typically seen as a 
neutral position (Wakker, 2010). In accordance with our theoretical predictions, if life years 
in TTO occurred below SLE, we observed less willingness to give up life years in both Study 
1 and Study 2. Hence, our results for TTO confirm the SLE effect observed in earlier work 
(Heintz et al., 2013, van Nooten and Brouwer, 2004, van Nooten et al., 2009, van Nooten et 
al., 2014) where similar comparisons were made between individuals expecting to live longer 
than TTO gauge duration or shorter. Furthermore, seeing as it occurs both in student and 
samples with older respondents, it appears to be robust to individuals’ current age, which 
provides some support for the external validity of the effect of SLE on TTO. These findings 
(according to our model) suggest that: a) subjects refrain from giving up life years compared 
to SLE as a result of loss aversion (as suggested by van Nooten et al., 2009), and/or b) 
subjects show less diminishing marginal utility for life duration for losses compared to gains 
with respect to SLE. 
For SG, the results for Study 1 were similar to those for TTO, i.e. students were more 
reluctant to risk losing life years when deciding about life years that fall short of their 
expectations. That is, when the gauge duration occurs below SLE, lower chances of 
immediate death were taken, which is, to our knowledge, a novel finding. However, these 
results were not replicated for people aged 60 years and older in Study 2. Given that our 
model based on prospect theory yields ambiguous predictions for SG, it can provide an 
explanation for this null result in Study 2. For Study 1, our findings suggest that loss aversion 
decreased willingness to risk immediate death for gauge durations below SLE. Our model 
predicts that probability weighting for gains and losses may have offset part of the effect due 
to loss aversion, which may explain the weaker effect of SLE for SG in Study 1, and perhaps 
the null result in Study 2. To explain the non-significant SLE effect for SG in Study 2 
individuals aged 60 years and older should be less loss averse and/or had larger differences in 
probability weighting between gains and losses than the student sample in Study 1 had.  
Although we derived predictions based on assumptions about loss aversion, utility curvature, 
and probability weighting, we did not include an empirical measurement of these prospect 
theory parameters. Instead, our predictions were based on earlier work on prospect theory for 
both health outcomes (e.g. Attema et al., 2018a, Attema et al., 2013, Attema et al., 2016, 
Kemel and Paraschiv, 2018, and Chapters 3 and 7 of this dissertation) and monetary 
outcomes (Abdellaoui et al., 2008, Bruhin et al., 2010, Kemel and Paraschiv, 2018), where 
substantial loss aversion and differences in curvature of probability weighting and/or utility 
functions between gains and losses were observed. As such, our study does not allow to 
directly test our theoretical explanations for the SLE effect for TTO, nor to determine why 
SLE effects could be observed in Study 1 but not in Study 2. Hence, combining our 
experimental approach with measurement of prospect theory parameters is a promising 
avenue for future research.  
 
 
However, existing work suggests that older individuals are typically more loss averse and 
loss aversion decreases with education level (Arora and Kumari, 2015, Gächter et al., 2007), 
which would lead us to expect stronger loss aversion in the sample of Study 2. For 
probability weighting the evidence is inconclusive. Donkers et al. (2001) find some evidence 
that suggests more pronounced weighting of probabilities for higher ages, but they do not 
differentiate between gains and losses. As such, at least two alternative explanations for the 
null result for SG in Study 2 appear relevant. First, QALY weights for health states Q1, Q2 
and Q3 were considerably higher in Study 2 compared to Study 1, with especially SG weights 
for these mild health states nearing 1.00. It may be possible that no SLE effect for SG is 
observed due to a ceiling effect, which could be tested by incorporating more severe states in 
future work. Second, it is possible that this null result is explained by differences between the 
student and older samples in how they perceive life (and death) at the ages considered in this 
experiment. Our results provide some indication for this, with students indicating to find 
health problems acceptable from younger ages than individuals aged 60 years and older. 
Future work could explore, for example using qualitative interview techniques, the influence 
of these perceptions on the effects of SLE on QALY weights. 
Before arriving at the conclusion that SLE serves as RP in TTO and SG, several alternative 
explanations, not related to reference-dependence with respect to SLE, and methodological 
limitations should be considered. First, subjects in both studies were asked to imagine being 
older than their current age. If subjects did not adopt the instructions in our experiment, the 
gauge durations in this experiment would be strongly discounted (Attema and Brouwer, 
2010b, van der Pol and Roux, 2005). Given that loss versions of TTO involved years below 
SLE, these would necessarily occur earlier in time than years given up in gain versions if 
current age is adopted instead of SLE. Thus, compared to their current age, life years in gain 
versions are likely to be discounted more strongly, and given up more willingly compared to 
life years for the loss version of TTO (i.e. this would predict higher QALY weights for loss 
versions). Similarly, if subjects used their current age instead of hypothetical ages in our 
experiment, the time dimension may explain higher utility for SG-losses compared to gains, 
as for monetary outcomes it is well-known (Abdellaoui et al., 2011, Baucells and Heukamp, 
2012, Noussair and Wu, 2006) that risk-seeking increases when lotteries are resolved in the 
future. As such, SG-gains are resolved further away in the future than loss versions, and thus 
higher risk-seeking could explain the higher risks of death accepted for gain versions of SG. 
Hence, although it is not possible to make sure subjects indeed adopted our instructions, in 
the Online Supplements of this dissertation we show that if subjects did not adopt the ages in 
our experiment the effects of discounting would be negligible. Hence, given that we do find 
significant SLE effects, this is not likely to result from failure to adopt 𝑡𝑎
𝑔
 and 𝑡𝑎
𝑙 .  
Second, scale compatibility has been suggested to bias both SG and TTO (Bleichrodt, 2002, 
van Osch and Stiggelbout, 2008). Our manipulation, i.e. shifting life years around SLE, may 
have caused subjects to focus on life duration in TTO and SG. Given that life duration is 
fixed and equal in both options in SG, while in TTO life duration is varied along the choice 
list, this may explain the stronger effect of our manipulation on TTO, especially as the RP 
was also operationalized on the scale of life duration. Third, even though we provided 
respondents in Study 2 a monetary incentive to diligently complete our experiment, their 
rewards were not contingent on their choices (such incentive compatibility is typically 
preferred in economic experiments, Galizzi and Wiesen, 2018). Although earlier work in 
economics suggests that the use of hypothetical choices as opposed to incentive-compatible 
 
choices has little to no effect on preferences (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999, Hertwig and 
Ortmann, 2001), we encourage the exploration of incentive-compatible choices in the context 
of health. Fourth, all theoretical predictions in this study were based on prospect theory, and 
hence, we explicitly assumed prospect theory to hold for decisions about health. Several 
authors have found violations of prospect theory, mostly for monetary outcomes (Bateman et 
al., 2007b, Birnbaum, 2006, Payne, 2005), but also for health (Feeny and Eng, 2005). As 
such, future work could explore if TTO and SG can be modeled in other reference-dependent 
models (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006). Finally, to accommodate our subjects and avoid 
confusion or unnecessary errors, we maintained a consistent ordering throughout the 
experiment. Future work could explore whether this lack of counterbalancing between-
subjects could have affected our conclusions, although other authors find no effects of order 
on gain-loss framing (e.g. De Dreu et al., 1994).  
Conclusion 
Whereas it is well-known that TTO and SG weights are typically different (e.g. Read et al., 
1984, Torrance, 1976), earlier work on the role of SLE has exclusively focused on TTO. Our 
work suggests that decision-making in both health state valuation methods may be affected 
by subjective expectations about length of life, with QALY weights being higher for TTO 
and (to a lesser extent) SG when gauge durations are below SLE; i.e., SLE may serve as RP 
in health state valuation. This SLE effect could be relevant for the current practice in health 
state valuation, as this typically involves short gauge durations, which imply losses compared 
to their SLE for a large part of the sample. For example, when obtaining nationally 
representative TTO tariffs for EQ-5D, EuroQoL typically uses a 10 year duration for health 
states preferred to death (Oppe et al., 2014), which must fall short of SLE for many subjects. 
Applying derivations based on EU or linear QALYs will then yield TTO or SG weights that 
are too high. 
Although finding a solution for this biasing effect attributable to SLE seems warranted, as 
discussed by Heintz et al. (2013), it can be complex to choose an appropriate duration for 
health state valuation. Durations below SLE may induce reluctance to lose any life years at 
all, while durations above SLE may yield lower QALY weights as individuals are more 
willing to lose some of these ‘bonus years’. To our knowledge, no compelling normative 
argument exists to prefer either of these scenarios, suggesting that it may be necessary to 
acknowledge these possible biases and derive health state utility in a reference-dependent 
model (as discussed by: Abellan-Perpiñan et al., 2009, and in Chapters 7 and 8 of this 
dissertation). Therefore, we hope that our attempt to unify earlier work on reference points in 
health state valuation into a formal model based on prospect theory provides some insight 
into the consequences of not being able to live up to expectations about length of life. 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
Chapter 10: A comparison of individual and collective decision 
making for standard gamble and time trade-off 
 
Chapter based on: Attema, A. E., Bleichrodt, H., l’Haridon, O., & Lipman, S.A. (2020). A 
comparison of individual and collective decision making for standard gamble and time trade-
off. The European Journal of Health Economics, 1-9. 
  
 
Abstract: Quality-Adjusted Life-Years (QALYs) are typically derived from individual 
preferences over health episodes. This paper reports the first experimental investigation into 
the effects of collective decision making on health valuations, using both time trade-off 
(TTO) and standard gamble (SG) tasks. We investigated collective decision making in dyads, 
by means of a mixed-subjects design where we control for learning effects. Our data suggest 
that collective decision making has little effect on decision quality, as no effects were 
observed on decision consistency and monotonicity for both methods. Furthermore, QALY 
weights remained similar between individual and collective decisions, and the typical 
difference in elicited weights between TTO and SG was not affected. These findings suggest 
that consulting with others has little effect on health state valuation, although learning may 
have. Additionally, our findings add to the literature of the effect of collective decision 
making, suggesting that no such effect occurs for TTO and SG. 
 
  
 
 
Introduction 
Many decisions about health are made in deliberation with others, e.g. children, spouses or 
medical professionals. This collective feature of decisions about health is, however, not 
typically reflected in health outcomes research focused on Quality-Adjusted Life-Years 
(QALYs). The weights representing quality of life, that are required to calculate these 
QALYs (i.e. QALY weights), are typically determined through choice-based methodologies 
(Dolan, 2000), such as standard gamble (SG) or time trade-off (TTO). Both methods are 
applied to the individual case, through decisions about one’s own (hypothetical) health 
outcomes (Brazier et al., 2002, Devlin et al., 2018), i.e. no deliberation with others is allowed. 
As is well-documented in the health economic literature, QALY weights usually differ 
between SG and TTO (Bleichrodt and Johannesson, 1997, Read et al., 1984, Sackett and 
Torrance, 1978). SG weights are typically higher than TTO weights, and conventionally, this 
difference between SG and TTO was explained as resulting from deviations from the linear 
QALY model and expected utility (EU) theory which have both been found to be 
descriptively inaccurate (Abellan-Perpinan et al., 2006, Starmer, 2000, Wakker and Deneffe, 
1996). Although it may be possible to measure these deviations and correct for their 
influences in SG and TTO (see Chapter 7 of this dissertation), currently no consensus exists 
on how these biases32 are best measured or corrected for. Hence, the main motivation of this 
paper is to explore if the quality and outcomes of SG and TTO are affected by asking 
individuals to complete these tasks in groups, and if the difference between SG and TTO 
weights is reduced as a result. 
The extant literature for monetary outcomes provides some indication that allowing 
individuals to discuss these complex decisions about health with others may be helpful. For 
example, collective decision making has been associated with less discounting and fewer 
time inconsistencies (Denant-Boemont et al., 2017). Other existing work on the effects of 
collective decision-making gives less firm results, with mixed evidence being reported for 
risk aversion (Ambrus et al., 2009, Brunette et al., 2015, Deck et al., 2012, Shupp and 
Williams, 2007, Zhang and Casari, 2012), ambiguity aversion (Brunette et al., 2015, Keck et 
al., 2014, Keller et al., 2007) and the violation rate of EU (Abdellaoui et al., 2013b, Bone et 
al., 1999, Rockenbach et al., 2007). When effects of collective decision making occur, they 
are hypothesized to result from the deliberation, bargaining and exchange of information 
when deciding collectively (e.g. Abdellaoui et al., 2013b, Deck et al., 2012). Taken together, 
these studies suggest that risk preferences, which are relevant for SG, and time preferences, 
which are relevant for TTO, might be affected by collective decision making. For example, 
discounting of future life years leads to downwards bias in TTO (Attema and Brouwer, 2014, 
Bleichrodt, 2002, van der Pol and Roux, 2005), and if such discounting is lower in when 
individuals decide in a group (Denant-Boemont et al., 2017) this could lead to higher TTO 
weights. Similarly, if groups are more willing to take risks (Brunette et al., 2015), perhaps 
due to reduced overweighting of small probabilities of dying, this could yield lower SG 
weights. If such effects occur simultaneously, the difference between SG and TTO might 
reduce. 
 
32 We will use the term ‘biases’ to refer to phenomena that yield violations of the linear QALY model and EU, 
the models that are used to calculate SG and TTO weights in practice.  
 
Only a few studies exist documenting effects of deliberation in groups or deciding 
collectively on SG and TTO weights. McIntosh and colleagues (2007) found that completing 
SG in a panel and deliberating about responses decreased subsequent SG weights, and Karimi 
and colleagues (2019) found that deliberation in a panel had an effect on individual TTO 
weights. Just a single study explored collective valuation for both SG and TTO and found 
only small effects (Krabbe et al., 1996); however, this study used an anonymous voting 
system to obtain collective SG and TTO responses, i.e. deliberation between respondents was 
not allowed. Hence, those few studies on the effects of deliberation or collective decisions on 
QALY weights differ in several respects from the economic literature, in which typically 
smaller groups actually decide together (i.e. bargaining is included). 
As such, we believe the evidence base on collective decision making precludes the formation 
of clear hypotheses for three reasons. First, next to the mixed evidence on risk preferences, an 
extensive psychological literature exists suggesting that in some cases detrimental effects of 
group decision making can be observed. This literature suggests that groups can engage in 
‘groupthink’, which fosters limited information search and enhances confirmation bias 
(Esser, 1998, Janis, 1972). Second, the extant literature on collective decisions mostly studies 
monetary decision making, while SG and TTO involve health-related decision making, and 
these differ in many ways (Suter et al., 2015). Third, those few available investigations on 
effects of collective decisions for health (Akunne et al., 2006, Karimi et al., 2019, McIntosh 
et al., 2007, Robinson and Bryan, 2013) did not use an experimental design, i.e. often no 
control condition or comparator was in place. This complicates the interpretation of these 
studies’ findings, as these may be caused by learning instead (i.e. as a result of repeated 
measurement after deliberation). Indeed, it is well-known that such effects may occur in 
health state valuation (e.g. Augestad et al., 2012). Hence, in our work we explore the effects 
of collective decisions for SG and TTO, whilst controlling for learning effects. 
Our study adds to the earlier literature on collective decisions and health state valuation in 
several respects. First, we report the first experimental test of the effects of collective 
decision making on QALY weights, by using a control condition constructed to control for 
learning. More specifically, we obtained a baseline measurement for SG and TTO for each 
subject, after which we distinguished between groups and individuals for repeated decisions. 
By using such a control condition (similar to that of Keck et al., 2014), we are able to isolate 
the effect of deciding collectively on multiple facets of SG and TTO decisions (only related 
to deliberation, bargaining and information exchange). We explore if such effects of 
collective decisions exist on internal consistency criteria, and if SG and TTO weights change 
by deciding collectively. Importantly, we test if the difference between SG and TTO reduces, 
as this could indicate that the different biases that are suggested to produce this difference are 
reduced (Bleichrodt, 2002). If that is the case, the use of collective decisions could provide an 
answer to the open questions surrounding the validity of QALY weights elicited with SG and 
TTO (see Chapter 8 of this dissertation). Finally, we test whether any possible effects of 
collective decision making carries over onto subsequent individual SG and TTO exercises for 
groups.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first cover the necessary notational 
conventions, introduce methodology and the experimental procedure. Next, the results are 
presented and the final section features a discussion of these results. 
 
 
Preliminaries 
In this paper, we only consider chronic health profiles described as (𝑄, 𝑇), with 𝑄 denoting 
health status and 𝑇 denoting its duration in years. For brevity, we denote immediate death as 
𝐷 and if health status is equal to full health (𝐹𝐻) we write 𝑄 = 𝐹𝐻. Under the assumption of 
completeness, decision makers are able to form preferences over health profiles, denoted 
using the conventional notation: ≻, ≽, and ∽ to represent strict preference, weak preference, 
and indifference, respectively. Most studies applying SG or TTO assume that decision 
makers form these preferences as modeled within the linear QALY model33 (Miyamoto and 
Eraker, 1989), i.e.:  
𝑉(𝑄, 𝑇) = 𝑈(𝑄) ∗ 𝑇.                                                          (10.1) 
Decision makers decide about health profiles, either under certainty (in case of TTO) or 
under risk (in case of SG). Risk is operationalized by presenting decision maker with lotteries 
of the following form: (𝑄, 𝑇)𝑝(𝑄′, 𝑇′), which signifies that health profile (𝑄, 𝑇) will be 
realized with probability 𝑝, and health profile (𝑄′, 𝑇′) with probability 1 − 𝑝.  
The SG method involves determining probability p at which decision makers are indifferent 
between a sure outcome (𝑄, 𝑇), and a risky prospect (𝐹𝐻, 𝑇)𝑝(𝐷). Probability 𝑝 is varied 
until the respondent is indifferent between a number of years (𝑇) in health state 𝑄 for certain 
and a gamble with two outcomes, which are 𝐹𝐻 during the same time period (𝑇), and 𝐷. 
These SG indifferences are typically evaluated under expected utility (EU) theory (Pliskin et 
al., 1980). The TTO method, on the other hand, asks for a time equivalent in perfect health 
which yields indifference between (𝑄, 𝑇) and (𝐹𝐻, 𝑇′), with 𝑇 > 𝑇′. The number of years 𝑇′ 
is varied until the respondent is indifferent between 𝑇 years in health state 𝑄 and 𝑇′ years in 
𝐹𝐻. Given the assumptions listed above, and setting 𝑈(𝐹𝐻) = 1 and 𝑈(𝐷) = 0 the SG 
indifference (Q, 𝑇)~(𝐹𝐻, 𝑇)𝑝(𝐷) is evaluated by 𝑈(𝑄) ∗ 𝑇 = 𝑝 ∗ (1 ∗ 𝑇) + (1 − 𝑝) ∗  0, 
and, thus: 𝑈(𝑄) = 𝑝. The TTO indifference (Q, 𝑇)~(𝐹𝐻, 𝑇′) is evaluated by: 𝑈(Q) ∗ 𝑇 = 1 ∗
𝑇′, and, thus, we obtain 𝑈(𝑄) = 𝑇′/𝑇. 
Bleichrodt (Bleichrodt, 2002) proposed that the typical differences between SG and TTO 
weights for the same health states may result from biases not accounted for in EU theory or 
the linear QALY framework, such as discounting, loss aversion and probability weighting. 
Thus, by evaluating SG and TTO without acknowledging these deviations, we should observe 
a gap between SG and TTO. Formally, we define the SG-TTO gap as the difference between 
𝑈(𝑄) as derived from SG and TTO: Δ(𝑆𝐺 − 𝑇𝑇𝑂) = 𝑝 − (
𝑇′
𝑇
). We expect Δ(𝑆𝐺 − 𝑇𝑇𝑂) >
0, and explore if collective decision making has effects on the difference between SG and 
TTO. If that is the case this gap should decrease, which we test empirically in an experiment. 
 
33 SG and TTO weights can be derived in more general models, which can account for some of the biases 
driving the differences between SG and TTO (see Chapter 7). However, such derivations are beyond the scope 
of this paper. 
 
Experiment 
Sample and design 
A total of 163 Business Administration students (78 female, mean age = 19.37, SD = 1.57) 
participated in this experiment34, which lasted around 55 minutes. Subjects were recruited via 
Erasmus Research Participation System, which rewards students with course credit for 
participation in scientific research. The experiment used a mixed between/within-subjects 
design (see Table 10.1) with two randomly assigned between-subjects conditions: individual 
decision making (IDM) and collective decision making (CDM). Experimental sessions were 
run on computers in sessions of two (CDM) or four (IDM) subjects sitting adjacently in 
separated cubicles. The experiment was programmed in Matlab, and instructions were 
provided on a separate sheet (see the Online Supplements of this dissertation). An instructor 
was present at all times to answer any questions subjects might have with regard to the 
procedure. Sessions consisted of three parts, with the experimental conditions IDM and CDM 
only differing in the second part. The first part served to establish a baseline measurement for 
SG and TTO weights, i.e. in Part 1 all subjects completed SG and TTO individually. In the 
second part, subjects in the CDM condition completed SG and TTO elicitations again 
collectively. Subjects in the IDM condition individually completed a filler task (adapted from 
Ameriks et al., 2007), which was not related to health states, risk or lotteries, to avoid 
confounding effects. The results of this filler task are not covered in this paper. In Part 3, to 
determine whether learning (IDM) or carryover effects (CDM) occurred, all subjects were 
presented with one final repetition of SG and TTO utility elicitation completed individually. 
When subjects finished Part 3, demographics were collected. 
Measurements for SG and TTO 
All SG and TTO elicitations were operationalized by using choice list methodology (see the 
Online Supplements of this dissertation for instructions and screenshots). This elicitation 
procedure, popularized by Holt and Laury (2002), is used frequently for elicitation of risk and 
time preferences for monetary outcomes (Andersen et al., 2006, Andersen et al., 2008). 
Although we are not aware of any study using choice list methodology for SG and TTO, 
recently choice lists have also been used to elicit preferences for health outcomes (e.g. Arrieta 
et al., 2017, Attema and Lipman, 2018). Figure 10.1 shows a combined example of SG and 
TTO choice lists.  
For choice lists based on the SG method, subjects were faced with a choice between two 
alternatives. Alternative A would make them certain to live 50 more years35 in some health 
state (𝑄), after which they would die. If they chose Alternative B, they would be taking a 
 
34 Sample size was informed by earlier studies on collective decision making in the economic literature. For 
example, the average sample size for all empirical studies on collective decision making cited in our 
Introduction is n = 103, with an average of n = 40 observations for groups (with sizes ranging from 2 to 5). 
Ethical approval was received from Erasmus Research Institute of Management’s Internal Review Board, 
Section Experiments. 
35 Often, health state valuation studies use a 10-year duration (Oppe et al., 2014). For this student sample a 10-
year duration followed by death would obviously entail a large decrease in life expectancy. It has been found 
that such a mismatch between durations in health state valuation and expectations about length of life may lead 
to biases in health state valuation (van Nooten & Brouwer, 2004; van Nooten et al., 2009; Chapter 9). Hence, we 
chose a much longer duration, more closely matched to our respondents’ actual life expectancy.  
 
 
gamble. The following instruction was used to clarify the risk of Alternative B: ‘On the one 
hand, you have the chance (100 × 𝑝%) of living 50 more years (𝑇) in full health (i.e. no 
problems on any dimension), after which you will die, but on the other hand, you have a 
chance (100 × (1 − 𝑝)%) of dying within a week’. Subjects faced choice lists of 10 choices 
in which Alternative B varied; more specifically, 𝑝 increased. For each elicitation, a two-
pronged approach was used. First, 𝑝 varied in increments of 10%, between 0% and 100%. 
After a switching point was obtained at this level, a second choice list was presented, which 
elicited a probability at the percentage point. For example, if a subject switched at 𝑝 = 80% in 
the first choice list (as in Figure 10.1), she would face a second choice list that varied 
between 70% and 80% with increments of 1% (see the Online Supplements of this 
dissertation for screenshots).  
 
Table 10.1. Overview experimental conditions 
  Between-subjects comparisons 
 Session IDM (n = 65) CDM (n = 98) 
Within 
subjects 
Part 1 Individual SG/TTO (I1)       Individual SG/TTO (I1) 
Part 2 Filler task (F) Collective SG/TTO (G)          * 
Part 3 Individual SG/TTO (I2)           ** Individual SG/TTO (I2) 
Note: * indicates the group effect, and ** indicates the carryover effect.  
 
For TTO choice lists, Alternative A was the same as for the SG choice lists, i.e. living 50 
more years (𝑇) in the indicated health state (𝑄), followed by death. If subjects chose 
Alternative B, they would live 𝑇′ more years in full health (i.e. no problems on any 
dimension), followed by death. A similar two-step elicitation procedure was in place, where, 
in the first choice list, 𝑇′ varied between 0 and 50 years. In the second choice list, the 
indifference point of the first list was continued, and a more precise estimate was obtained by 
presenting subjects with a choice list with 10 increments of 0.5 year. For example, if a subject 
switched from A to B at 𝑇′ = 35 years (as in Figure 10.1), she would face a choice list with 
Alternative B varying between 30 and 35 with 0.5 year increments (see the Online 
Supplements of this dissertation).  
Collective decision making task 
If a session was randomized to be a CDM session it consisted of two subjects who arrived at 
the lab at the same time. Both subjects first completed Part 1 individually, i.e. the baseline 
measurement for SG and TTO, while seated in separate cubicles. After they were both 
finished with Part 1 (if necessary one of the subjects was asked to wait until the other was 
finished), subjects were asked to move to one of the adjacent cubicles together. In this 
cubicle, they were asked to repeat the task they just performed (Part 2) and instructed to 
freely discuss amongst each other until they reached an answer that was satisfactory for both 
of them. Subjects, thus, filled out a single choice lists such as in Figure 10.1, which reflected 
 
their joint evaluation. The experimenter remained present in the room during this time to 
address questions and monitor the experiment. The conversations between subjects were not 
recorded, we only store their collective response on the choice lists. After completing the 
collective task, subjects returned to their individual cubicle and were asked to complete Part 3 
without discussing with each other.  
 
SG Common TTO 
Alternative B B A Alternative A A B Alternative B 
0% of 50 years in FH, D otherwise □ ■ 50 years in Q ■ □ 0 years in FH 
10% of 50 years in FH, D otherwise □ ■ 50 years in Q ■ □ 5 years in FH 
20% of 50 years in FH, D otherwise □ ■ 50 years in Q ■ □ 10 years in FH 
30% of 50 years in FH, D otherwise □ ■ 50 years in Q ■ □ 15 years in FH 
40% of 50 years in FH, D otherwise □ ■ 50 years in Q ■ □ 20 years in FH 
50% of 50 years in FH, D otherwise □ ■ 50 years in Q ■ □ 25 years in FH 
60% of 50 years in FH, D otherwise □ ■ 50 years in Q ■ □ 30 years in FH 
70% of 50 years in FH, D otherwise □ ■ 50 years in Q □ ■ 35 years in FH 
80% of 50 years in FH, D otherwise ■ □ 50 years in Q □ ■ 40 years in FH 
90% of 50 years in FH, D otherwise ■ □ 50 years in Q □ ■ 45 years in FH 
100% of 50 years in FH, D otherwise ■ □ 50 years in Q □ ■ 50 years in FH 
Figure 10.1. Example choice list for SG and TTO filled in by example participant. Note that 
FH and D denote health states full health and death respectively, ■ indicates that this choice 
is preferred by a hypothetical subject.  
 
Health state descriptions 
Each part consisted of SG and TTO elicitations for the same 3 health states (and 1 practice 
health state), for which descriptions were obtained from the EQ-5D-5L classification system 
(Herdman et al., 2011). The EQ-5D-5L distinguishes between five health domains, i.e., 
‘‘mobility’’, ‘‘self-care’’, ‘‘usual activities’’, ‘‘pain/discomfort’’, and ‘‘anxiety/depression’’. 
Within these domains, this taxonomy uses five health state levels from ‘‘no problems’’ to 
‘‘extreme problems/unable to’’. In EQ-5D nomenclature, health states are represented by 5 
digit codes like 22113. This example features as a label for a health state with: slight 
problems (i.e. level 2) with mobility and self-care, no problems with the usual activities and 
no pain/discomfort (i.e. level 1), and moderate anxiety/depression (i.e. level 3). To familiarize 
subjects with the choice list elicitation, they completed a practice elicitation for 𝑄𝑝: 41321 
 
 
using both SG and TTO choice lists (in Parts 1 and 2). Next, SG and TTO elicitations were 
completed for three health states, which were relatively mild and ordered monotonically 
increasing in severity, i.e. each consecutive health state featured more severe problems on at 
least one domain and was identical otherwise. The following health states were used: 11221 
(’high’), 21222 (’middle’) and 32322 (’low’), which we denote 𝑄1,  𝑄2 and  𝑄3. We selected 
mild health states to avoid health states that may be considered worse than death, for practical 
reasons, as such severe health states require a different elicitation procedure (Oppe et al., 
2014).  
Data quality 
Several checks for data quality were implemented. First, to familiarize subjects with health 
states 𝑄1,  𝑄2 and  𝑄3 at the start of this experiment, subjects were required to rate these 
health states alongside death on a scale between 0 and 100, where 100 represented full health. 
Second, choice lists did not allow multiple switching points, which traditionally pose a 
significant problem to this method when it is applied with paper-and-pencil (Bruner, 2011). 
Third, to test for consistency, SG choice list elicitations were repeated for health state 𝑄1 in 
all Parts (before continuing with TTO). Finally, we were able to determine violations of 
monotonicity. Given that health states were monotonically increasing in severity, we should 
obtain 𝑈(𝑄1) > 𝑈(𝑄2) > 𝑈(𝑄3), i.e. monotonically increasing probabilities 𝑝 accepted in 
SG and decreasing number of years 𝑇′ in 𝐹𝐻 for TTO.  
Analyses 
We analyzed: a) decision quality, and b) decision outcomes (a full transcript of our analyses 
is available on request). Each of these decision domains was first analyzed by direct 
comparisons (i.e. t-tests) at the aggregate level between sessions and conditions. Second, we 
applied mixed effects regressions in order to i) determine if collective decisions for SG and 
TTO influences decision making beyond mere learning, and ii) estimate if collective decision 
making improves subsequent individual decision making. The former is referred to as a 
‘group effect’, while the latter is referred to as ‘carryover effect’ (see Table 10.1). For the 
group effect we compared the group answers in the CDM condition (CDM: G) and the 
repeated individual answers in the control group (IDM: I2) to their respective baseline. Thus, 
this comparison consisted of the second time subjects completed SG and TTO weights for 
both conditions, while individuals in CDM completed this second round in groups. To 
estimate this group effect, we ran generalized linear mixed effect regressions (LMER) with 
subject random effects and the following fixed effects included: i) learning – dummy 
indicating whether it concerned a first or repeated session, ii) treatment – IDM or CDM, iii) 
method – SG or TTO and iv) group – interaction term for learning and treatment. The 
carryover effect was estimated similarly, where we instead compared CDM: I2 and IDM: I2 
to their respective baseline. To estimate this carryover effect, we ran a similar LMER, with 
the same fixed effects included; i.e., i) learning, ii) treatment, iii) method, and iv) carryover–
interaction term for learning and treatment. These analyses were performed with R using the 
lmerTest package. For the sake of brevity, we will not present full model statistics for the 
linear mixed-effect analyses, but only report fixed effect estimates (FEE) and standard errors 
(SE). 
 
 
Results 
Decision quality 
We analyzed decision quality by determining the effect of collective decision making on our 
consistency checks and monotonicity of SG and TTO valuations (see the Online Supplements 
of this dissertation for additional results on decision quality). 
Consistency 
Consistency on repeated SG choices was adequate for all individual tasks (I1 and I2 for both 
IDM and CDM), with no significant difference between original and repeated elicitation (t-
tests, p’s>0.07). However, consistency was lower for collective decision making, with 
significant differences existing between original and repeated decision making (t-test, 
p<.001). Next, we estimated the group effect and carryover effect for consistency (see Table 
10.2). Considering that consistency checks were only applied to SG, we dropped fixed effects 
for method in both analyses. We found no significant effects in mixed effects regressions.  
Monotonicity 
We determined for each subject to what extent violations of monotonicity occurred per 
session. A large majority (81% to 100% depending on session) of our subjects assigned 
monotonically decreasing QALY weights to all health states. Next, we estimated the group 
and carryover effect for monotonicity (see Table 10.2). Subjects were classified as either 
violators or non-violators; hence, we applied a linear binomial mixed effect model instead of 
LMER. First, when estimating the group effect, we observe significant effects for: a) 
treatment and b) group. This indicates that: a) although sampling was random, monotonicity 
was lower overall for subjects in CDM, and b) monotonicity increased for collective 
decisions above and beyond learning. No effects of learning or method were observed. 
Second, when estimating the carryover effect, we found no significant fixed effects. 
Decision outcome 
We analyzed decision outcomes using a similar analytical approach, with a focus on both 
absolute SG and TTO weights, and the relative differences between these methods.  
SG and TTO weights 
Figure 10.2 presents the main results on SG and TTO weights. Several trends at the aggregate 
level can be observed from this figure. First, QALY weights appeared to increase after 
repetition, with significant within-subjects increases for 9 out of 18 subsequent measurements 
(all p’s < 0.049). For example, for subjects in the IDM condition mean TTO and SG weights 
for 𝑄3 increased from 0.50 and 0.58 in I1 to 0.56 and 0.62 in I2, i.e. 0.06 and 0.04 
respectively (see Figure 10.2 for the differences for all other measurements). Pooled across 
all measurements and subjects, each repeated measurement increased QALY weights by 0.03. 
Next, we estimated the carryover and group effect on the QALY weights, where we ran 
models with health state included as fixed effect. For both these approaches, we found a 
significant effect for a) learning, b) method and c) health state dummies. These effects 
indicate that a) repetition increases QALY weights, b) TTO weights were lower and c) the 
more severe health states received lower QALY weights. No effect of treatment, group or 
carryover was observed, indicating that the increase in QALY weights observed on aggregate 
appears not to be related to collective decisions.  
 
 
Table 10.2. Fixed effect estimates (standard errors) for LMER analyses for both group and 
carryover effects 
 Decision quality Decision outcome 
 Consistency Monotonicitya QALY weight Δ(SG-TTO) 
     
Group effect : IDM: I1 vs. I2 | CDM: I1 vs G 
Constant 8.87 (2.02) *** 1.09 (0.65) + 0.50 (0.03) *** 0.06 (0.02) *** 
Learning -1.68 (1.25) 0.64 (0.44) 0.04 (0.01) *** 0.00 (0.01) 
Treatment: CDM 0.15 (2.59) -2.75 (1.03) ** -0.03 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) 
Method: TTO   0.42 (0.28) -0.03 (0.01) ***  
Group: 
(Learning*Treatment) 
-0.74 (1.61) 2.38 (0.86) ** 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Health state: middle   0.15 (0.01) *** -0.04 (0.01) *** 
Health state: high   0.29 (0.01) *** -0.08 (0.01) *** 
     
Carryover effect : IDM: I1 vs. I2 | CDM: I1 vs I2 
Constant 8.87 (1.99) *** 1.32 (0.69) + 0.51 (0.02) *** 0.06 (0.02) * 
Learning -1.68 (1.22) 0.67 (0.45) 0.04 (0.01) *** 0.00 (0.01) 
Treatment: CDM -1.35 (2.30) -0.51 (0.82) -0.03 (0.03)  0.01 (0.03) 
Method: TTO  0.42 (0.26) -0.03 (0.01) ***  
Carryover 
(Learning*Treatment) 
0.76 (1.31) 0.12 (0.55) 0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01)  
Health state: middle   0.15 (0.01) *** -0.03 (0.01) *** 
Health state: high   0.28 (0.01) *** -0.08 (0.01) *** 
Note: *,**, and *** represent significance at p < 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 respectively. + 
indicates marginal significance at 0.05< p <0.10. a binomial regression. 
 
Difference between SG and TTO  
Next, to test if the difference between SG and TTO reduced as a result of collective decision 
making we compared the SG-TTO gap per session and health state (denoted ΔSG-TTO). We 
found consistent evidence of higher weights for SG than TTO in health state 𝑄3 (paired t-
tests, all p’s < 0.011). For example, for subjects in the IDM condition the mean SG-TTO gap 
was 0.08 for I1 and 0.06 for I2. However, we found no strong evidence for health state 𝑄2 
(only significant for CDM-I2, paired t-test, p <0.01) and 𝑄1 (paired t-tests, all p’s > 0.11). We 
observed a positive SG-TTO gap for baseline measurements (CDM/IDM-I1) pooled across 
health states with a size of 0.03 (significantly larger than 0, t-test, p <0.001), suggesting that 
on average a difference existed between SG and TTO at baseline. Next, we applied our 
analytical approach to estimate group or carryover effects on this difference between SG and 
TTO (see Table 10.2). Only fixed effects for health states were significant, indicating that the 
difference between SG and TTO increased for more severe health states, and was unaffected 
by learning or collective decisions.  
 
 
 
Figure 10.2. Mean weights split by method (SG vs. TTO), session (I1 vs. G vs. I2), health 
state (Q1 vs. Q2 vs. Q3) and condition (IDM vs. CDM).  
 
Discussion 
In this study, we report the first experimental test of the effects of collective decision making 
on QALY weights. Collective decision making did not appear to have a systematic effect on 
quality of decisions for SG and TTO; no effects were found for consistency and the initially 
low monotonicity became up to par with individual decisions. Furthermore, we did find an 
effect of collective decision making with regard to outcomes for SG and TTO, although we 
found that QALY weights increased, both for collective decisions and for individual 
decisions. More sophisticated analyses indicated that this increase was only related to 
learning (and not to facets of collective decisions such as deliberation or bargaining), i.e. 
repetition increased SG and TTO weights (both in groups and individually). This trend of 
increased QALY weights for repetition is in accordance with earlier work by Augestad and 
colleagues (2012). Given that student samples in some cases have been found to yield low SG 
and TTO weights (e.g. see Chapter 7 of this dissertation) this learning effect could be seen as 
beneficial as it realized a movement towards QALY weights representative of the general 
population, obtained by a more comprehensive elicitation procedure, shorter SG and TTO 
durations, and a general public sample (Versteegh et al., 2016). As expected, we replicated 
the typical SG-TTO gap at baseline (Bleichrodt and Johannesson, 1997, Read et al., 1984, 
Sackett and Torrance, 1978), although this gap was less apparent for the least severe health 
state. Perhaps this lack of SG-TTO gap for the mildest health state results from a ceiling 
 
 
effect (as QALY weights were close to 1.00). Importantly, we find that the SG-TTO gap was 
unaffected by collective decision making or learning, and no carryover effects were observed.  
This study adds to the evidence base on collective decision making (mostly studies using 
monetary outcomes). In agreement with the mixed findings of those studies, we do not find a 
substantial beneficial effect of collective decisions for SG and TTO. However, earlier work 
on collective decisions for monetary choice suggested that groups discount the future less 
(Denant-Boemont et al., 2017). Because discounting has a negative effect on TTO values 
(Bleichrodt, 2002), less discounting in the group treatment would cause higher TTO values. 
Hence, our results could suggest that discounting of health outcomes is not affected by 
collective decision making; an alternative explanation would be that both discounting and 
loss aversion decrease in group tasks, which would neutralize each other (Bleichrodt, 2002). 
Our results also indicate that collective decision making does not alleviate the typical gap 
between SG and TTO, which is also partially explained as a result of discounting (Bleichrodt, 
2002). Future research could therefore obtain separate measurements of discounting and loss 
aversion (and possibly also other traits such as scale compatibility and probability weighting) 
for health outcomes to test these possibilities.  
Our results confirm findings by Krabbe and colleagues (1996), who find only small 
differences between collective and individual valuation for SG and TTO using an anonymous 
voting procedure, and that SG-TTO gaps are unaffected by collective decision making 
(Krabbe et al., 1996). Furthermore, our findings are in accordance with earlier non-
experimental studies on deliberation in TTO or SG, which generally finds that deliberation 
has little to no effect on QALY weights (Karimi et al., 2019, McIntosh et al., 2007, Stein et 
al., 2006). Hence, it appears that deciding collectively has no added benefit beyond providing 
respondents with opportunities for learning. Our findings, thus, suggest that this procedure 
could be relevant for obtaining nationally representative value sets in settings where 
providing ample opportunity for learning is too costly or otherwise infeasible.  
As in most experiments on the effects of collective decision making in the economic 
literature, the use of a student sample can be considered a drawback of this study. Obviously, 
students differ from the general population in a number of ways (so does any particular sub-
sample used in empirical work). This is a common criticism of laboratory experiments  ̧as 
any experiment using a non-representative sample will generate questions of external 
validity. To this end, in experimental economics, usually a distinction is made between 
experiments aimed at measurement and experiments aimed at documenting treatment effects 
(Jacquemet and L'Haridon, 2018). One can question the representativeness of our 
measurements, as individual QALY weights are typically lower compared to those in the 
general population (Versteegh et al., 2016). However, we believe it is not as straightforward 
to question external validity of the treatment effects (i.e. within-subject learning effects and 
between-subjects group effects), unless one explicitly assumes that these causal processes 
occur differently for our subject pool than for the general population. For one thing, students 
are likely to be younger, healthier and higher educated than the general population, and 
hence, the finding of a substantial learning effect in our student sample may suggest that the 
inclusion of a sufficient number of practice rounds in health state valuation will be necessary 
for a sample representative of the general public. We have no reason to expect that 
deliberation and bargaining are likely to occur differently for students as opposed to the 
general population. Nonetheless, a potential problem is that our sample consisted of students 
 
exclusively, of whom it is likely that they had similar views on length and quality of life (and 
thus relatively few opportunities to influence each other). Hence, we believe future work 
should study if in less homogenous dyads (e.g. doctor/patient or student/retiree) the effects of 
collective decision-making on QALY weights are more prominent. 
To conclude, our work suggests that collective decision making does not appear to yield an 
effect for health state valuation. As in earlier work (Krabbe et al., 1996), the difference 
between SG and TTO does not disappear when moving from an individual to a collective 
task, which suggests that collective decision making does not help to reduce the effect of the 
biases that affect SG and TTO (Bleichrodt, 2002). Therefore, other solutions for alleviating 
these confounding effects, such as more elaborate instructions, practice rounds and correction 
mechanisms (as developed in Chapter 7 of this dissertation) should be considered if one aims 
to correct for these biases. 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
Chapter 11: Discussion 
  
 
Many individuals worldwide are living unhealthy lifestyles resulting in large preventable 
health losses. At the same time ageing populations and the desire to implement costly new 
health technologies (inter alia) are leading to growing pressure on health care budgets. These 
trends necessitate the study of decisions about health, both at an individual level and a 
societal level. Whereas research into individual decisions about health may provide insights 
that could be utilized to design interventions aimed at promoting a healthier lifestyle, the 
study of societal decisions about health is important in guiding how to face growing demand 
for health care in the context of a limited budget. 
The first aim of this thesis was to improve our understanding of how individuals actually 
decide about their health. Rather than assuming that decisions about health are made 
rationally, i.e. maximizing expected utility (EU) by means of consistent and context-
independent preferences, we studied health-related decision-making using methods and 
theories from behavioral economics (in which these assumptions are relaxed or dropped). As 
such, the studies in this dissertation drew from earlier work on financial decision-making 
showing that theories of rational decision-making provide a poor description of actual 
decisions. Instead, many individuals are influenced by reference-points (Baucells et al., 2011, 
Eibach and Ehrlinger, 2006, Koop and Johnson, 2012, Wang and Johnson, 2012), are 
disproportionally sensitive to losses (i.e. loss aversion, see: Abdellaoui et al., 2007, De Dreu 
et al., 1994, Gächter et al., 2007, Köbberling and Wakker, 2005, Tversky and Kahneman, 
1991) overreact to small probabilities while underreacting to large probabilities (i.e. 
probability weighting, see: Abdellaoui, 2000, Bruhin et al., 2010, Fehr-Duda et al., 2006, 
Gonzalez and Wu, 1999, Suter et al., 2016), and are prone be inconsistent (i.e. preference 
reversals, see: Butler and Loomes, 2007, Grether and Plott, 1979, Lichtenstein and Slovic, 
1971, Reilly, 1982, Tversky et al., 1990). However, as such insights from behavioral and 
experimental economics are only limitedly applied in health economics (Galizzi and Wiesen, 
2018), it is not entirely clear to what extent such concepts apply to decisions about health as 
well. Hence, in Part I of this dissertation a series of ‘Behavioral experiments in health’ are 
reported, in which the following research questions were addressed: 
1. To what extent are individuals risk averse for uncertain health outcomes with small or 
moderate stakes, and can EU explain such risk aversion? (Chapter 2) 
2. Does the degree to which individuals are loss averse for life duration depend on the 
quality of life experienced during this time? (Chapter 3) 
3. How heterogeneous are risk and time preferences, and can this heterogeneity be used 
to tailor financial incentives to improve decisions about health? (Chapter 4) 
4. Are decisions about health as (in)consistent as those for money, and does the degree of 
preference reversals depend on who makes these decisions? (Chapter 5) 
The second aim of this thesis was to use some of the insights derived from earlier work in 
behavioral economics to improve methods used in health state valuation. Currently, cost-
utility analyses (CUAs) are performed with quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) derived by 
(implicitly) assuming that respondents completing health state valuation tasks have rational 
health preferences. More specifically, the methods used to derive the QALY weights 
(representing the utility of health status) are typically applied assuming the linear QALY 
model and expected utility (EU) theory. Instead, we acknowledge that many individuals 
deviate from the linear QALY model (and EU), and that such deviations may affect the 
outcomes of methods used to derive QALY weights. Earlier work has shown this is true 
 
 
especially for two of the prominent methods used to derive QALY weights: time trade-off 
(TTO) and standard gamble (SG). Bleichrodt (2002) has suggested that the problematic 
difference between these methods might be explained by behavioral insights derived from 
prospect theory. However, empirical work had not yet fully tested this. Hence, Part II of this 
thesis reports several ‘Applications of behavioral insights to health state valuation’, which 
aimed to address the following research questions:  
5. Which method reflects QALY weights better according to respondents themselves: 
TTO or SG? (Chapter 6) 
6. Can prospect theory help to improve the validity of QALY weights (i.e. through 
correction)? (Chapter 7)  
7. How feasible is it currently to apply ‘corrected QALY weights’ in practice? (Chapter 
8) 
8. What is the influence of subjective expectations of length of life on TTO and SG 
weights? (Chapter 9)  
9. Can QALY weights be improved by deciding collectively during measurement? 
(Chapter 10) 
Behavioral experiments in health 
Chapters 2 and 3 reported behavioral experiments in health in which individuals decided 
about health gains and losses under risk. Although individual and cultural differences exist 
(Bontempo et al., 1997, Rosen et al., 2003, Weber and Hsee, 1998), many individuals dislike 
risks, and would rather have a certain outcome than a risky one with the same expected value. 
Such risk aversion is a hallmark phenomenon in health economics, for example in the classic 
work by Arrow (1963) on health insurance. Traditionally, decisions under risk are evaluated 
by expected utility (EU) theory with a concave utility function (von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1944). The degree to which EU is a descriptively valid model for decisions 
under risk, however, has long been questioned in economics, with many violations observed 
for financial decisions (Allais, 1953, Starmer, 2000). In Chapter 2, a now classic paradox, 
developed by Rabin (2000, 2001), was extended to the health domain in an experiment. 
Individuals were asked to report if they were willing to enter in a gamble for moderate stakes 
(‘50% chance of gaining 11 minutes of lifetime, or losing 10 minutes otherwise’) and a 
similar gamble with much larger stakes (‘gaining 400 days of lifetime with 50% chance or 
losing 4 days otherwise‘). This experiment demonstrated that a large majority indeed show 
the ‘paradoxical’ preferences assumed by Rabin (2000, 2001), i.e. they turned down small 
stake gambles but were inclined to accept gambles for larger stakes (and thus violating EU). 
Hence, Chapter 2 answered research question 1, as the findings reported in this chapter 
showed that individuals are indeed risk averse for health outcomes, even for small stakes. 
Modelling this risk aversion by means of EU with concave utility over health outcomes, 
however, leads to implausible conclusions for the large stakes often present in the health 
domain. Hence, reference-dependent theories, which allow for sign-dependence and loss 
aversion should be considered for studying decisions about health. 
Chapter 3 continued this investigation of decisions about health under risk, and as suggested 
in the previous chapter moved beyond EU by using prospect theory. Prospect theory is 
reference-dependent (as developed by: Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992, Wakker, 2010), as it assumes that outcomes are evaluated compared to a 
 
reference-point, an outcome that serves to separate gains (outcomes above the reference-
point) from losses (outcomes below the reference point). A key premise of prospect theory is 
loss aversion, i.e. the tendency for losses to loom larger than similarly sized gains, but only 
few studies exists that measure loss aversion for health outcomes. Earlier work that extended 
prospect theory to the health domain (e.g. Attema et al., 2013) required individuals to make 
decisions with different amounts of life duration as an outcome, but for simplicity the quality 
of life in which this life duration was spent was kept fixed (usually at perfect health). Hence, 
it was unclear if loss aversion depended on health status, or in other words, if the degree to 
which a loss of life duration looms larger than a similar gain in life duration depends on the 
quality of life experienced during this time. Therefore, in this chapter we tested whether loss 
aversion for life duration was independent of quality of life. Respondents in this study 
completed an adaptation of the non-parametric method developed by Abdellaoui et al. (2016) 
to measure loss aversion for different levels of quality of life. As such, they decided about 
health gains and losses, in which health was described as years of life in different health 
states. Separate loss aversion and utility curvature coefficients were estimated for each level 
of quality of life. Hence, Chapter 3 answered research question 2, as the findings of this 
chapter showed consistent loss aversion for life duration, independent of health status. The 
results of this chapter also suggest that while many people might be loss averse, the strength 
of this tendency may differ between contexts and individuals.  
Similarly large heterogeneity can be observed in empirical work (e.g. reported in Chapter 8) 
that attempted to measure concepts such as: probability weighting (e.g. Abdellaoui, 2000, 
Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2000, Bleichrodt et al., 1999, Gonzalez and Wu, 1999, Suter et al., 
2016), discounting (Attema et al., 2010, Attema and Brouwer, 2012a, Chapman, 1996, 
Chapman and Elstein, 1995, Loewenstein and Prelec, 1991, Redelmeier and Heller, 1993, 
Van der Pol and Cairns, 2000) and time inconsistency or present bias (Attema and Lipman, 
2018, Attema et al., 2010, Bleichrodt et al., 2016, Rohde, 2010, Rohde, 2019, Shiba and 
Shimizu, 2019). This heterogeneity, however, is typically not considered when policy tools 
are used that are inspired by behavioral research. Instead, these policy tools often use a one-
size-fits-all approach. In particular, they include some behavioral insight that is then assumed 
to apply to all people affected by the policy. For example, behavioral research on loss 
aversion has motivated offering financial incentives in which individuals could lose their own 
money (i.e. deposit contracts). Although such behaviorally inspired financial incentives have 
been found to be quite effective (Halpern et al., 2015, e.g. Kullgren et al., 2016), no 
conclusive evidence exists about which type of behaviorally inspired incentives work best, 
for whom and why (Adams et al., 2014, Haisley et al., 2012, Halpern et al., 2015, Paloyo et 
al., 2015). Also, the role that the large heterogeneity in risk and time preferences (such as loss 
aversion) play in preferences for behaviorally inspired incentives is unclear. Chapter 4 aimed 
to address this gap in the literature, by exploring the association between risk and time 
preferences and the type of behaviorally inspired incentives individuals would select into. 
More specifically, individuals were asked to tailor their own incentive scheme for reaching a 
weight loss goal, after which a wide array of risk and time preferences were elicited. The 
results in Chapter 4 allowed answering research question 3. The tailored incentives 
individuals designed for themselves were highly heterogeneous: e.g. a majority selected 
tailored incentives with a commitment component and only very few respondents preferred 
uncertain incentives. Nonetheless, these behaviorally inspired incentives were not related to 
risk and time preferences. Given that this null result has multiple possible explanations, it 
 
 
remains unclear if tailoring incentives to individuals’ preferences (e.g. measuring loss 
aversion beforehand and assigning those with high loss aversion a deposit contract) will 
improve effectiveness compared to one-size-fits-all behaviorally inspired incentives. 
Throughout this dissertation, we have drawn on and expanded the work on financial decision-
making, even though earlier work suggested that differences exist between decisions for 
money and health. For example, discounting is usually stronger for monetary outcomes when 
compared to health (Attema et al., 2018b, Chapman, 1996). Such differences between 
domains were also found for probability weighting (Suter et al., 2016) and loss aversion 
(Oliver, 2018). In Chapter 5, we extend this work by comparing choice consistency between 
domains, i.e. we study the degree of preference reversals in choices for both health and 
money. Unlike earlier work on preference reversals, Chapter 5 studied decisions made on 
behalf of others, which occur frequently in both domains. For example, health care 
professionals will make decisions on behalf of their patients, or at least provide them with 
advice on which treatment to choose. Similarly, financial professionals will decide how 
others’ money is invested. Relatively few studies, however, have investigated whether 
experience with deciding about health or money improves (the quality in terms of consistency 
of) decision-making. Existing work studying the decisions of physicians (Brosig-Koch et al., 
2016) or stockbrokers (Abdellaoui et al., 2013a) found them to be comparable to the 
decisions typically observed in medicine or economics student samples, respectively. Hence, 
in Chapter 5, we answered research question 4 by investigating the consistency of decisions 
about health and money on behalf of others in a student sample consisting of both economics 
and medical students. We found preference reversals to occur frequently, especially in the 
health domain. Furthermore, medical students reversed their preferences more frequently 
overall. Nonetheless, this chapter yielded two strategies to improve consistency. First, 
although overall preference reversals occurred more frequently for health outcomes, this 
increase was stronger for economics students than for medicine students. This suggests that 
domain-relevant experience might improve consistency. Second, valuations for gambles were 
obtained in two ways: open valuation and by means of completing a guided list of choices. 
Preference reversals occurred less frequently when guided choice list valuation was used. 
This suggests that the use of transparent choice-based valuation procedures could increase 
consistency. 
In summary, Part I of this dissertation (Behavioral experiments in health) has shown that: 
1. the degree to which individuals are risk averse for small or moderate stakes 
violates EU, 
2. life year losses loom larger than life year gains, and the degree to which this is the 
case is independent from the quality of life during the years lost or gained, 
3. individuals prefer different types and combinations of behaviorally inspired 
incentives, but these tailored incentives are unrelated to their risk and time 
preferences, 
4. decisions about health and money are both often inconsistent, but preference 
reversals may be lower in domains in which one has experience and when using 
choice-based methods. 
 
 
Applying behavioral insights in health state valuation 
Chapters 2 and 3 showed that decisions about health often violate the assumptions underlying 
EU and the linear QALY model (e.g. Abellan-Perpinan et al., 2006, Attema and Brouwer, 
2010a, Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2005, Bleichrodt et al., 1999), which could be problematic as 
both theories are often (implicitly) assumed to hold in health state valuation with TTO and 
SG (Brazier et al., 2002, Versteegh et al., 2016). If, regardless of these violations, TTO and 
SG responses are used assuming EU and the linear QALY hold, the outcomes of these 
measures are likely to be biased. Bleichrodt (2002), using a theoretical approach, predicted 
that SG weights are generally too high, while TTO weights are likely to better represent 
utility of health status (as they are subject to both upward and downward biases). These 
claims, however, have not yet been substantiated empirically, as determining which method 
yields more valid QALY weights requires an objective ‘standard’ to compare the utility of 
health status elicited with both methods to. Given that the degree to which ‘true utilities’ exist 
is questionable at best (Braga and Starmer, 2005), no decisive argument can be made for any 
single standard to compare the validity of individuals’ QALY weights to. In Chapter 6 we 
proposed to test the validity of health state valuations by asking each individual to reflect on 
their implied QALY weights, given their responses in SG and TTO exercises, themselves. 
Individuals completed TTO and SG for multiple health states and were subsequently 
presented with their implied QALY weights. Respondents were asked to indicate for each 
health state i) whether QALY weights elicited with TTO or SG better reflected the utility of 
the health state in their opinion, and ii) if the QALY weight should be adjusted upwards or 
downwards in their opinion if neither method yielded the ‘true’ estimate. The findings of 
Chapter 6 confirm the predictions made by Bleichrodt (2002) and provide an answer to 
research question 5: for each health state the majority of individuals indicated that TTO better 
captured QALY weights. However, on average, QALY weights were adjusted downwards, 
suggesting some (upward) bias still remains in TTO weights.  
In Chapter 7, instead of asking individuals to adjust their QALY weights themselves, another 
strategy was used. Bleichrodt (2002) proposed that the behavioral insights captured in 
prospect theory (i.e. loss aversion, utility curvature and probability weighting) may explain 
the difference between TTO and SG weights. As such, in Chapter 7, we measured these 
components of prospect theory for each individual and derived TTO and SG weights under 
prospect theory. We referred to these as ‘corrected weights’, since the bias resulting from 
violations of EU and the linear QALY model was corrected for, and to the process of 
adjusting for prospect theory as ‘correction’. When comparing QALY weights, before 
correction a difference was observed between TTO and SG for all health states, which 
disappeared after correction. The corrected QALY weights, however, were reduced 
significantly. As such, the answer to research question 6 is tentatively positive, as it appears 
that prospect theory can be applied to correct TTO and SG and in our study it yielded the 
convergence between TTO and SG predicted by Bleichrodt (2002). Furthermore, these results 
corroborate the suggested conclusions of Chapter 6, i.e. both TTO and SG weights appear to 
be too high without correction. However, the decrease in QALY weights that resulted from 
correction for prospect theory was substantial, which compromised the face validity of 
corrected weights. As such, whether or not correction improved validity of QALY weights 
was not addressed in this Chapter and remains a topic for future research. 
 
 
Whereas Chapter 7 showed it is technically possible to correct TTO and SG based on 
prospect theory, research question 7 (answered in Chapter 8) deals with the feasibility and 
consequences of using corrected weights in economic evaluation. Using the data from the 
previous chapter, in Chapter 8 we showed the consequences of using corrected weights 
instead of uncorrected QALY weights (i.e. classic weights). Obviously, if corrected QALY 
weights are different from uncorrected ones (i.e. often lower), this may influence estimates of 
cost-effectiveness and allocation decisions significantly. Several unresolved issues currently 
preclude the use of corrected weights in practice. First, the influence and validity of the 
methodology and sample used in Chapter 7 have not yet been tested, which is relevant as 
other methods have yielded different conclusions (Abdellaoui et al., 2007, Attema et al., 
2013). Hence, further replication and methodological exploration is needed, preferably by 
including respondents from the general public. Second, even though loss aversion and 
probability weighting are sometimes seen as ‘errors’ or ‘irrationalities’ that need to be 
corrected for, they could also provide important, policy-relevant information on the 
emotional value of losses and uncertainties in health. If one believes the latter to be true (as 
for example argued in: Diecidue and Wakker, 2001, Köbberling and Wakker, 2005), this 
information might be relevant to incorporate in the context of economic evaluation 
deliberately. We provided first ideas as to how in Chapter 8. Third, correction based on 
prospect theory requires assumptions about the reference-point relative to which all outcomes 
are compared. Whereas in the previous chapters in which prospect theory was applied (i.e. 
Chapter 2, 4 and 7), this was handled by pragmatically assuming that a single, constant 
outcome served as reference-point throughout the task, earlier work suggests that reference-
points may change from task to task or differ between individuals (van Osch et al., 2006). It 
has also been argued that individuals may use their subjective life expectancy as reference-
points (van Nooten and Brouwer, 2004, van Nooten et al., 2009, Wouters et al., 2015). 
Hence, before corrected weights can be used in practice, the role and nature of the reference-
point should also be explored more extensively.  
Chapter 9 commenced this exploration, by studying subjective life expectancy (SLE), i.e. 
individuals’ expectations with respect to length of life, and in doing so answered research 
question 8. Earlier work has shown that those with higher SLE (i.e. expecting to become 
older) generally yield higher QALY weights (Heintz et al., 2013, van Nooten and Brouwer, 
2004, van Nooten et al., 2009, van Nooten et al., 2014). Van Nooten et al. (2009) explain this 
effect by suggesting that SLE serves as reference-point in TTO exercises. Loss aversion may 
explain higher QALY weights, as for most individuals the durations considered in TTO (e.g. 
10 years) are shorter than their SLE. This explanation, however, has not yet been tested and 
even though SG can also be affected by loss aversion (Bleichrodt, 2002), no work exists 
testing the effects of SLE on SG. Hence, in Chapter 9 we constructed a model (similar to that 
of Chapter 7) with SLE as reference-point and apply it to both methods. We derived 
predictions for TTO and SG through several assumptions about individuals’ preferences (e.g. 
they are loss averse). These predictions were tested in an experiment, in which individuals’ 
SLE was used to construct TTO and SG exercises with durations above (i.e. gain versions) 
and below (i.e. loss versions) their reference-point. Our model predicted that for loss versions 
TTO weights are subject to upward bias and SG weights are subject to both downward and 
upward bias (compared to gain versions). These predictions were confirmed in two 
experiments, in which a sample of students and a sample of individuals aged 60 years and 
older completed gain and loss versions of TTO and SG. We confirmed the findings of earlier 
 
work, which suggested (based on correlational evidence) that SLE affects TTO. When 
individuals completed TTO for durations below SLE, they gave up fewer life years compared 
to TTO with durations above SLE. For SG, these effects were less pronounced, i.e. the effects 
were smaller compared to TTO (and not significant in the study with an older sample). The 
results of Chapter 9 suggest that SLE can serve as a reference-point in health state valuation 
exercises. Hence, if, as we did in Chapter 7, we assume that for all individuals the time in 
impaired health serves as reference-point, this assumption might not hold for all TTO and SG 
tasks. Hence, applying a corrective approach based on this assumption might decrease rather 
than increase the validity of QALY weights.  
In Chapter 10, we explored an alternative approach to improve decisions about health. Earlier 
work in economics has shown that individuals deciding together (e.g. about financial 
gambles) are less prone to deviate from the predictions of EU (Abdellaoui et al., 2013b), and 
discount the future less (Denant-Boemont et al., 2017). These effects are hypothesized to 
result from deliberation, bargaining and information exchange. If such findings can be 
extrapolated to TTO and SG, the differences between these measures might be reduced by 
having individuals decide collectively in these tasks (as these differences are partly driven by 
violations of EU and discounting of future life years). Hence, we developed an experiment 
aimed at investigating the causal effect of deciding collectively (in dyads) in TTO and SG. 
We advanced earlier work on this topic (Karimi et al., 2019, Krabbe et al., 1996) by 
controlling for learning effects, as it has been shown that these affect elicited QALY weights 
(Augestad et al., 2012). Our work indeed demonstrated the importance of controlling for 
learning, as almost all effects reported in Chapter 10 were explained by learning, rather than 
by collective decision-making. In fact, decision quality, QALY weights, and the difference 
between TTO and SG were unaffected by collective decision-making. As such, although the 
unresolved issues mentioned in Chapter 8 should be addressed, directly correcting for bias in 
TTO and SG (as in Chapter 7) appears to be a more promising strategy than collective 
decision-making. 
In summary, Part II of this dissertation has shown that:  
1. Although both methods appear to yield QALY weights that are too high, TTO appears 
to yield more valid QALY weights compared to SG, according to individuals 
themselves. 
2. It is possible to correct TTO and SG weights for prospect theory, and their initially 
different QALY weights converged after correcting for loss aversion, probability 
weighting and utility curvature. 
3. Although correcting for prospect theory appears to be a promising way forward in 
health state valuation, several methodological and theoretical challenges currently 
preclude the use of ‘corrected’ QALY weights in practice. 
4. It appears that individuals’ expectations about length of life can serve as reference-
point for both TTO and SG. 
5. QALY weights are unaffected by deciding collectively, but bargaining and 
information exchange during collective decision-making yield no benefits beyond 
learning effects. 
 
 
 
 
Policy implications 
The answers to the research questions of this dissertation have several policy implications. 
First and foremost, the results presented in this dissertation imply that assuming everyone 
decides rationally about health misrepresents actual decision-making. As such, policy aimed 
at improving decisions with health consequences can learn from behavioral economics (and 
the findings reported in this dissertation). In particular, reference-points matter, loss aversion 
is relatively stable and extends to decisions about health, and people overreact to small 
probabilities while underreacting to large probabilities (i.e. probability weighting). Indeed, 
such insights have already reached policy makers, as the past decade has seen a large increase 
in attention for behavioral public policy (Bernheim and Rangel, 2005, Oliver, 2013a, Oliver, 
2015, Shafir, 2013), i.e. public policy based on research in behavioral economics and 
psychology, rather than being based on traditional economic insights (assuming rationality). 
Several new public policy tools have been developed, which aim to use behavioral insights to 
steer people in the ‘right direction’ (e.g. nudges). Such behavioral insights have also been 
used to ‘supercharge’ existing policy tools, e.g. behaviorally inspired information campaigns 
or financial incentives (Galizzi, 2014). The findings of this thesis, however, suggest that 
policy makers should recognize the inherent heterogeneity in how individuals decide about 
health, both within and between individuals. For a single individual, decisions about health 
may differ depending on whether risks or delays are involved, and health preferences could 
depend on how they are elicited. The findings of this dissertation furthermore suggest that 
large differences exist in, for example, loss aversion or probability weighting between 
individuals. Hence, general behavioral public policy interventions that aim to benefit from 
these behavioral insights, e.g. nudges, or information campaigns and financial incentives that 
are ‘behaviorally inspired’ (Galizzi, 2014) may have heterogeneous effects. Although the 
(null) results of Chapter 4 suggest that much work remains needed in this area, this 
dissertation suggests that ‘tailoring’ interventions to this heterogeneity could be a promising 
way forward (see for example the work on personalized nudges, by: Peer et al., 2019). Such 
personalization could potentially improve the (cost-)effectiveness of behavioral public policy, 
by attempting to fit policy to individuals’ heterogeneous preferences.  
Part II of this dissertation aimed to apply behavioral insights in a specific context, i.e. health 
state valuations. Hence, the results of these chapters have several policy implications in this 
context. First, the results of Chapter 6 suggest that QALY weights based on TTO better 
reflect individuals’ preferences (according to themselves) than those based on SG. Hence, by 
extension it could be argued that generic health measures that have health utility tariffs 
derived with TTO probably more adequately reflect the general public’s preferences for 
health states than those derived with SG (ceteris paribus). As such, this chapter provides 
some additional arguments for the recommendation of NICE (2018) and the Dutch Health 
Care Institute (2015) to use EQ-5D (which is valued by TTO) to measure and value quality of 
life, as opposed to SF-6D (which is valued by SG). However, many individuals, when given 
the opportunity, still adjusted the implied TTO weights downwards when asked to directly 
indicate health state utility. As such, reimbursement and allocation decisions using TTO 
weights (e.g. using nationally representative EQ-5D tariffs: Kim et al., 2016, Versteegh et al., 
2016, Xie et al., 2016) may be systematically biased upwards due to the use of QALYs based 
on TTO (note that Chapters 7 and 9 also suggested that TTO and SG weights are too high). 
Whether the use of discrete choice experiments in health state valuation (Norman et al., 2013, 
 
Stolk et al., 2010, Xie et al., 2014) offers a way forward to improve validity of QALY 
weights is, also due to the lack of consensus on how to anchor this method’s subjective scale 
onto the QALY scale (Norman et al., 2016), still open for debate. Hence, in the final chapters 
of this dissertation alternative ways forward were explored. Chapter 7 suggests that directly 
correcting biases in TTO and SG may be a promising strategy, but several additional research 
questions should first be answered before such a corrective approach can be used in policy 
(see Chapter 8). Collective decision-making (Chapter 10) in health state valuation appears to 
yield little benefit above and beyond learning effects (which could also be realized through 
sufficient practice questions, as is for example prescribed in EuroQol Valuation Technology, 
Stolk et al., 2019). 
Limitations and implications for future research 
With this thesis I aimed to i) provide additional understanding into how individuals actually 
decide about health (using theories and methods from behavioral economics), and ii) use this 
understanding to improve the methods used in health state valuation. My dissertation only 
provides a partial answer to the research questions that followed from the main aims of my 
thesis. This is also due to the limitations present in the approaches I used throughout my 
research. Some important limitations are highlighted below, as well as the potential avenues 
for future research implied by these limitations. 
First, almost all experiments reported in this dissertation utilized a locally recruited student 
sample, as is usual in economic experiments (e.g. Harrison and List (2004) refer to student 
samples as ‘standard subjects’). Obviously, students differ from the general (or global) 
population in several ways, i.e., age, education level, current income, residential area (most 
students are from Rotterdam), and culture. A crucial limitation to take into account when 
interpreting the findings from this dissertation is, therefore, that the use of a student sample 
may hamper generalizability of our findings (Henrich et al., 2010). Indeed, the results 
reported in the Chapters of my dissertation suggest that these student subjects may decide 
differently about health compared to the (Dutch) general population. For example, Chapters 
6, 7, 9 and 10 reported QALY weights that are considerably lower than those observed in a 
sample representative of the general public. Furthermore, in Chapter 10 this external validity 
could be compared directly, by using the same methods in both a student sample and sample 
of people aged 60 years and older. Considerable differences were observed. An important 
point to make, however, is that most studies reported in this dissertation aimed to compare 
decisions about health in multiple situations or using different methods (e.g., for TTO or SG 
for gains and losses, or in groups or individually). Hence, although it may be fair to question 
whether the outcomes of these decisions about health (i.e. the QALY weights or risk 
attitudes) generalize to other groups than students, raising similar doubts about the decision 
processes implies that students decide about health in a fundamentally different way than 
other strata in society. For example, all chapters comparing TTO and SG find that although 
elicited QALY weights were generally lower for students than those observed for the general 
public (i.e. decision outcomes are not externally valid), as observed in many previous studies 
(Bleichrodt and Johannesson, 1997, Read et al., 1984, Sackett and Torrance, 1978), TTO 
weights were significantly lower than SG weights (i.e. externally valid decision process) in 
both groups.  
 
 
Second, the work reported in this dissertation almost exclusively relied on lab experiments, 
i.e. studies in which respondents complete abstract choice tasks in the highly controlled 
environment of the behavioral lab (the online experiments used in Chapter 4 and 10 are 
exceptions). Lab experiments have many desirable qualities, i.e. they are affordable means of 
data collection, allow researchers to maintain high internal validity and as such may be 
helpful in determining the causal pathways underlying certain effects (Harrison and List, 
2004). Lab experiments are often used in behavioral economics and given that the aim of this 
dissertation was to extend some of the insights from this field to decisions about health, the 
use of lab experiments can be considered a pragmatic first step. However, decisions about 
health are often different in many respects from the artificial tasks used in my lab 
experiments (Galizzi and Wiesen, 2018), and will often take place under less ‘sterile’ 
conditions. Hence, the use of field experiments, i.e. behavioral research that takes place in the 
context in which decisions (about health) are actually made (Harrison and List, 2004), 
appears to be relevant. The literature on risk, time and altruistic preferences for health 
contains several excellent examples that illustrate how the type of studies reported in Part I of 
this dissertation could be performed in field contexts (e.g. Brosig-Koch et al., 2016, Galizzi et 
al., 2016c). It is, however, questionable if the work reported in Part II of this dissertation (i.e. 
on health state valuation) lends itself for field experiments, as TTO and SG are highly 
abstract (and unrealistic) decisions about health by design. Extending the findings from Part 
II to non-student samples, however, may require the use of lab-in-the-field procedures, e.g. 
mobile labs as in many of the large-scale health state valuation studies used to derive value 
sets for EQ-5D measures (e.g. Kim et al., 2016, Pickard et al., 2019, Versteegh et al., 2016, 
Xie et al., 2016). 
Third, several of the Chapters of this dissertation reported the results of preference 
elicitations that may not be feasible for use in other samples or non-lab settings. For example, 
the non-parametric methodology used in Chapters 3, 5 and 7 has several theoretical 
advantages over other methods (Abdellaoui et al., 2016, Abdellaoui et al., 2007), but involves 
a relatively large amount of choices for elicitation of the relevant parameters. As such, the 
incorporation of this methodology into, for example, large-scale surveys will likely be 
infeasible, as opposed to survey measures of risk-attitude (e.g. Blais and Weber, 2006) or 
choice-list methodology (e.g. Holt and Laury, 2002). Furthermore, the methods used in this 
dissertation require numerate and literate respondents and will not necessarily be applicable 
in all settings in which the measurement of risk and time preferences is of interest. To 
accommodate future work in resource-constrained settings, the use of simpler and more 
efficient elicitation approaches should be explored (i.e. using fewer choices and accessible 
stimuli, as in: van Wilgenburg, 2018). It is then also crucial to study the extent to which this 
reduction in complexity increases or decreases the external validity of the measures in 
predicting decisions about health (e.g. Massin et al., 2018). 
Fourth, many of the Chapters in this dissertation have attempted to drop some of the strict 
assumptions present in EU and the linear QALY model, and instead assume prospect theory 
to understand decisions about health. Although prospect theory, more than 40 years after its 
introduction (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), often is regarded as the best descriptive theory 
of decision under risk and uncertainty (Wakker, 2010), it is not the only available framework 
(Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006, Loomes and Sugden, 1982, Wang and Johnson, 2012). As such, 
many of the findings in this dissertation should be interpreted in light of the limitations of 
prospect theory. For example, several empirical violations of prospect theory exist, both for 
 
monetary outcomes (Bateman et al., 2007b, Birnbaum, 2006, Payne, 2005) and health 
outcomes (Feeny and Eng, 2005). Furthermore, prospect theory uses an algebraic approach to 
describe and predict the outcomes of decisions about health, but offers little insight into the 
processes that underly these decisions (Pachur et al., 2017). Some authors have investigated 
these processes, and their findings suggest that loss aversion and probability weighting may 
actually reflect how individuals divide their attention among different possible outcomes in 
decision tasks (Pachur et al., 2014, Suter et al., 2016, Yechiam and Hochman, 2013). The 
reliance on stated preferences and an algebraic approach to model decisions also typically 
exclude qualitative methods, although some authors have supplemented their work on 
prospect theory with think-out-loud procedures (van Osch et al., 2006). Hence, future 
research could focus more on the processes underlying the phenomena modeled in prospect 
theory, especially in the context of health state valuation (in which the use of prospect theory 
appears promising, see Chapter 8). 
Concluding remarks 
Societies worldwide face increasing proportions of individuals living unhealthily and 
growing pressure on health care budgets. Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that 
health economic research can address these worrying trends better by moving beyond homo 
economicus. This traditional model of decisions about health, however desirable one might 
believe such rationality to be, is unlikely to reflect how real individuals decide. As such, the 
main goal of this dissertation was to extend and apply methods and theories from behavioral 
economics to improve understanding of individual and societal decisions about health. 
Indeed, it appears that many of the insights from behavioral economics extend to decisions 
about health. Individuals deciding about health (both their own and others’) are often 
inconsistent, are influenced by reference-points, and place excess weight on health losses and 
overreact to small probabilities while underreacting to large probabilities. However, my hope 
is that, if the reader indeed derived some new insights about decision about health, it has not 
made her pessimistic about human decision-making faculties. The inability of individuals in 
my experiments to live up to the standards of homo economicus, in my opinion, if anything 
indicates the need for additional theoretical and empirical research to better model and 
understand and influence their decisions.  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
Summary 
Understanding how individual and societal decisions about health are made is of crucial 
importance, given the increasing prevalence of preventable diseases and growing pressure on 
public health care budgets. Traditionally, in economic models of health-related decision-
making it is assumed that individuals decide rationally: i.e. maximizing utility through 
satisfying consistent and context-independent preferences. Decisions about uncertain health 
outcomes were modelled with expected utility (EU) theory, which assumes individuals 
maximize utility while weighting all possible outcomes by their likelihood of occurring. 
Earlier experimental work has shown that EU is often violated in the context of financial 
decision-making. In Part I of this dissertation several of such behavioral experiments were 
extended to the health domain, to study if the same behavioral insights apply for decisions 
about health. In the context of societal decisions about health, EU underlies the 
measurements required for deriving the preferred outcome in economic evaluations 
comparing the costs and benefits of medical treatments: Quality-Adjusted Life-Years 
(QALYs). This measure of health utility is obtained by multiplying the duration of a health 
gain by a weight that represents the health-related quality of life improvement experienced. 
QALY weights typically depend on the health state valuation method used for measuring 
these QALY weights. Two prominent ones are the Time Trade-Off (TTO) method and the 
Standard Gamble (SG). In Part II of this dissertation it is explored if behavioral insights can 
explain differences between the QALY weights elicited with TTO and SG. 
Part I: Behavioral experiments in health 
EU is often used to model risk aversion, i.e. to explain why individuals would rather receive 
nothing than play a gamble with positive expected value, e.g. winning 11 euro with 50% 
chance or losing 10 euro otherwise. However, one of the famous paradoxes challenging the 
validity of EU shows that turning down such gambles yields the absurd prediction that 
gambles with extremely high expected values should also be turned down (e.g. winning 
100.000 euro with 50% chance and losing 100 euro otherwise). In Chapter 2, this paradox 
was extended to health by constructing such gambles for health outcomes (e.g. with life 
duration or disease cases). Our experiment showed that many respondents have risk 
preferences that violate EU for health. These results suggested that individuals are risk averse 
for health outcomes, but this risk aversion is not adequately described by EU.  
Hence, alternative utility theories should be used to model risk preferences, such as prospect 
theory. Prospect theory assumes that all outcomes are evaluated compared to a reference-
point. Earlier work showed that many individuals are loss averse, i.e. losses (i.e. outcomes 
below the reference-point) loom larger than gains of the same size (i.e. outcomes above the 
reference-point). In the experiment reported in Chapter 3, individuals’ loss aversion was 
measured for lifetime, where the quality of life during this lifetime was systematically varied. 
The results reported in this chapter showed that although the majority of respondents were 
loss averse regardless of quality of life, the strength of this tendency differed strongly 
between individuals and measurements. 
Such heterogeneity in preferences is often observed in behavioral experiments but rarely 
utilized in policy inspired by such experimental findings. For example, it is unclear how 
heterogeneity in loss aversion affects the selection or effectiveness of financial incentives 
inspired by this phenomenon (e.g. deposit contracts). As such, Chapter 4 explored whether 
 
incentives for physical activity could be tailored, by allowing individuals to design their own 
financial incentives. The results of this experiment showed that individuals prefer different 
types and combinations of incentives, but the type of incentives they designed was not 
associated with risk and time preferences. Therefore, Chapter 4 concluded that it is currently 
unclear if tailoring incentives to individuals’ risk and time preferences is beneficial. 
Finally, we explored the consistency of decisions about health (and money) in Chapter 5. In 
this behavioral experiment medicine and economics students’ preferences were elicited for 
health and monetary outcomes using different elicitation methods. The results indicated that 
preference reversals were more likely to occur for medical students (compared to economics 
students), and when deciding about health (rather than about money). Furthermore, the results 
of Chapter 5 showed that the degree of preference reversals depended on the method used for 
eliciting preferences and on the interaction between field of study and outcome domain, 
suggesting that experience is associated with higher consistency.  
Part II: Applications of behavioral insights to health state valuation  
Earlier work suggested that although both TTO and SG can be biased by violations of EU, 
TTO yields more accurate QALY weights because its outcomes are subject to both upward 
and downward biases that may cancel out. In Chapter 6, we tried to verify this claim by 
showing individuals their QALY weights measured with TTO and SG and asking them to 
reflect on these weights. According to individuals themselves, TTO yielded more valid 
QALY weights than SG. However, both methods yielded QALY weights that were too high 
according to respondents, as they were on average adjusted downwards. As such, deriving 
QALY weights with TTO or SG could overestimate the utility assigned to health states, 
which could have a distorting influence on economic evaluations that rely on these weights. 
In Chapter 7 we explored if prospect theory could be used to ‘correct’ these biases. In an 
experiment, next to completing TTO and SG tasks, each respondent also completed 
measurements of loss aversion, probability weighting (i.e. if a respondent overestimates or 
underestimates probabilities) and the shape of their utility function. If we took into account 
these individual differences captured by prospect theory, the differences between TTO and 
SG disappeared for all health states. Although this convergence of TTO and SG is promising 
and in accordance with earlier theoretical predictions, QALY weights for both methods were 
significantly reduced. This suggests the need for further validation of the correction process. 
Next, Chapter 8 explored the challenges currently precluding the use of such a ‘corrective 
approach’ in economic evaluation. Seeing as the use of corrected weights could strongly 
affect economic evaluation, the results reported in Chapter 7 should first be replicated with 
different samples and methodologies. Furthermore, although probability weighting and loss 
aversion for health signal that uncertainties and health losses are of significant importance, 
whether and how this should be incorporated in economic evaluation is unclear. Finally, since 
applying a corrective approach requires assumptions about the reference-point in prospect 
theory, the role and nature of reference-points in health should also be further explored. 
Chapter 9 commenced this exploration of the role of the reference-point by investigating the 
influence of subjective life expectancy (SLE). In earlier work using TTO it was observed that 
those with higher SLE gave up fewer life years, which was posited to result from loss 
aversion. In this chapter we provided the theoretical foundation to experimentally test this 
prediction for both TTO and SG. Respondents’ SLEs were used to construct TTO and SG 
 
 
tasks with life years above or below SLE. As predicted, subjects gave up fewer years in TTO 
and were less risk-tolerant in SG below SLE, suggesting that years below SLE are seen as 
losses and SLE can serve as reference-point. The short durations typically used in TTO and 
SG could, therefore, yield upward bias and it is unclear how this should be addressed.  
Finally, we explored an alternative solution to biases in TTO and SG in Chapter 10: 
deciding collectively. Earlier work suggested that collective decision-making could reduce 
violations of EU, meaning that the difference between weights derived with TTO and SG 
resulting from such violations might also diminish. Nonetheless, the findings of the 
experiment reported in this chapter suggested that collective decision making in dyads has 
little effect on decision quality. Furthermore, QALY weights remained similar between 
individual and collective decisions and the typical difference in elicited weights between 
TTO and SG was not affected.  
Collectively, Part I and Part II have several policy implications. First, as many experimental 
findings could be extended to the health domain, the increased interest in policy interventions 
including behavioral insights is supported by this dissertation. Our findings, however, suggest 
policy makers should recognize that large differences exist between individuals in terms of 
how they decide about health, and as such, personalized interventions tailored to individuals’ 
heterogeneous preferences may be warranted. Second, this dissertation showed that TTO and 
SG are likely to lead to QALY weights that are biased upwards. The research reported in this 
dissertation suggested that applying a corrective approach could be a promising way forward, 
although several additional research questions should first be answered. Such future research 
efforts should aim to avoid some of the limitations present in most of the chapters of this 
dissertation. That is, future work could explore the validity of the conclusions reported in this 
dissertation with general public samples, in (lab in the) field settings, with more efficient 
measurement methods, and using alternative theories or qualitative methods. 
Concluding, this dissertation showed that individuals deciding about health are often 
inconsistent, are influenced by reference-points, and place excessive weight on health losses 
and extreme probabilities. Currently, the biases these preferences may yield are disregarded, 
as they violate traditional assumptions about rationality or for pragmatic reasons. I believe 
that additional theoretical and empirical research is needed to better model these decisions 
and hope my dissertation has contributed to a better understanding of decisions about health.  
  
 
  
 
 
Nederlandse samenvatting 
De groei in prevalentie van te voorkomen ziektes en de druk op publieke zorgbudgetten 
maken het van cruciaal belang te begrijpen hoe beslissingen over gezondheid zowel door 
individuen als maatschappijen worden genomen. Wanneer in de economische traditie 
modellen worden gebruikt om aan gezondheid gerelateerd gedrag te voorspellen, werd 
aangenomen dat iedereen rationeel beslist. Dat wil zeggen dat eenieder nut of utility 
maximaliseert door aan consistente en context-onafhankelijke voorkeuren te voldoen. 
Onzekere beslissingen over gezondheid werden gemodelleerd aan de hand van de verwachte 
nutstheorie, dat wil zeggen expected utility (EU) theory, waarin wordt aangenomen dat 
individuen alle uitkomsten wegen op basis van de kans dat ze voorkomen. Eerder 
experimenteel onderzoek heeft uitgewezen dat de aannames gebruikt in EU vaak worden 
geschonden wanneer men keuzes over geld maakt. In Deel I van dit proefschrift werden 
enkele van deze bevindingen vertaald naar het gezondheidsdomein, om te onderzoeken of 
dezelfde gedragsinzichten van toepassing zijn op beslissingen over gezondheid. EU ligt ook 
ten grondslag aan maatschappelijke beslissingen over gezondheid. Er wordt namelijk 
aangenomen dat EU standhoudt bij het meten van de uitkomstmaat die in economische 
evaluaties van medische behandelingen bij voorkeur wordt gebruikt: voor kwaliteit 
gecorrigeerde levensjaren (Quality-Adjusted Life Years, QALY’s vanaf nu). Deze 
uitkomstmaat wordt geschat door de gezondheidswinst van medische behandelingen uit te 
drukken als het product van de lengte en kwaliteit van die levenswinst. De voor die 
berekening benodigde kwaliteitsgewichten, zo blijkt uit eerder werk, zijn afhankelijk van de 
methode waarmee ze worden geschat. Time trade-off (TTO) en standard gamble (SG) zijn 
populaire methodes voor dit doel. In Deel II van dit proefschrift werd onderzocht of de tussen 
TTO en SG verschillende kwaliteitsgewichten aan de hand van gedragsinzichten kunnen 
worden verklaard. 
Deel I: Gedragsexperimenten voor gezondheid 
EU wordt vaak gebruikt om risicoaversie te modelleren, dat wil zeggen om uit te leggen 
waarom men liever niets ontvangt dan een gok neemt met positieve verwachte waarde, e.g. 
het winnen van 11 euro met 50% kans of anders 10 euro verliezen. Echter, een van de meest 
bekende paradoxen die de validiteit van EU in twijfel trekt, laat zien dat het afwijzen van 
zulke gokken tot de absurde voorspelling leidt dat gokken met extreem hoge verwachte 
waarde ook worden afgewezen (e.g. 100.000 euro met 50% kans of anders 100 euro 
verliezen). In Hoofdstuk 2 werd deze paradox vertaald naar het gezondheidsdomein door het 
aanbieden van zulk soort gokken met gezondheidsuitkomsten (e.g. met levensduur of 
ziektegevallen). Ons experiment liet zien dat men vaak risicovoorkeuren heeft die niet in 
overeenstemming zijn met EU. Deze resultaten suggereren dat men risicoavers is wat betreft 
gezondheidskomsten, maar dat deze risicoaversie door EU niet adequaat wordt beschreven. 
Zodoende lijkt het nodig om andere nutstheorieën te gebruiken om risicovoorkeur te 
modelleren, zoals prospect theorie. In prospect theorie wordt aangenomen dat uitkomsten 
vergeleken worden met een referentiepunt, waar alles hierboven een winst en daaronder een 
verlies is. Eerder werk toonde aan dat veel mensen verliesafkerig zijn: dat wil zeggen een 
verlies weegt zwaarder dan evenredige winst. In het experiment dat in Hoofdstuk 3 werd 
besproken werd verliesafkeer voor levensduur gemeten, waar de levenskwaliteit waarin die 
levensduur werd doorgebracht gevarieerd werd. De resultaten van dit hoofdstuk lieten zien 
 
dat het merendeel van de respondenten verliesafkerig was, ongeacht de levenskwaliteit van 
de jaren waarmee gemeten werd. Er waren wel aanzienlijke verschillen tussen individuen en 
metingen.  
Dit soort heterogeniteit wordt in de gedragsexperimenten vaak waargenomen, maar wordt 
zelden in de praktijk ingezet voor beleid dat door experimentele bevindingen is geïnspireerd. 
Het is bijvoorbeeld onduidelijk of de verschillen in verliesafkeer invloed hebben op de 
effectiviteit van financiële prikkels die met dit inzicht in gedachten zijn ontworpen (bijv. 
deposit contracten). Zodoende werd in Hoofdstuk 4 verkend of financiële prikkels op maat 
gemaakt kunnen worden, door deelnemers te vragen hun eigen financiële prikkels te 
ontwerpen. Dit experiment liet zien dat er grote verschillen bestaan in het soort prikkels dat 
men zou willen ontvangen, maar dat die verschillen niet te verklaren zijn aan de hand van 
tijds- en risicovoorkeuren. Zodoende werd op basis van Hoofdstuk 4 niet duidelijk of het op 
maat maken van financiële prikkels direct een toegevoegde waarde heeft.  
Ten slotte werd in Hoofstuk 5 de consistentie van keuzes over geld en gezondheid 
onderzocht, dat wil zeggen preference reversals. Voor dit onderzoek werd een steekproef van 
zowel economie- als geneeskundestudenten geworven, bij wie met verschillende methoden 
voorkeuren werden gemeten voor uitkomsten in zowel het financiële alsmede het 
gezondheidsdomein. De resultaten van dit hoofdstuk toonden dat een preference reversal 
vaker voorkwam onder geneeskundestudenten (ten opzichte van economiestudenten) en voor 
keuzes over gezondheid (ten opzichte van keuzes over geld). Daarnaast wezen de resultaten 
van Hoofdstuk 5 uit dat de mate van consistentie afhangt van de methode die wordt gebruikt 
om voorkeuren te meten en de interactie tussen studierichting en uitkomstdomein. Dit laatste 
suggereerde dat hogere consistentie met ervaring samenhangt. 
Deel II: de toepassing van gedragsinzichten voor gezondheidswaardering 
Dit hoofdstuk bouwde voort op eerder werk dat stelde dat, ondanks dat zowel TTO als SG 
door afwijkingen van EU vertekend kunnen zijn, TTO een betere weergave zou geven van de 
waarde van gezondheidstoestanden. De verklaring die werd voorgesteld is dat vertekeningen 
bij TTO in tegengestelde richting (zowel opwaarts als neerwaarts) werken en elkaar 
misschien opheffen. In Hoofdstuk 6 poogden wij deze stelling te testen door een experiment 
uit te voeren waarin respondenten hun kwaliteitsgewichten, gemeten met TTO en SG, te zien 
kregen en op deze gewichten reflecteerden. Kwaliteitsgewichten gemeten met TTO leken 
meer valide te zijn volgens respondenten zelf. Echter, beide methoden leverden te hoge 
kwaliteitsgewichten op volgens respondenten zelf; ze werden namelijk naar beneden 
bijgesteld. Zodoende suggereerden deze resultaten dat het meten van kwaliteitsgewichten met 
TTO en SG gemiddeld te hoge resultaten oplevert, wat een vertekenende invloed kan hebben 
op economische evaluaties (waarin deze gewichten worden toegepast).  
In Hoofdstuk 7 werd daarom onderzocht of prospect theorie gebruikt kan worden om deze 
vertekening te ‘corrigeren’. In dit experiment werden TTO en SG taken afgenomen, en 
werden verschillende componenten van prospect theorie gemeten: verliesafkeer, kansweging 
(d.w.z. de mate waarin men kansen onder- of overschat) en de nutsfunctie voor levensduur. 
Als deze individuele kenmerken in de schatting van kwaliteitsgewichten op basis van TTO en 
SG werden meegenomen, verdween het problematische verschil tussen de uitkomsten van 
beide methodes. Alhoewel deze convergentie veelbelovend lijkt en overeenkomt met de 
vooropgestelde verwachtingen, waren de resulterende gecorrigeerde kwaliteitsgewichten 
 
 
aanzienlijk lager. Deze reductie laat de noodzaak zien om het correctieproces verder te 
valideren. 
Vervolgens bezigde Hoofdstuk 8 zich met de uitdagingen die op dit moment het gebruik van 
deze ‘correctieve aanpak’ in de praktijk uitsluiten. Omdat het gebruik van gecorrigeerde 
gewichten economische evaluaties sterk zou kunnen beïnvloeden, moeten de bevindingen van 
Hoofdstuk 7 eerst gerepliceerd worden met andere steekproeven en meetmethoden. Daarnaast 
is, ondanks dat kansweging en verliesafkeer uitwijzen dat risico’s en verliezen op 
gezondheidsgebied een belangrijke rol spelen, het niet duidelijk hoe deze inzichten in 
economische evaluaties mee te nemen. Bovendien, aangezien een correctieve aanpak 
aannames over het referentiepunt in prospect theorie nodig maakt, moet meer onderzoek 
gedaan worden naar de rol en het ontstaan van referentiepunten op het gebied van 
gezondheid.  
In Hoofdstuk 9 werd met onderzoek naar de rol van het referentiepunt van start gegaan door 
de invloed van de subjectieve levensverwachting verder uit te diepen. In eerder werk waar 
TTO taken werden afgenomen, werd geobserveerd dat wanneer men langer verwachtte te 
leven, er minder jaren opgegeven werden. Dit werd door verliesafkeer verklaard. In dit 
hoofdstuk verschaften we de theoretische onderbouwing om deze verklaring te testen in een 
experiment, zowel voor TTO als SG. De subjectieve levensverwachting van deelnemers werd 
gebruikt om TTO en SG taken op te stellen met levensjaren volledig onder of boven die 
levensverwachting. Zoals voorspeld werden er in TTO voor jaren onder de subjectieve 
levensverwachting minder jaren opgegeven en werd in SG minder risico genomen. Deze 
bevindingen suggereerden dat jaren onder de subjectieve levensverwachting als verliezen 
worden gezien, en de subjectieve levensverwachting dus een referentiepunt was voor zowel 
TTO als SG. De korte levensduren die normaliter in beide methodes worden gebruikt, zouden 
zodoende een verhogend effect op kwaliteitsgewichten kunnen hebben.  
Ten slotte werd in Hoofdstuk 10 een alternatieve oplossing voor het verkleinen van 
vertekening in TTO en SG voorgesteld: collectieve besluitvorming. Eerder werk liet zien dat 
gezamenlijk beslissen tot een verminderde afwijking van EU kan leiden, wat zou kunnen 
betekenen dat het door de afwijkingen van EU verklaarde verschil tussen TTO en SG ook zou 
kunnen afnemen. Echter, de bevindingen van een experiment lieten geen effect zien van 
collectieve besluitvorming op de kwaliteit en uitkomsten van beslissingen in TTO en SG. 
Ook het verschil tussen de uitkomsten van TTO en SG bleef onveranderd.  
Deel I en Deel II hebben enkele gezamenlijke beleidsimplicaties. Ten eerste, aangezien veel 
van de experimentele bevindingen zich lieten vertalen naar keuzes over gezondheid, 
ondersteunt dit proefschrift de vergrote interesse in beleidsinterventies waarin 
gedragsinzichten worden meegenomen. Onze bevindingen suggereren daarentegen wel dat 
beleidsmakers zullen moeten aannemen dat er grote individuele verschillen bestaan in de 
manier waarop over gezondheid wordt besloten. Zodoende lijkt het gebruik van 
gepersonaliseerde interventies, die op basis van individuele voorkeuren op maat gemaakt 
worden, gerechtvaardigd. Ten tweede laat dit proefschrift zien dat TTO en SG in de 
gebruikelijke vorm waarschijnlijk vertekende resultaten opleveren. Ons onderzoek suggereert 
dat een aanpak op basis van individuele correctie veelbelovend is, maar dat enkele 
openstaande vragen eerst verder onderzocht moeten worden. Dat wil zeggen, toekomstig 
onderzoek zou zich kunnen richten op het verkennen van de validiteit van onze bevindingen 
 
in representatieve steekproeven, buiten het experimentele lab, met efficiëntere 
meetmethodieken en door alternatieve theorieën of kwalitatieve methoden te gebruiken. 
In conclusie, mijn onderzoek liet zien dat wanneer men beslist over gezondheid, 
inconsistenties vaak voorkomen, referentiepunten invloed hebben en kleine verschillen in 
kansen en verliezen aanzienlijk gewicht hebben. De vertekening die deze bevindingen tot 
gevolg hebben, wordt op dit moment vaak genegeerd omdat deze niet aansluit bij aannames 
over rationaliteit, of uit pragmatisch oogpunt. Ik geloof dat meer theoretisch en empirisch 
onderzoek nodig is om deze beslissingen over gezondheid beter te modelleren en te begrijpen 
en ik hoop dat mijn proefschrift daar een bijdrage aan heeft geleverd. 
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Dankwoord 
Maanden voordat ik begon met het schrijven van een introductie van mijn proefschrift ben ik 
gestart met mijn dankwoord, ik denk het belangrijkste onderdeel van mijn proefschrift. In de 
fantastische tijd die ik heb doorgemaakt gedurende het promoveren zijn er veel mensen die ik 
graag wil bedanken. Zij hebben een cruciale rol gehad in de totstandkoming van dit 
proefschrift, omdat ze het promoveren gemakkelijker maakten, of omdat ze het juist 
moeilijker maakten. 
Te beginnen met hen die het promoveren gemakkelijker maakten: 
Allereerst wil ik Arthur en Werner bedanken, mijn (co)promotors, begeleiders en mentoren.  
Werner, ik begon als promovendus toen jij nog (officieel) decaan van iBMG was. Je wist me 
gelijk voor deze faculteit te winnen door jouw enthousiasme voor interdisciplinair onderzoek, 
maar vooral door de openheid, interesse en humor waarmee je met mij in gesprek ging. In 
mijn tweede sollicitatieronde kwam ik onverhoopt een half uur te laat. Bezweet en gestresst 
kwam ik aan, en daar zaten jullie rustig keuvelend muziek te luisteren, niet gestoord door 
mijn vertraging. Binnen een seconde voelde ik me op mijn gemak bij je, en dat is niet meer 
weg gegaan. Onze gesprekken waren een maandelijks hoogtepunt, en je was altijd in staat om 
mij te helpen richting te geven aan de wirwar van plannen en ideeën waarmee ik aankwam – 
waar je mijn interesse altijd leidend liet zien.  
Arthur, meer dan vier jaar geleden nam je de telefoon op, en stimuleerde je een jonge 
psycholoog om te solliciteren op jouw vacature. Meer dan enthousiasme, de wil om te leren 
en een totaal andere achtergrond had ik jou op dat moment niet te bieden. Het vertrouwen dat 
je me hebt gegeven door mij aan te nemen als je eerste promovendus is enorm, en ik hoop dat 
ik de verwachtingen die je van te voren had waar heb kunnen maken. Ik kon elke dag bij je 
terecht, voor koffie, voor vragen of advies, of voor je dubieuze kijk op voetbal. Dank voor je 
analytisch vermogen, je aandacht voor detail, jouw geduld, en voor het bieden van het 
platform waar ik mijn ambitie kan waarmaken. 
Ik ben ook veel dank verschuldigd aan mijn andere coauteurs: Han, Olivier, en Sebastian. 
Han, je hebt op afstand een grote rol gespeeld in mijn ontwikkeling. De methoden die je hebt 
ontwikkeld vormen de basis van veel van mijn werk. Dat ik samen met jou heb kunnen 
werken aan een paper en een deel van jouw onderwijs in Advanced Economic Evaluation 
over heb mogen nemen voelt als een enorme eer.  
Olivier, I was very lucky that you were in Rotterdam so often. Thanks for your patience, 
especially when working through the analysis of our paper. Your proficiency in data-analysis 
is especially impressive, and I have learnt so much from just watching your work.  
Sebastian, thanks for keeping me caffeinated at all times. We worked on several projects 
together closely, which is testament of your generosity – you were willing to let me join in on 
some of your many good ideas.  
Verder wil ik graag een aantal mensen bedanken die over de jaren heen bijdrages hebben 
geleverd aan mijn werk, door het bieden van praktische ondersteuning of het lezen en 
becommentariëren van eerdere versies van de hoofdstukken in dit proefschrift. Ten eerste, 
 
dank aan Marcel en Christiaan van Erasmus Behavioral Lab, waar ik een groot deel van de 
experimenten heb uitgevoerd. Mijn dank gaat ook uit naar de beheerders van het Erasmus 
Research Participation System, waar ik voor het merendeel van mijn hoofdstukken 
deelnemers heb geworven. Onze secretaresse Liza dank ik voor haar hulp en het oppakken 
van dingen waar ik geen verstand van heb, zoals het boeken van vluchten, verzekeringen 
(voor vermiste koffers) en ga zo maar verder. Via deze weg bedank ik ook graag opnieuw de 
vele discussianten en vrijwilligers die mijn stukken lazen en van feedback voorzagen! 
Mijn grote dank gaat ook uit naar de groep Behavioral Economics, in het bijzonder naar Peter 
Wakker. Elke week mocht ik aansluiten bij jullie wekelijkse bijeenkomst waar een mix tussen 
nieuwe en klassieke papers werden gelezen en besproken. Ik heb me altijd onderdeel van 
jullie groep gevoeld, ondanks dat ik dit feitelijk niet ben. De inzichten die ik in aan deze 
bijeenkomsten heb ontleend zijn cruciaal geweest in mijn verdere vorming.  
Ik vervolg mijn dankwoord graag met het adresseren van hen die het promoveren moelijker 
maakten, maar wel leuker, gezelliger en uitdagender – zonder jullie had ik het nooit (zo snel) 
afgemaakt. 
Meg, Mariska en Friederike, het grootste deel van mijn promotietraject waren jullie mijn 
kamergenoten. Dank voor het tolereren van mijn rommelige bureau, slechte humor en hardop 
uitgesproken warrige gedachtegangen. Meg, thanks for being always being thoughtful, at 
times snarky and often sarcastic – and allowing me to practice my English all day long. 
Mariska, dank de gezelligheid! We hebben veel gelachen, onze vlucht uit de stromende regen 
richting het sportcafé in Boston was op dat gebied een hoogtepunt. Friederike, van een 
student in mijn eerste hoorcollege werd je mijn collega en kamergenoot. Je goede humeur 
deed me altijd goed en ik ben blij dat je nu bij RIVM een mooie nieuwe uitdaging kan 
aangaan! 
Ik heb daarnaast het geluk gehad om te mogen werken op de afdeling Health Economics in 
het midden van een grote groep uitzonderlijke wetenschappers en fijne collega’s, die de 
dagen op kantoor misschien niet productiever maar wel uit te houden maakten. Leander, voor 
vele borrels heb je me kunnen enthousiasmeren, zelfs tot in een wolkenkrabber in Boston. 
Jannis, thanks for teaching me how to play squash and for wiping the floor with me week 
after week until I did the same with you. I am very happy you wanted to be a paranimf at my 
defence! Pieter B., we werkten niet samen, maar tijdens de pauzes gaf je me een aantal keer 
carrière advies wat ik dankbaar ter harte heb genomen. Pieter van B., Feyenoord-supporter 
zijn was de afgelopen jaren vaak geen pretje, en gelukkig was ik niet de enige die op 
maandag vaak chagrijnig op werk kwam. Vivian, dank voor je zwarte humor, ik ben blij dat 
het aan het einde van onze promotietrajecten toch nog gelukt is samen een paper te schrijven. 
Judith, dankzij jou was ik gelukkig niet de enige ‘crazy cat person’ op de afdeling. Klas, 
thanks for advice on movies and series, and for stretching out lunch breaks to finish your 
enormous lunches. Job, dank voor de kansen en vrijheid die je me gaf in het ontwikkelen van 
de minor. Marianne and Igna, I feel lucky to have such accomplished colleagues present to 
ask for advice for the next steps of my career. 
Ik heb mijn promotietraject doorlopen met een grote groep andere promovendi. Maandelijks 
spraken we af ons werk in ontwikkeling te bespreken, en via deze bijeenkomsten heb ik de 
 
 
breedte van mijn vakgebied leren kennen. Thanks to all participants of these HE-junior 
meetings over the years, for giving insight into your work and providing your insights into 
mine: Joaquim, Linda, Jenny, Wally, Sara, Charlotte, Sebastian, Pugo, Sebastian, Marlies, 
Valerie, Samare, Friederike, Rita, Lisa, Jawa and Dilnoza. 
Ik ben ook veel dank verschuldigd aan Elly (en de EuroQol groep), door wiens hulp en advies 
het mij gelukt is om een aantal fondsen te bemachtigen die me in staat stellen blijven werken 
aan het begrijpen en verbeteren van de methodologie voor het waarderen van 
gezondheidstoestanden. Ik kijk erg uit naar de mogelijkheid om te kijken of een deel van de 
inhoud van dit proefschrift ook in de praktijk ingezet kan worden. 
Een grote eer was het om de belangen van promovendi te behartigen binnen onze faculteit 
met young-ESHPM. Timo, Eline, Mathilde en Marthe, wat ben ik trots op wat wij in een 
korte periode hebben kunnen organiseren en bereiken – en door dit met jullie te doen voelde 
het nooit als (hard) werken. 
Ik kan natuurlijk mijn teamgenoten, vrienden en trainers bij volleybalclub VollinGo de 
afgelopen jaren niet vergeten. In het bijzonder bedank ik Reinier, Frank, Erik en Gerard voor 
‘doen-we-er-nog-eentje?’ en de vele thuiswerkdagen op vrijdag.  
Timo, Michael en Maurice, dank voor jullie vriendschap over de jaren heen. Ik hoop dat jullie 
me nog vele jaren van mijn werk af houden. 
Om af te sluiten, mijn eeuwige dank en liefde gaan uit naar mijn familie. 
Papa, veel jongetjes willen wel worden zoals hun vader – en ik probeer het nog steeds. Je 
hebt me nooit aangemoedigd om de wetenschap in te gaan, dat was niet nodig, je bent mijn 
voorbeeld. Mam, jouw aanmoediging en onvoorwaardelijke trots maken alles wat ik bereikt 
heb nog mooier – en gaven me het vertrouwen in mezelf dat zo cruciaal was tijdens het 
promoveren. Rosa, als je me om hulp met statistiek vroeg voelde ik me altijd vereerd, ik ben 
heel blij dat we ook jouw afstuderen binnenkort kunnen vieren. Niels, veel dank dat je 
paranimf bij mijn verdediging wil zijn, ik kijk er naar uit om je in rokkostuum te zien. 
Lieve Ilse, jou bedanken is het moeilijkste van allemaal. Dank voor het delen van mijn hart 
en mijn thuis, voor je steun en toeverlaat, voor het zijn van een reden om hard te werken en 
gauw naar huis te komen. Jij bent mijn referentiepunt: ten opzichte van bij jou zijn is al het 
andere een verlies. 
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